Articles Posted in Medical Negligence

Our office is fortunate to be sought out in a large number of Tennessee medical malpractice cases involving cancer.   Most of the cases involve a delay in the diagnosis of cancer, that is, that the patient presented with certain symptoms or physical findings that should have triggered a diagnosis of cancer earlier than the cancer was actually diagnosed.

Our internal review of these cases often cause us to conclude that the health care provider failed to properly and / or promptly respond the the patient’s complaints, condition and symptoms.  Where we often get hung up, however, is what lawyers causally call the "so what?" question.  In other words, even if we can establish that an error was made, how did the delay in diagnosis (and the start of treatment) harm the patient?

We know, or at least think we know, that prompt treatment is good and delayed treatment is bad.  Prompt treatment cannot start without prompt diagnosis.  Thus, the thought goes, a delay in diagnosis always harms the patient because treatment was by definition delayed.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court’s decision to grant an extension to file certificate of good faith in a medical malpractice case,  finding “good cause” based on parties’ confusion on Tennessee case law. 

In Stovall v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC , No. W2013-01504-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 22, 2014), the Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected defendant medical providers’ attempts to dismiss plaintiff’s medical malpractice suit for failure to strictly comply with the certificate of good faith requirements set forth in Tennessee’s health care liability act.

In December 2010, Mrs. Stovall filed a medical malpractice suit against defendants for allegedly causing the death of her husband. A certificate of good faith was filed with the complaint, as required by Tenn. Code. Ann. §29-26-122(d)(4). That statute states that “the certificate of good faith shall disclose the number of prior violations of this section by the executing party.” Here, however, the certificate attached to the complaint did not assert that Mrs. Stovall’s counsel had no prior violations of the good faith certificate statute.

In Tennessee, before a plaintiff may file a lawsuit for medical malpractice, he or she must give pre-suit notice to the defendants in compliance with a Tennessee statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). 

In Potter v. Perrigan, the Court of Appeals recently addressed whether a plaintiff who properly gives notice and files a medical negligence lawsuit but later voluntarily dismisses the lawsuit must give notice again before re-filing the case. In Potter, the trial court dismissed the second lawsuit finding the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement of pre-suit notice since the plaintiff did not give notice a second time before re-filing the lawsuit.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court finding that the applicable notice statute required notice sixty days in advance of the filing of a lawsuit and that plaintiff gave notice more than sixty days prior to filing the suit the second time when the plaintiff gave notice before the initial filing of the case. The Court of Appeals noted that the second lawsuit asserted the same cause of action against the same defendants. 

The recent case of  Payne v. Tipton County gave the Tennessee Court of Appeals the opportunity to review the finding of the trial court of no liability on the part of the defendant, Tipton County, for failure to provide appropriate and timely medical care to an inmate.  The inmate suffered a severe hypertensive crisis while in custody of the county,  leading to renal failure, a stroke, heart attack, hemorrhage on his brain, anemia, seizures, kidney failure, and other conditions and resulting in a 45-day hospital admission.

The inmate appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the trial court. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals addressed what duty was owed to the inmate by Tipton County. The court noted that under Tennessee law prison officials have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of those in their custody, but that they are not insurers of a prisoner’s safety. Instead, prison officials must act reasonably in light of the inmate’s known condition. The court went on to discuss the duty of a prison to provide inmates with access to proper medical treatment.

The court reviewed the evidence and testimony presented at trial and found that the County failed to provide the inmate with appropriate medical care and failed to follow its own procedures with regard to providing the inmate with medical care. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that Tipton County breached its duty to provide proper medical treatment during the inmate’s confinement by:

This is yet another Tennessee medical malpractice (health care liability) notice case and the issue is whether strict compliance is required for T.C.A. § 29-26-121 (a)(3) and (4), which requires an affidavit from the party mailing the notice. The underlying procedural facts were not in dispute: plaintiff fully and strictly complied with the pre-suit notice provisions of T.C.A. § 29-26-121(a) but failed to simultaneously file an affidavit of the party mailing the pre-suit notice. Instead, the plaintiff filed it after the notice was given and before the defendants filed any responsive pleading. In response, the defendants filed a “gotcha” motion to dismiss arguing the failure to simultaneously file the affidavit required a dismissal of the case.

The trial court disagreed noting the error had been remedied prior to the defendants filing a responsive pleading and ultimately finding the plaintiff had complied with the notice provision of the Act. An interlocutory appeal was granted pursuant to Rule 10 and the Court of Appeals made quick work of the issue relying on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., No. M2012-00582-SC-SO9-CV, 2013 WL 61580000.

In Stevens, the Tennessee Supreme Court had been asked to decide whether strict compliance was required with T.C.A. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) (the HIPPA compliant medical authorization section of the Act). Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that substantial compliance rather than strict compliance was all that was required for that particular section because the provision was non-substantive and no prejudice had befallen the defendants as a result of the non-compliance.

Long story short, Givens v. Vanderbilt Univ. M2013-00226-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2014), is a medical malpractice case that was dismissed without prejudice for failure to give pre-suit notice, since that is the appropriate remedy identified by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care, Inc., – S.W.3d –, 2013 WL 6158000 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 2013).

Because Plaintiffs did not make any attempt to give pre-suit notice, the Court of Appeals rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the failure to give notice should be excused for extraordinary cause under Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 29-26-121(b). Plaintiffs previously used their savings statute by way of a voluntary nonsuit in the case, so the Court of Appeals acknowledged that dismissal without prejudice effectively makes the case time-barred.

The longer version is a painful tour down civil and appellate procedure, with multiple cases, dismissals, appeals, and remands. Suffice it to say that (based on prior appellate opinions applied to this case):

Tennessee health care liability (formerly called medical malpractice) cases are tough.  Tough because there is lots of sympathy for the defendant health care providers.  Tough because the defendants spare no expense and thus they are expensive for patients to try.  Tough because the health care providers hire excellent lawyers.  Tough because rarely does a jury verdict end the case – there is almost always an appeal.

The case of Cullum v. Baptist Hospital System, Inc., M2012-02640-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 576012 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2014).has been tried three times and each of the three times the verdict has been set aside and a new trial ordered.  In the most recent trial, the jury returned a verdict of $7,974,505 against the defendants and the defendants appealed raising a number of evidentiary issues.  The Court of Appeals decided two of them.

First, the trial court refused to allow the defendants to play a video of their expert’s testimony from the previous trial.  Doctors are exempt from subpoena to trial under a Tennessee statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-9-101.  However, the trial court made a distinction between a treating doctor and a doctor testifying as an expert witness at trial, and ordered that the doctor was not exempt from trial and that he must testify live or not testify at all. 

On November, 9, 2009, plaintiff was an emergency room nurse at Erlanger Hospital. During her shift, a certified nurse anesthetist employed by the defendant was administering anesthesia to a patient. Near the end of the procedure, the patient awoke prematurely and was agitated. The patient tried to extubate herself and rise from the table. Plaintiff noticed the situation and lunged toward the patient in an attempt to save her from falling and otherwise injuring herself. As a result, plaintiff sustained a back injury. So, it was not the patient bringing the healthcare liability claim, but a third-party nurse working nearby.

On September 27, 2010, plaintiff sent defendant a notice of intent to sue letter pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-26-121, and the return receipt was dated September 30, 2010.   Only 38 days after the notice of intent letter was sent, plaintiff filed her complaint.  Two and a half years later, defendant moved for summary judgment alleging plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice requirements of T.C.A. § 29-26-121.   Specifically, plaintiff had filed her suit less than 60 days after sending the notice of intent to sue. Plaintiff did not dispute her non-compliance with the notice provision but responded by claiming the defendant had waived the defense of failure to comply with T.C.A. § 29-26-121 by failing to timely raise it.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff renewed the waiver argument and also claimed T.C.A. § 29-26-121 conflicted with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 18.01, Joinder of Claims (A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, in contract or tort, as the party has against an opposing party.)