In a case where a former Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation Deputy Commissioner claimed defamation based on statements related to a sexual harassment investigation and his subsequent termination, the Court of Appeals ruled that the State’s motion to dismiss should not have been granted, and that the State had not yet met its burden of showing that the absolute executive privilege applied.
In Hill v. State of Tennessee, No. M2022-01749-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 10, 2025), the plaintiff was terminated from his position as Deputy Commissioner of a state department after an investigation into alleged sexual harassment claims. The initial incident that started the investigation centered on another state employee with whom the plaintiff discussed camping. The plaintiff had texted her information about a hike after an in-person conversation. This employee later commented to a co-worker that the plaintiff had a crush on her. According to plaintiff, this was said in jest, and the employee was not bothered by the plaintiff’s comments or texts. In fact, the plaintiff asserted in this suit that the employee was eventually discharged because she would not go along with the narrative that the plaintiff sexually harassed her.
Plaintiff asserted that the investigation into his alleged sexual harassment was a sham, and that the state employees who conducted the investigation knew he was innocent. He asserted that sexual harassment allegations were fabricated and known to be false, and that these false statements were distributed to the media.
Plaintiff filed a defamation claim with the Claims Commission, which granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission ruled that some of the statements complained of were time-barred, and that for those that were not time-barred, the plaintiff had failed to allege essential elements of his claim. The Claims Commission also ruled that any statements contained in the “Investigation Summary Memorandum” were protected by the absolute executive privilege. The Court of Appeals reversed these rulings.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Claims Commission “did not accept the allegations in the Complaint as true,” and the appellate court ultimately agreed. The Court noted that “[i]f even one allegedly defamatory statement survives as a viable claim, then the dismissal of [the plaintiff’s] complaint as a matter of law would be in error.” The parties did not dispute that the plaintiff was a public figure for the purpose of this claim, so to “establish a prima facie case of defamation…, the plaintiff must show that a party (1) published a statement, (2) concerning the plaintiff and that (3) the statement was made with actual malice, that is, either with knowledge that the statement was false and defaming or with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement.” (internal citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals first looked at the Investigation Summary Memorandum (“Memo”) created by the Department. Because the plaintiff alleged that state officials knew the allegations were false, and because the Memo stated that others corroborated the harassment allegations, which the plaintiff stated was known to be false, the Claims Commission erred in finding that this document did not “contain any purportedly false statements” as a matter of law. The plaintiff had sufficiently plead the elements of defamation.
The Claims Commission also found that the Memo was protected by the absolute executive privilege. The Tennessee Supreme Court has “adopted an absolute privilege from claims of defamation for cabinet-level executive officers who have made statements within the scope of their official duties.” (internal citation omitted). Subsequent cases have explored how far below cabinet-level officials this privilege may reach, although the matter has not been fully settled in Tennessee. In other jurisdictions, the “[p]rivilege has been extended to officials entrusted with administrative or executive policy-making responsibilities of considerable dimension, who bear the greatest burdens of government and must be insulated from the harassment and financial hazards that may accompany suits for damages by the victims of even malicious libels or slanders.” (internal citation omitted). In a Tennessee Court of Appeals case, the court stated that the immunity determination “hinged on an inquiry into whether executive officials formulated official policy at the state level.” (internal citation omitted).
Looking at this case, the Court found that there was nothing in the record showing the duties of the individual who drafted the Memo, and thus no facts to support granting him the absolute executive privilege. While the Court did not hold that the privilege could not apply here, it ruled that the Claims Commission incorrectly dismissed the case on this basis due to the lack of relevant facts in the record at this point.
The Court also found that the Commission erred by finding that the statements to a reporter were not capable of a defamatory meaning. A state employee confirmed to a reporter that the plaintiff was terminated after an investigation into workplace misconduct. While that may have technically been true, this statement was capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. The plaintiff asserted that the investigation was a sham and that the investigators knew the allegations were false. The statement to the reporter could reasonably be understood to mean “that there was a real investigation that confirmed that there was misconduct and that the misconduct was of sufficient seriousness that it was the reason [the plaintiff] was separated from employment.” Based on the allegations in the complaint, then, this statement could have conveyed a defamatory meaning.
Because the plaintiff adequately plead the elements of defamation and the State had not yet produced enough evidence to show that the absolute executive privilege applied, dismissal was reversed.
This opinion was released fourteen months after oral arguments.