Day on Torts

June 26, 2026

Premises liability summary judgment based on superior knowledge of plaintiff vacated.

Summary judgment for the defendant store in a premises liability case was vacated where the trial court did not “engage in an analysis of foreseeability and the gravity of harm to determine whether a duty was owed.”

In Coblentz v. Tractor Supply Company, No. M2023-00249-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2026), the plaintiff worked for a retailer who sold products in the defendant store. The plaintiff’s job included visiting various stores where his employer’s product was sold, and he typically visited each store every four to six weeks. While at a store, the plaintiff would look for any issues with the display and stock the product, among other responsibilities.

The display at defendant store was a track and hanger rack with barn door tracks. These displays had fallen and caused injuries in other stores, and the plaintiff’s employer had accordingly implemented a safety bar design to be added to the displays by the store chain. While the plaintiff was visiting the defendant store and standing near the display, a track fell on him, causing a head injury. Two store employees responded to the incident, and neither of them saw a safety bar on the floor.

June 24, 2026

Negligent hiring claim against broker of interstate transportation was not preempted by FAAA.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A negligent hiring claim against a logistics broker who hired a trucking company to perform the interstate transport of goods was not preempted by federal law.

In Montgomery v. Caribe Transportation II LLC, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2036, — U.S. — (May 14, 2026), the plaintiff was a truck driver who was injured when his truck was struck by another truck that was hauling a load of plastic pots through Illinois. The truck that injured plaintiff was being operated by Caribe Transport. The defendant at issue in this appeal was the transportation broker who hired Caribe Transport and coordinated the shipment.

The plaintiff filed a negligent hiring claim against the transportation broker, arguing that due to Caribe Transport’s safety rating from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the broker “knew (or should have known) that choosing Caribe Transport to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others.” The district court and Seventh Circuit held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAA”) preempted the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.

June 24, 2026

Case management order established written permission to file amended answer.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A personal injury plaintiff was allowed to amend his complaint and assert a claim against a new defendant well after the statute of limitations ran when the original defendant had written consent to file a new answer, and that new answer included allegations against the new defendant.

In Johnson v. Airtight Resources Inc., No. M2023-01336-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2026) (memorandum opinion), the plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Airtight after he fell through a second floor garage door at his mother’s home. Airtight answered the complaint by alleging that an unknown defendant fraudulently obtained a permit to do the door work in its name.

In May 2021, well after the one-year statute of limitations had run, the parties held a case management conference. During that conference, an order was drafted indicating that Airtight intended to file an amended answer naming Phillip Taylor (“Taylor”) as a responsible party. Counsel for all parties signed this order, and soon thereafter the amended answer was filed. Within five days, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Taylor as a defendant. Taylor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Airtight did not have permission to file an amended pleading, and therefore the statutory grace period for adding a new party under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 was not triggered. The trial court agreed and granted dismissal, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

June 22, 2026

Plaintiff not entitled to pursue claim directly against UM insurance carrier.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In a car accident case, where the plaintiff’s summons to the other driver was returned with a note from the process server stating that the defendant was “avoiding service/said he would not cooperate,” the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed directly against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier.

In Urquia v. Seal, No. W2024-01842-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2026), the plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against the defendant following a car accident. The summons to the defendant was returned, stamped “NOT TO BE FOUND AFTER DILIGENT SEARCH AND INQUIRY.” In addition to this stamp, the process server hand wrote on the summons that the defendant was “avoiding service/ said he would not cooperate.”

The plaintiff did not make any further attempt to serve the defendant. When the one-year statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant ran, the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff was “unable to proceed against it directly as the uninsured motorist insurance carrier because the action had not been properly commenced against the uninsured motorist.” After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

June 18, 2026

HCLA dismissal based on insufficient HIPAA authorizations affirmed.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a HIPAA authorization only allowed the healthcare professionals to release records, not to obtain them, the Plaintiff had failed to substantially comply with the HCLA and dismissal was affirmed.

In Moxley v. AMISUB SHF Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, No. W2025-00443-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2026) (memorandum opinion), the plaintiff filed a health care liability suit against the defendants based on alleged medical negligence during her cancer treatment. The plaintiff had sent pre-suit notice to twelve possible defendants, but the HIPAA authorizations included with those pre-suit notices only stated that the receiving entity could release records to certain other entities. The HIPAA authorizations did not contain any language “stating that [the defendants] could ‘obtain’ any medical records.”

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff failed to comply with the HCLA requirements found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. On this third appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal based on the insufficient HIPAA authorizations.

June 16, 2026

TPPA petition denied where business letter was not protected by First Amendment.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

An email from a music publisher to a license company requesting that royalties from certain songs be credited to the publisher did not fall within the protections of the U.S. Constitution, and the Tennessee Public Protection Act therefore did not apply.

In 4U2ASKY Entertainment, Inc. v. Offor, No. M2023-00238-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2026), the plaintiff music publisher sued the defendant musician for breach of contract. After lengthy litigation, the musician eventually filed for bankruptcy, which prompted the negotiation of an agreed order stating that the publisher had all right and title to music created by the musician from August 18, 2015, through December 15, 2017.

The publisher subsequently sent a letter to a licensing company stating that it owned “100%…rights in the songs written…, performed, etc., of Blessing Offor…” The publisher attached the agreed order to this letter. The musician, however, provided the licensing company a list of the songs that were actually included within the time limitations of the agreed order. The licensing company wrote back to the publisher expressing concerns with its earlier communication and stating that only the songs identified by the musician would be transferred to the publisher’s ownership.

June 16, 2026

Recreational Use Statute applied when plaintiff fell on sidewalk while camping.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Dismissal based on the Recreational Use Statute was affirmed where the plaintiff tripped on an uneven sidewalk while camping at a state park.

In Thompson v. State of Tennessee, No. M2025-00518-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2026), the plaintiff went to a state park to camp for the weekend. While walking on a sidewalk to the bathroom, the plaintiff tripped. The sidewalk was later determined to be uneven with the road at an intersection. According to a park ranger, the area had previously been painted yellow but the paint had faded.

The plaintiff filed this premises liability case with the Claims Commission, and the state filed a motion to dismiss based on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (TRUS). The Claims Commission found that the TRUS applied and granted dismissal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

May 12, 2026

TPPA dismissal affirmed where Plaintiff offered no evidence.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Dismissal under the TPPA was affirmed where the plaintiff did not attempt to establish a prima facie case after the TPPA petition to dismiss was filed.

In Secure Air Charter, LLC v. Barrett, No. M2025-00312-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2026), the defendant filed reports with the FAA after being terminated by the plaintiff. Based on these filings, the plaintiff filed this case against the defendant, asserting claims for tortious interference with business relationships.

The defendant filed a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The defendant argued that his filing of the FAA reports constituted him exercising his right to petition and right to free speech, so the TPPA applied. The defendant attached his own declaration to the petition, which stated that he filed the reports “to encourage review of an issue by a federal governmental body, and in the hopes of protecting the public.” In response to this petition, the plaintiff did not present any evidence or attempt to make a prima facie case. Instead, the plaintiff argued that the declaration was inadmissible and filed a motion to amend its complaint to instead assert a breach of contract claim.

May 7, 2026

Dismissal due to failure to file certificate of good faith affirmed.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a Tennessee HCLA complaint was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to file a certificate of good faith with her first complaint and the certificate of good faith filed with her amended complaint was not sufficient, but the plaintiff only addressed one ground in her appeal, dismissal was affirmed.

In Moses v. State of Tennessee, No. W2025-00386-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026), the plaintiff filed a pro se HCLA claim against the state after experiencing complications after a root canal. When the plaintiff filed her initial complaint with the Claims Commission, she failed to file a certificate of good faith. After the state filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and included a certificate of good faith. The plaintiff asserted that “her amended complaint cured any issues related to her original failure to file a certificate of good faith.” The state then filed a motion to strike the amended complaint and certificate of good faith, as well as a brief in support of its motion to dismiss.

The Claims Commission granted the motion to dismiss, finding that 1) the plaintiff failed to file a certificate of good faith with her original complaint as required in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 or to file a “properly supported motion for an extension of time,” and 2) that the certificate filed with her amended complaint was insufficient under the HCLA, as it “merely stated that [the plaintiff] had consultations with experts, and…she failed to identify individual defendants in the certificate.” Dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

May 5, 2026

Tennessee “Litigation Privilege” applied to statements made to opposing counsel in divorce case.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a lawyer made reasonable arguments within the context of a divorce case, the litigation privilege barred claims against her based on those arguments.

In Missel v. Larkins, No. E2025-00419-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2026), the plaintiff inadvertently included his son and daughter-in-law on a deed for a home in which all the parties lived. By the time this deed error was discovered, the son and daughter-in-law were involved in divorce proceedings, in which the defendant attorney represented the daughter-in-law.

At some point, the daughter-in-law gave a sworn statement that she did not own any real property. The inclusion of her name on the deed was later discovered, and defendant attorney communicated to the son’s attorney that the daughter-in-law could not sign a quitclaim deed for the property, as such a transfer of property could violate the temporary injunction against the transfer of any marital property.