Defendant's Discovery Abuse Results in Default Judgment of $8,000,000, Plus Fees

What do you do when a party to a lawsuit intentionally refuses to follow the rules?  One judge in Washington State knew what to do: the judge struck the defendant's answer, entered judgment for $8,000,000, and awarded attorneys' fees.  Last week the Washington Supreme Court had upheld the award.

The facts are almost impossible to summarize and readers are urged to review the opinion to learn the details.  The bottom line:

The court found (1) there was no agreement between the parties to limit discovery, (2) Hyundai falsely responded to Magaña's request for production and interrogatories, (3) Magaña was substantially prejudiced in preparing for trial, and (4) evidence was spoiled and forever lost. The trial court considered lesser sanctions but found that the only suitable remedy under the circumstances was a default judgment. Hyundai then appealed.

[Footnotes omitted.]

Here are some highlights from the opinion of the Washington Supreme Court:

 

A corporation must search all of its departments, not just its legal department, when a party requests information about other claims during discovery. Here Hyundai searched only its legal department. Hyundai's counsel told the trial court that in response to request for production 20, Hyundai's search "was limited to the records of the Hyundai legal department" and that "no effort was made to search beyond the legal department, as this would have taken an extensive computer search." CP at 5319. As the trial court correctly found, "[t]here is no legal basis for limiting a search for documents in response to a discovery request to those documents available in the corporate legal department. ... Hyundai had the obligation to diligently respond to Magaña's discovery requests about other similar incidents. It failed to do so by using its legal department as a shield. The trial court also found "Hyundai had the obligation not only to diligently and in good faith respond to discovery efforts, but to maintain a document retrieval system that would enable the corporation to respond to plaintiff's requests. Hyundai is a sophisticated multinational corporation, experienced in litigation." Id. Hyundai willfully and deliberately failed to comply with Magaña's discovery requests since Magaña's initial requests in 2000 and continued to do so.

...

Magaña's ability to prepare for trial was substantially prejudiced because of Hyundai's egregious actions during discovery. The Court of Appeals substituted its own discretion for the trial court's, which is inconsistent with the abuse of discretion standard. The record supports the findings of the trial court that Magaña was prejudiced in preparing for trial.

...

The record fully supports the trial court's other conclusions: there was no agreement between the parties to limit discovery,Hyundai's definition of "claims" was too narrow because Magaña's discovery request was broad, and the seats in the Hyundai Elantra were similar to the seats in the Hyundai Accent. These findings of fact also support the conclusion Hyundai willfully violated the discovery rules.

 

[Footnotes omitted.]

The case is Magana v. Hyundia Motor America, No.80922-4.(Wash. Nov. 25, 2009).  Read the opinion here.  Regular readers will recall that a Minnesota trial judge recently awarded millions of dollars in sanctions against a defendant railroad company and a Vermont trial judge recently awarded sanctions against a lawyer for the Roman Catholic Diocese when its lawyer violated a motion in limine.

 

Does Error of Counsel Justify Setting Aside a Default Judgment?

Not in the Seventh Circuit, it doesn't.   In Bakery Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc.,  No 08-1967 (7th Cir. June 29, 2009) the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to vacate a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).

The Court ruled as follows:

[W]e drew a clear line in United States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue, 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1994) when we said that “[t]he clients are principals, the attorney is an agent, and under the law of agency the principal is bound by his chosen agent’s deeds.” The rule is that all of the attorney’s misconduct (except in the cases where the act is outside the scope of employment or in cases of excusable neglect) becomes the problem of the client. See id. A lawyer who inexcusably neglects his client’s obligations does not present exceptional circumstances. See Williams, 890 F.2d at 996. Hinterlong’s actions, even with BMF’s purported diligence, do not fall within the exceptions to the rule and do not rise to the level of  'exceptional' to warrant such 'extraordinary' relief.

BMF’s beef is against Hinterlong, not the court’s ruling on the case. Deception of a client becomes the liability of the client’s attorney and not the client’s opponent. See  Tolliver, 786 F.2d at 319 (“Holding the client responsible for the lawyer’s deeds ensures that both clients and lawyers take care to comply. If the lawyer’s neglect protected the client from ill consequences, neglect would become all too common.”). Since clients must be held accountable for their attorney’s actions, it does not matter where the actions fall between 'mere negligence' and 'gross misconduct.' See 7108 West Grand Avenue, 15 F.3d at 635. 'Malpractice, gross or otherwise, may be a good reason to recover from the lawyer but does not justify prolonging litigation against the original adversary.'  Id. at 633. See United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1496 (7th Cir. 1989) ('It seems clear to us that the law in this circuit is that an attorney’s conduct must be imputed to his client in any context.') (emphasis in original).

Hinterlong was given lots of opportunities to file an answer on behalf of his client but failed to do so.  He apparently was not truthfully representing the status of the case to his client.

To be sure, this case has some outrageous facts.  But there is language here that could come back to haunt the lawyer who fails to answer a complaint because he or she thinks the judge will give them more time if the plaintiff lawyer files a motion for a default.