Articles Posted in Defamation

A slander case based on a homeowner’s complaint filed with the Tennessee Board of Licensing Contractor dismissed under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”) was affirmed on appeal.

In Hampton v. Millsaps, No. M2024-01036-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2026), the plaintiff homeowners sued the defendant contractor after disputes arose surrounding home construction the defendant performed. The defendant filed a construction lien based on alleged nonpayment under the parties’ contract, which led the plaintiffs to file this action for invalid lien, breach of contract, and additional claims.

In response to the complaint, the defendant filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting a claim for slander against the plaintiff homeowners. The contractor asserted that the homeowners committed slander when they made allegedly false statements to the state licensing board. The homeowners filed a petition to dismiss the slander claim under the TPPA, which the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

In a case where a former Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation Deputy Commissioner claimed defamation based on statements related to a sexual harassment investigation and his subsequent termination, the Court of Appeals ruled that the State’s motion to dismiss should not have been granted, and that the State had not yet met its burden of showing that the absolute executive privilege applied.

In Hill v. State of Tennessee, No. M2022-01749-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 10, 2025), the plaintiff was terminated from his position as Deputy Commissioner of a state department after an investigation into alleged sexual harassment claims. The initial incident that started the investigation centered on another state employee with whom the plaintiff discussed camping. The plaintiff had texted her information about a hike after an in-person conversation. This employee later commented to a co-worker that the plaintiff had a crush on her. According to plaintiff, this was said in jest, and the employee was not bothered by the plaintiff’s comments or texts. In fact, the plaintiff asserted in this suit that the employee was eventually discharged because she would not go along with the narrative that the plaintiff sexually harassed her.

Plaintiff asserted that the investigation into his alleged sexual harassment was a sham, and that the state employees who conducted the investigation knew he was innocent. He asserted that sexual harassment allegations were fabricated and known to be false, and that these false statements were distributed to the media.

Where the defendant posted false information about a previous plea agreement involving the plaintiff on Facebook, a $75,000 verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.

In Austin v. Plese, No. E2024-00586-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2025), the plaintiff and the defendant were neighbors. During a disagreement, the defendant posted on Facebook about the plaintiff, including a statement that the plaintiff had been arrested in Texas for deadly conduct with a gun, and that the plaintiff had pleaded guilty to those charges. In reality, the plaintiff had plead guilty many years ago to a Texas statute entitled deadly conduct to reach a better deal in a DUI case.

The plaintiff filed this suit for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. The trial court found the statement about deadly conduct with a gun actionable, and it entered a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $95,100. On appeal, the $20,000 in reputational damages was vacated, but the judgment for the plaintiff was otherwise affirmed.

Where the Southern Baptist Convention sent a letter stating that a church “may employ an individual with an alleged history of abuse,” the letter named one employee, and the letter asked if the church had received “allegations of sexual misconduct involving” the employee, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply to require dismissal of the case. While the TPPA did apply to the case, the plaintiff employee met his burden of showing a prima facie case of defamation and the related torts alleged.

In Garner v. Southern Baptist Convention, No. E2024-00100-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2025), the plaintiff was a worship pastor at a church affiliated with defendant Southern Baptist Convention (“SBC”). He was also the music director at a Baptist school. The defendant did not exert control over churches affiliated with it, but it could determine whether a church was in “friendly cooperation” with the SBC. That process was controlled by the defendant’s Credentials Committee.

In December 2022, a member of the defendant’s Credentials Committee contacted the plaintiff’s church and stated that it would be sending a letter regarding one of the church’s employees. During subsequent conversations, the Credentials Committee revealed that the allegation involved the plaintiff and later revealed that it was “sexually related.”

TPPA dismissal of a defamation claim related to news stories about an orthodontic business was recently affirmed.

In SmileDirectClub, Inc. v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, No. M2021-01491-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2024), plaintiff teledentistry business offered teeth straightening services. The business model operated on minimal dentist/orthodontist involvement, and therefore cost significantly less than traditional braces. Defendant news organization published an online article and a television news story that included claims that some of plaintiff’s clients had experienced painful problems and suffered permanent damage. The news story asserted that employees told customers that the initial visit with a dentist was not required, and it discussed a confidentiality agreement required in order to obtain a refund from plaintiff.

Based on these print and television stories, plaintiff filed defamation and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) claims against defendant. Defendant filed a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), which the trial court granted. On appeal, dismissal was affirmed.

A real estate professional who served as HOA president and who assisted with the development of a residential community qualified as a limited public figure for purposes of a google review about changes to the development.

In Charles v. McQueen, No. M2021-00878-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. July 3, 2024), plaintiff worked as a local real estate professional. The company developing Durham Farms, a planned community, hired plaintiff to assist with the community development. In addition to working for Durham Farms, plaintiff served as the HOA president at Durham Farms and ran homeowners’ meetings.

Defendant purchased a home in Durham Farms in 2017. In the following years, Durham Farms changed several features of its community. Lot size requirements were reduced in 2019, then in 2020 Durham Farms announced plans to add over 160 rental-only units. After this announcement, controversy grew as homeowners opposed the new plans. As part of the opposition effort, several Durham Farms residents left google reviews on the developer’s page. Defendant wrote a google review expressing her frustration with the “bait and switch” tactics and the “multiple changes to our development.” Defendant’s review was the only one that used plaintiff’s name, as it stated: “Bill Charles, especially, uses misleading tactics to lure in home buyers only to deceive them.”

Where defendant moved to dismiss a defamation suit under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), and the trial court failed to take into account the third step of the TPPA burden-shifting framework which considers whether a defendant can establish a valid defense to the claims, the case was remanded for further consideration of the third step in the analysis.

In Pragnell v. Franklin, No. E2022-00524-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 18, 2023), plaintiffs filed a defamation suit against defendants, who were plaintiffs’ former employer. Plaintiffs were financial advisors, and when they left defendants’ company, SEC regulations required defendants to file a U5 form online as to plaintiffs’ departure. Plaintiffs asserted that the U5 forms initially filed by defendants stated that plaintiffs left the company voluntarily, but that after a dispute arose and plaintiffs filed suit against defendants in chancery court, defendants changed the U5 forms to state that plaintiffs were discharged for violating “client privacy rights, misrepresentation, and selling away.” Plaintiffs thus filed this defamation suit based on the statements in the revised U5 forms.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the TPPA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-101, et seq. Defendants argued that they were required to file the amended U5 forms upon discovering additional information about plaintiffs’ employment, that the statements contained therein were true, and that the case was subject to dismissal under the TPPA.

Where plaintiff asserted a defamation claim based on his car insurance company putting an “at fault designation” on a federally regulated database, summary judgment for defendant insurance company was affirmed.

Seely v. GEICO Advantage Insurance Company, No. M2021-01263-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2023) arose out of a dispute between an insured driver and his insurance company following a minor car accident. The insurance company determined that plaintiff driver was at fault, and it paid the claims from the injured party. Despite plaintiff’s assertion that the accident was caused by brake failure and his submission of receipts for brake work, GEICO put an “at fault designation” on plaintiff’s Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange (CLUE) report. Plaintiff’s premiums were thereafter raised.

In his complaint, plaintiff asserted several causes of actions, including one for defamation. Plaintiff alleged that “[b]y filing an erroneous entry in Plaintiffs’ CLUE reports GEICO damaged not only their driving records but affected their creditworthiness and good names.” Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the defamation claim, which the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

A plaintiff may take a voluntary nonsuit even after the defendant has filed a petition to dismiss under the TPPA, and a petition to dismiss under the TPPA does not survive after voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff and is not considered a counterclaim.

In Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), plaintiff filed suit against several defendants asserting claims for libel, intentional interference with business, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims were based on statements made by defendants about plaintiff through text messages and on social media regarding plaintiff’s role as the landlord of a duplex.

In response to the complaint, the two non-governmental defendants filed separate motions to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) and the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), Tennessee’s anti-SLAPP statute. While these motions were pending, plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal. The trial court dismissed the matter without prejudice pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01, and it held that “the TPPA was not excepted from the right to dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41.01.” On appeal, this ruling was affirmed.

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