In a negligence case, a brief reference to the lottery during opening statements and an unintentional mention of employment benefits that paid partial wages during the plaintiff’s time off work were not enough to require overturning the jury verdict for defendant.

In Campbell v. T.C. Restaurant Group, LLC, No. M2024-00362-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2025), the plaintiff filed a negligence claim against a musician and the bar at which he performed. When the musician did a birthday shoutout on stage, the plaintiff climbed onto the stage. The plaintiff stated that the musician grabbed her, spun her around, and then dropped her off the stage. The musician testified that he tried to guide the plaintiff off the stage, but she was drunk and stepped off the stage, causing her to fall. The plaintiff hit her head and was diagnosed with a concussion several days later. At trial, the plaintiff’s credibility was called into question when her testimony regarding her medical status appeared to conflict with online videos that had been posted showing her dancing.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding that the musician was not at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, citing two errors: 1) a reference during opening statements that the plaintiff hoped to be “a lottery lawsuit winner,” and 2) an alleged violation of the collateral source rule. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict.

Because the HIPAA authorizations included with a health care liability plaintiff’s pre-suit notice included limiting language, the authorizations did not comply with the HCLA and thus plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims were dismissed.

In Curtis v. Sharp, No. E2023-01583-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2025), the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice of a her HCLA suit to five health care providers. This notice included HIPAA authorizations. The HIPAA authorizations sent by the plaintiff including the following limiting language: “Any conferences, formal or informal, of any type or oral communication with [the provider receiving the authorization], or any of [his/her/its] representatives is absolutely forbidden.”

The plaintiff filed her HCLA complaint against three of the providers. Although the plaintiff attached the pre-suit notice materials to her complaint, she failed to attach the HIPAA authorization sent to one of the defendants. That HIPAA authorization was subsequently filed as a Late Filed Authorization. The plaintiff eventually voluntarily dismissed this original suit and refiled pursuant to the savings statute. The second set of HIPAA authorizations contained the same limiting language as the first. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply with the HCLA by sending faulty HIPAA authorizations and failing to attach one HIPAA authorization to the original complaint. The defendants argued that because of these errors, the plaintiff was not entitled to the 120-day statute of limitations exception granted by the HCLA, making the original suit untimely. The trial court agreed with both of the defendants’ arguments and found that because the original suit was time-barred, this second complaint should be dismissed. On appeal, this ruling was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

When an amended answer asserted comparative fault against the city, which had previously been a party but had been voluntarily dismissed before the amended answer was filed, the plaintiff was allowed to add the city as a defendant within ninety days of the comparative fault allegation under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119.

In Sands v. Williard, No. W2024-00772-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2025), the plaintiff filed suit against both the city and homeowners after she tripped on a sidewalk in front of the homeowners’ property. The city raised an issue about service of process in its initial answer. In their initial answer, the homeowners admitted to two paragraphs stating that the city had a duty, but there was no other allegation of comparative fault.

The city eventually filed a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, asserting that it was not properly served and, thus, the limitations period had run. While this motion was pending, the homeowners moved to amend their answer to assert comparative fault against the city. The plaintiff then moved to voluntarily dismiss her claim against the city. The plaintiff explained in her motion that “the purpose of the dismissal was to avoid the alleged outstanding service issues” and that she intended to rely on Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 to bring the city back into the suit after the homeowners filed their amended answer. The trial court granted the voluntary dismissal, and it allowed the plaintiff to bring the city back into the suit after the homeowners’ amended answer asserted comparative fault against the city.

The 120-day extension of the statute of limitations granted to health care liability plaintiffs who give proper pre-suit notice under the HCLA does not apply to or extend the Saving Statute.

The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the interplay between pre-suit notice, the 120-day statute of limitations extension, and the Saving Statute in Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, No. M2022-00597-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2025). The plaintiff had filed an HCLA suit against the defendant after giving proper pre-suit notice under the statute. When filing his first case, the plaintiff utilized the 120-day extension of the limitations period granted by the HCLA. The plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit in the first case, and subsequently refiled his case pursuant to Tennessee’s Saving Statute, which allows certain cases to be refiled within a year of the dismissal. The second complaint was filed more than a year after the voluntary dismissal, but the plaintiff argued that because he gave pre-suit notice, he was entitled to the 120-day extension pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c).

The trial court dismissed the refiled complaint, holding that it was time-barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal based on the statute of limitations. In this opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 120-day extension granted by the HCLA does not apply to extend the Saving Statute.

Where the Southern Baptist Convention sent a letter stating that a church “may employ an individual with an alleged history of abuse,” the letter named one employee, and the letter asked if the church had received “allegations of sexual misconduct involving” the employee, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply to require dismissal of the case. While the TPPA did apply to the case, the plaintiff employee met his burden of showing a prima facie case of defamation and the related torts alleged.

In Garner v. Southern Baptist Convention, No. E2024-00100-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2025), the plaintiff was a worship pastor at a church affiliated with defendant Southern Baptist Convention (“SBC”). He was also the music director at a Baptist school. The defendant did not exert control over churches affiliated with it, but it could determine whether a church was in “friendly cooperation” with the SBC. That process was controlled by the defendant’s Credentials Committee.

In December 2022, a member of the defendant’s Credentials Committee contacted the plaintiff’s church and stated that it would be sending a letter regarding one of the church’s employees. During subsequent conversations, the Credentials Committee revealed that the allegation involved the plaintiff and later revealed that it was “sexually related.”

In a case about the demise of a family business, the Court of Appeals reversed trial court rulings for the plaintiff on tort claims of intentional interference with business relationships and conversion.

In Grubb v. Grubb, No. E2023-01358-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2025), the plaintiff and the defendant were brothers who ran several companies as a family business before their relationship deteriorated. The plaintiff eventually sued the defendant for breach of contract, intentional interference with business relationships, conversion, and other claims. The trial court credited the plaintiff’s testimony that the brothers had an oral agreement. It awarded the plaintiff approximately $2.25 million in damages plus attorneys’ fees and ordered the redistribution of certain companies. On appeal, the verdict for the plaintiff was reversed.

After reversing the finding that the brothers had an express oral agreement, the Court also reversed the finding for the plaintiff on both tort claims. Noting the elements of an intentional interference with business relationships claim, the Court stated that the trial court found that the plaintiff “proved [the defendant’s] improper motive and improper means as [the defendant] maliciously harmed [the plaintiff] and misused his position of control over the LLCs to effectuate the interference.” But while the trial court focused on ways the defendant pushed the plaintiff out of the business, such as asking employees not to talk to him and keeping him from getting equal pay, the Court of Appeals pointed out the plaintiff continued to have “opportunities to do business with the jointly owned companies.”

The Tennessee Supreme Court recently affirmed a premises liability judgment for the plaintiff based on an apartment complex failing to maintain a pedestrian bridge properly.

In Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP, No. M2021-01511-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. Jan. 8, 2025), the plaintiff was a tenant in the defendant’s apartment building. The plaintiff often used a wooden pedestrian bridge when traveling to and from the apartment fitness center. On the day of the plaintiff’s injury, it had rained the night before and was possibly still drizzling. The plaintiff attempted to cross the bridge after his workout when he slipped and fell. The plaintiff described the slippery substance that caused his fall as “slimy but clear” and “obviously not just water.” The plaintiff could not get up, even with the assistance of a maintenance employee, so an ambulance was called. The plaintiff suffered significant injuries to his left quadriceps tendon. The plaintiff required two surgeries, neither of which was successful, and he was left with permanent disability from the incident.

The plaintiff filed a premises liability suit against the defendant apartment owner, and the trial court ruled in the plaintiff’s favor. At trial, the plaintiff offered his own testimony as well as that of an expert. The plaintiff’s expert testified that, because the bridge was built with treated lumber, it would become slick if it was not maintained. Representatives from the defendant testified that there had been no previous issue with the bridge and that the premises had been inspected six days earlier. These representatives also stated that the company policy was to pressure wash communal areas such as the bridge once a year, but that there was no evidence this bridge had been pressure washed in the year preceding the plaintiff’s fall. The trial court found that the plaintiff had proven his negligence case, but it did assign the plaintiff 15% of the fault for the incident. The trial court awarded the plaintiff over $2 million in damages.

Where the trial court found the plaintiff more credible in a bench trial surrounding a pedestrian accident, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals opinion overturning a finding for the plaintiff on her negligence claim. The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the negligence ruling, but it vacated the allocation of fault and award of damages for recalculation.

In a memorandum opinion in Easley v. City of Memphis, No. W2023-00437-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2025) (memorandum opinion), the Court of Appeals affirmed a negligence ruling it had previously overturned. The case involved a pedestrian injury, where the plaintiff was hit by a truck while crossing the street in the middle of the block. The truck was owned by the city and driven by a city employee. The nearest intersection had a crosswalk and was about forty feet away, but the plaintiff did not use the crosswalk.

During a bench trial, the plaintiff testified that the driver had stopped to allow a group of pedestrians to pass, but when she got to the middle of the truck, the truck moved forward and hit her. She also stated that the driver was on the phone and distracted. The driver, on the other hand, testified that he was stopped behind two other cars at an intersection. According to the driver, he began moving forward when the car in front of him moved forward, and the plaintiff stepped suddenly into his path.

Where the seller of real property was found not liable for negligent misrepresentation, the trial court’s finding of liability for negligence was reversed, as “a seller’s liability for the failure to disclose such material facts in a real estate transaction is coextensive with a party’s liability for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.” (internal citation omitted).

In Baker v. Baskin, No. M2023-00433-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2024), the plaintiffs purchased a home from the defendants, who were husband and wife. The defendants had lived in the home for thirty-two years. Seven months before the sale, defendant husband noticed a dip in the ground while mowing. He investigated and found a small hole near a bush. The husband believed this hole was likely caused by the decayed roots of a tree he had previously removed. The husband filled the hole with two four-by-four posts, placed topsoil and a topsoil bag on top of it, then covered the area with soil and grass. In the months between finding the hole and closing the sale, the husband did not notice any additional problems despite riding his heavy lawn mower over the area many times. It was undisputed that the husband did not tell his wife about the hole.

The defendants did not disclose this hole in the documents related to the real estate sale. They also marked no on questions related to sinkholes or other soil problems. The contract the parties negotiated included an “as is” provision, and the plaintiff buyers signed a disclosure recommending a geotechnical engineer.

The following graphs demonstrate the resolution of personal injury, wrongful death, and other tort cases in Pickett County, Tennessee during the last six fiscal years ending June 30, 2023.

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