Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

The sellers of a home were not required to disclose a condition of the home that was apparent through common observation, and their failure to do so did not support a claim of intentional misrepresentation.  Part of the claims were lost because the plaintiffs failed to properly respond to a Rule 56.03 statement of undisputed material facts served by defendants.

In McDaniel v. Frazier, No. W2025-00183-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2025), the plaintiffs purchased a home from the defendants without first visiting or viewing the home. Before closing on the home, the defendants completed a disclosure statement affirming that they were not aware of any material defects. The plaintiff buyers hired a home inspector, who provided a report that mentioned minor defects, fogged windowpanes, and a moisture stain in the ceiling. The home inspector recommended routine maintenance on the wood, but the plaintiff buyers did not ask any additional questions after receiving the inspection. When the plaintiff buyers eventually went to the property after closing, they discovered “rotting exterior siding, rotting windows, [and] rotting doorframes” that they asserted were “readily apparent” at the home.

The plaintiff buyers filed this suit asserting claims against several parties, including a claim for intentional misrepresentation against the defendant sellers. The trial court dismissed this claim on summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Where a patient signed a consent form for a double mastectomy after being told about multiple options for treating her breast cancer, summary judgment on her HCLA claim against the surgeon based on surgical overtreatment and lack of informed consent was affirmed.

In Oakes v. Fox, No. E2024-00453-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2025), the plaintiff patient was diagnosed with early-stage breast cancer and met with defendant surgeon to discuss treatment options. According to the defendant and the notes in the plaintiff’s file, the defendant discussed multiple options with the plaintiff, including a lumpectomy and a double mastectomy. The parties agreed that the plaintiff asked the surgeon what he would choose for his wife, and he responded that he would choose the double mastectomy. The plaintiff expressed a desire to avoid radiation treatment, which the doctor informed her could likely be avoided with the mastectomy. The plaintiff chose to move forward with the double mastectomy.

On the day of the surgery, the plaintiff signed a consent form stating that she expressly consented to the double mastectomy and the removal of lymph nodes. A few months after the surgery, the plaintiff experienced lymphedema. She opted to undergo an elective revision surgery with a different doctor.

Where a Florida general contractor allegedly used a fraudulent invoice to defraud a Tennessee company, the Court of Appeals ruled that Tennessee could exercise personal jurisdiction over the general contractor for the plaintiffs’ tort claims.

In Hannah Development, LLC v. Maverick General Contractors, LLC, No. M2024-01592-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 21, 2025), the plaintiff, a Tennessee company, had worked with the defendants, a Florida general contractor and its principal, on two homebuilding projects. The homes were built in Florida. During the construction of the homes, the defendants sent an invoice to the plaintiff that included a charge for the painting of the defendant principal’s residential fence. The expense was “fraudulently disguised…as a legitimate business expense” for the home building project. The invoice was sent to the Tennessee company, and it was paid with a Tennessee account.

When the plaintiff later learned of the fraudulent expense, it brought this tort action in Tennessee. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In response, the plaintiff responded with voluminous exhibits including emails, invoices, text messages, money transfers, and other documents purportedly showing that the defendants “knowingly and intentionally engaged in tortious conduct aimed at Tennessee and that they injured a Tennessee domiciliary in the State of Tennessee.” The circuit court granted dismissal, finding a lack of personal jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

A mailman’s notation on a certified letter sent by the Secretary of State did not constitute proper service of process in a car accident case.

In Lowe v. Harvey, No. E2024-01588-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2025), the plaintiff and defendant were in a car accident, and the defendant lived in Indiana. The plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant under the Tennessee statutes addressing service of an out-of-state motorist, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-203 through -207. Pursuant to the statute, the plaintiff had a summons issued to the Tennessee Secretary of State, who then sent a summons to the defendant by registered mail. At the time of service in 2021, however, the postal service had “suspended its signature requirement for certified mail and registered return receipt mail because of Covid-19.” The letter to the defendant was returned with a marking made by the mail carrier in the signature space.

After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant moved to dismiss based on insufficient service of process. The trial court agreed that the defendant had not been served and dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Tennessee Products Liability Act (“TPLA”) does not apply extraterritorially, and therefore dismissal of a case where the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in the Dominican Republic was affirmed.

In Renel v. Drexel Chemical Company, No. W2023-01693-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2025), the plaintiffs worked in the sugar cane industry. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant chemical company, claiming they were injured by chemicals produced and sold by the defendant, which was a Tennessee company located in Tennessee.

The trial court granted the defendant company’s motion to dismiss, ruling that “the TPLA does not have extraterritorial application,” and that “even if a case were to proceed in Tennessee, the applicable law would be the law of the Dominican Republic.” The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal.

Where an HCLA plaintiff failed to provide deposition dates for her expert witness by the deadline listed in the scheduling order, but she filed a motion to revise the scheduling order on the day of the deposition deadline, exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert was too harsh a sanction and was vacated.

In Buckley v. Jackson Radiology Associates, P.A., No. W2023-01777-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2025), the plaintiff filed an HCLA suit in 2016. Due to a motion for a qualified protective order, the case was stayed pending the outcome of a separate case. After the stay was lifted, the trial court set a scheduling order in September 2021. This scheduling order was later modified to require the plaintiff to disclose her expert by February 13, 2023, and to have all expert depositions completed by June 12, 2023.

The plaintiff disclosed Dr. Esposito on February 13, 2023. Counsel for the defendants immediately requested available deposition dates. According to the defendants, they requested deposition dates several times and received no response from the plaintiff. The plaintiff explained in her appellate brief that Dr. Esposito’s wife filed for divorce during this time and he did not cope well, causing the scheduling issues.

In a negligence case, a brief reference to the lottery during opening statements and an unintentional mention of employment benefits that paid partial wages during the plaintiff’s time off work were not enough to require overturning the jury verdict for defendant.

In Campbell v. T.C. Restaurant Group, LLC, No. M2024-00362-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2025), the plaintiff filed a negligence claim against a musician and the bar at which he performed. When the musician did a birthday shoutout on stage, the plaintiff climbed onto the stage. The plaintiff stated that the musician grabbed her, spun her around, and then dropped her off the stage. The musician testified that he tried to guide the plaintiff off the stage, but she was drunk and stepped off the stage, causing her to fall. The plaintiff hit her head and was diagnosed with a concussion several days later. At trial, the plaintiff’s credibility was called into question when her testimony regarding her medical status appeared to conflict with online videos that had been posted showing her dancing.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding that the musician was not at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, citing two errors: 1) a reference during opening statements that the plaintiff hoped to be “a lottery lawsuit winner,” and 2) an alleged violation of the collateral source rule. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict.

When an amended answer asserted comparative fault against the city, which had previously been a party but had been voluntarily dismissed before the amended answer was filed, the plaintiff was allowed to add the city as a defendant within ninety days of the comparative fault allegation under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119.

In Sands v. Williard, No. W2024-00772-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2025), the plaintiff filed suit against both the city and homeowners after she tripped on a sidewalk in front of the homeowners’ property. The city raised an issue about service of process in its initial answer. In their initial answer, the homeowners admitted to two paragraphs stating that the city had a duty, but there was no other allegation of comparative fault.

The city eventually filed a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, asserting that it was not properly served and, thus, the limitations period had run. While this motion was pending, the homeowners moved to amend their answer to assert comparative fault against the city. The plaintiff then moved to voluntarily dismiss her claim against the city. The plaintiff explained in her motion that “the purpose of the dismissal was to avoid the alleged outstanding service issues” and that she intended to rely on Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 to bring the city back into the suit after the homeowners filed their amended answer. The trial court granted the voluntary dismissal, and it allowed the plaintiff to bring the city back into the suit after the homeowners’ amended answer asserted comparative fault against the city.

Because an HCLA (Medical Malpractice) plaintiff is required to prove the elements of his claim through expert testimony, summary judgment was affirmed after the trial court applied the cancellation rule to plaintiff’s expert’s conflicting testimony regarding damages.

In Simmons v. Islam, No. M2023-01698-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2024), the plaintiff filed an HCLA claim alleging that the defendant psychiatrist had engaged in improper, sexualized conduct directed toward the plaintiff. When his claim was filed, the plaintiff relied on Expert 1, but Expert 1 dropped out of the case after depositions.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that without Expert 1 plaintiff could not prove his case. The plaintiff requested more time to identify a new expert, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff then disclosed Expert 2. In Expert 2’s affidavit, she stated that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant’s conduct. During her deposition, however, she testified that you would expect damages and that they were possible, but that she “didn’t go into damages. I just basically put that you would expect damages, damages can be reignited.”

Where defendant had filed both a TPPA petition to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was not allowed to voluntarily dismiss the action against that defendant.

In Garramone v. Dugger, No. M2023-00677-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2024), plaintiff filed a false light invasion of privacy claim against defendants based on events that occurred when plaintiff ran for re-election as a city commissioner. According to plaintiff, defendants were involved in creating a website that alleged plaintiff had been given a free pass on drinking and driving and speeding because she was a commissioner.

Defendant Curtsinger and Defendant Patrick both filed petitions to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. Defendants asserted that the claim was related to their exercise of free speech. Defendant Patrick also filed a motion for summary judgment.

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