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When a case that should have been filed with the Claims Commission was filed in circuit court and did not “pertain to the negligent operation or maintenance of any motor vehicle or any other…conveyance,” the trial court could not transfer the case to the Claims Commission and dismissal was affirmed.

In Powell v. Tennessee Department of Correction, No. M2018-01677-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 2019), plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in circuit court alleging that TDOC employees injured him “’by gross negligent acts or omissions within the scope of their employment’ in the handling of Plaintiff’s prison disciplinary hearing.” The trial court dismissed the case, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and it denied plaintiff’s request to transfer the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

“[A]s a general rule, claims for monetary damages against the State may be heard only by the Claims Commission.” (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)). Because plaintiff’s claims did not fall into any exception to this rule, the trial court correctly ruled that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

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An award for future medical expenses in a personal injury claim under Tennessee law may be appropriate even where the plaintiff does not establish with “absolute certainty” that the future treatment will be pursued, as the standard for such an award is “reasonable certainty.”

In Kirby v. Memphis Light Gas & Water, No. W2017-02390-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 29, 2019), plaintiff was in a car accident with one of defendant’s drivers. After a bench trial, the judge assigned plaintiff 30% of the fault and awarded him $105,000 in damages, which included an award for future medical expenses to cover a prospective surgery. On appeal, defendant argued that the award for future medical expenses was speculative, and that plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages by stopping treatment when he did. The Court of Appeals affirmed the damages award.

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An interesting article in The Atlantic about how the law came to treat corporations as people.

An excerpt:

Somewhat unintuitively, American corporations today enjoy many of the same rights as American citizens. Both, for instance, are entitled to the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion. How exactly did corporations come to be understood as “people” bestowed with the most fundamental constitutional rights? The answer can be found in a bizarre—even farcical—series of lawsuits over 130 years ago involving a lawyer who lied to the Supreme Court, an ethically challenged justice, and one of the most powerful corporations of the day.

 

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When an HCLA plaintiff decides to serve pre-suit notice via personal service, such service must actually be completed in accordance with the statute in order for the plaintiff to take advantage of the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations.

In Webb v. Magee, No. 2018-01305-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 30, 2019), plaintiffs had filed a previous healthcare liability claim under the HCLA against multiple parties, including Dr. Charles Roberson. Plaintiffs attempted to personally serve Dr. Roberson with pre-suit notice within the one-year statute of limitations, but service of the pre-suit notice was not actually completed until almost two months later. One week after Dr. Roberson received pre-suit notice, plaintiffs filed their initial suit.

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Where a plaintiff tripped on a crack in a parking lot that was 54 feet long and resulted in a height deviation of no more than 1.5 inches, the property owner owed no duty to plaintiff and summary judgment in a premises liability case was affirmed.

In Shaw v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, No. M2018-01157-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019), plaintiff was a school bus driver who was required to attend a training session at a local school. Plaintiff parked in a large parking lot at the school, and as she was walking to board a shuttle bus, she tripped on a crack in the pavement. The crack was 54 inches long and “amounted to a deviation of up to one and a half inches.”

Plaintiff filed a premises liability claim, alleging that “the parking lot existed in a state of disrepair and had been in such a state for a sufficient length of time that Metro knew or should have known of its dangerous condition.” Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff filed a motion to amend and add allegations of negligence per se. The trial court granted summary judgment, and on a first appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court improperly “neither ruled upon the pending motion to amend nor undertook analysis…in order to determine whether the sought amendment should have been granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01.” The case was accordingly remanded. On remand, the trial court granted the motion to amend and add negligence per se claims, but then again granted summary judgment to defendant on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Where a plaintiff continued to pursue a defamation case even after depositions revealed that the allegedly defamatory statements were only made to two of plaintiffs’ friends and the statements did not change their opinion of plaintiff, Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff were affirmed.

In McMillin v. Realty Executives Associates, Inc., No. E2018-00769-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 12, 2019), plaintiff asked two of his friends to contact a realtor and set up a showing of a home that was part of plaintiff’s mother’s estate. During the showing, the realtor stated that utilities had been turned off due to plaintiff removing money from the estate, that the potential buyers might not want to become involved with plaintiff because he had sued several people, that the house had plumbing issues, and that plaintiff had replaced expensive appliances with cheaper ones. Based on these statements, plaintiff brought this pro se defamation suit.

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Where a plaintiff claiming that he was sexually assaulted in a locker room failed to present any evidence that the “health club knew or should have known of prior assaults by the assailant or anyone else,” summary judgment for defendant health club was affirmed.

In Boswell v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Middle Tennessee, No. M2018-00180-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019), plaintiff claimed that he was sexually assaulted by Jack Dabney in the locker room at his local YMCA three times. Accordingly to plaintiff, Dabney first groped him in July 2015, at which time he left the facility and told no one. The second incident occurred one week later, at which time plaintiff reported the incident to the membership greeter. Plaintiff refused, however, to review video footage to identify the assailant, and instead wrote on a comment card that the YMCA should “put somebody inside the shower area to protect people from being sexually assaulted.” The third incident occurred seven months later. At that time, plaintiff told the YMCA executive director, and a male staff member went into the locker room with plaintiff and Dabney was identified. An investigation began, but plaintiff failed to return a phone message or email sent from the director regarding the matter. Although plaintiff did not supply additional information, Dabney’s membership was eventually revoked.

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A plaintiff’s claim that the city had a duty to protect her against a dog owned by another citizen fell under the public duty doctrine, and summary judgment for defendant city was thus affirmed.

In Fleming v. City of Memphis, No. W2018-00984-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2019), plaintiff filed suit against defendant city after she was attacked and mauled by a dog owned by a private citizen. Plaintiff alleged that the city “had actual prior notice of this dog’s vicious propensities” based on two prior attacks by the same dog. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the public duty doctrine, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

It was undisputed that the GTLA did not provide the City immunity in this case. After the dog bite preceding the attack on plaintiff, an animal control worker “did not believe there were grounds upon which [to seek] a petition to declare the dog dangerous and vicious under City ordinance,” and this decision by the government worker was determined to be operational. The issues raised by plaintiff, then, were “1) whether the GTLA supersedes the public duty doctrine; and 2) if the public duty doctrine survives, whether the trial court erred in finding that it applie[d]” here.

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In order to bring a direct claim against a plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier, the plaintiff must have filed his initial complaint against the uninsured motorist (or “John Doe” if unknown) within the one-year statute of limitations.

In Fults v. MetLife Auto & Home Insurance Agency, Inc., No. M2018-00647-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 7, 2019), plaintiff was injured in a hit-and-run car accident on November 16, 2015, and the other driver was never identified. Plaintiff filed suit, naming his uninsured motorist carrier as defendant, on July 14, 2017. Defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was barred “on the ground that the complaint did not name or contain allegations against a “John Doe” driver, that no summons had been issued against “John Doe”…, and that the statute of limitations…would prevent John Doe from being named as a defendant.” Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint and add John Doe, but the trial court denied the motion to amend and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Where the Claims Commissioner’s ruling for defendant on a negligence suit did not include conclusions of law regarding both of plaintiffs’ theories, the order of dismissal was deemed deficient and was vacated by the Court of Appeals.

In Kim v. State, No. W2018-00762-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019), plaintiffs filed a negligence claim after their six-year-old son fell from a fifth-floor balcony at a state-owned hotel. Plaintiffs were guests of the hotel as part of a church group, and while checking out, the son became separated from his parents. The son went upstairs to the room that plaintiffs had been staying in, and despite having already been cleaned, the door to the room was ajar. The son entered the room, went onto the balcony, climbed on top of the railing, and ultimately fell, sustaining major injuries. Testimony at trial established that it was both hotel and industry policy for a housekeeper to ensure that the door to a hotel room was locked after it had been cleaned, and it was undisputed that the son could not have gained access to the room if it had been locked. It was further established that the housekeeper who cleaned this particular room “had previously been reprimanded for neglecting to secure a room after cleaning it.”

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