Articles Posted in Medical Negligence

Where an HCLA plaintiff filed unsigned HIPAA authorizations with her complaint, but at least one defendant admitted that the HIPAA authorization it received was actually signed, dismissal was reversed.

In Buckner v. Complete Wellness Chiropractic Center, No. E2024-00698-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2025), the plaintiff suffered long-term complications after several practitioners failed to diagnose the cause of her back pain properly. She filed this healthcare liability suit against twenty defendants and asserted in her complaint that she had sent proper pre-suit notice under the HCLA. The notices attached to her complaint, however, included HIPAA authorizations that were not signed.

Based on these unsigned authorizations, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff did not provide additional proof, but she insisted that she complied with the statute. The defendants argued that the error here was substantive because the plaintiff could not prove compliance, and dismissal was therefore appropriate. During oral arguments, counsel for one of the defendants was asked by the trial court whether the HIPAA authorization his client received was signed, to which he admitted that it was. The trial court nonetheless granted the motion to dismiss, but that ruling was reversed on appeal.

Where a HIPAA authorization had blanks beside the names of all the providers listed under who was authorized to make disclosures, but none of the blanks were marked or checked, the HIPAA authorization was not compliant with the HCLA requirements.

In Crenshaw v. Methodist Healthcare- Memphis Hospitals, No. W2024-00682-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 7, 2025), the plaintiff filed a health care liability suit on behalf of her deceased mother. Per the HCLA statutory requirements, the plaintiff included a HIPAA authorization for the release of the decedent’s medical records with her pre-suit notice. Under the heading “The following individual or organization is authorized to make the disclosure,” the plaintiff listed thirteen providers. Beside each provider’s name there was a small blank. On the authorizations sent with the pre-suit notice, none of the small blanks were checked or marked in any way.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss asserting, among other arguments, that the HIPAA authorizations did not substantially comply with the HCLA statute. The trial court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Statements made that were related to a QIC meeting on a patient’s care were subject to the QIC privilege, but the hospital administrator waived that privilege to the extent he disclosed the privileged information to the patient’s family.

In Castillo v. Rex, No. E2022-00322-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. May 9, 2025), the plaintiff filed an HCLA suit after her husband died shortly after being discharged from defendant hospital. Following the husband’s death, the hospital held a quality improvement committee (“QIC”) meeting to discuss his care. The hospital then invited the plaintiff wife and her parents to what the hospital labeled a CANDOR meeting. (Note: The Supreme Court specifically pointed out that Tennessee has not adopted a statute creating CANDOR meetings, so this meeting had no additional statutory protections, but the Court referred to the meeting in this way for simplicity). During this meeting, the plaintiff did not sign any documents and was not told that any information being shared was privileged. The hospital told the plaintiff that the CT scan performed on her husband showed an internal bleed and that he should not have been discharged.

After this suit was filed, counsel for the hospital deposed the plaintiff. Defense counsel asked the plaintiff about the CANDOR meeting and made “detailed inquiries into the statements” made therein. When the plaintiff’s attorney deposed hospital representatives, however, defense counsel instructed the witnesses not to answer questions about what was said in the CANDOR meeting because it was subject to the QIC privilege. The defense also asserted the QIC privilege in response to some written discovery requests.

Where an HCLA plaintiff provided incomplete HIPAA authorizations with his pre-suit notice, the trial court should have granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

In Elmore v. Mills, No. E2023-01064-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2025), the plaintiff filed an HCLA suit against multiple defendants based on decedent’s death, who aspirated during a hip surgery after being given food on the day of the surgery by hospital staff. The plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to multiple individuals and entities, including Dr. Sorce, the treating physician, and Dr. Sorce’s group, TVO. The plaintiff thereafter filed this HCLA suit.

Defendants Sorce and TVO filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the pre-suit notice was not sent within the one-year statute of limitations and that the HIPPA authorizations provided with the pre-suit notice were insufficient. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed based on the incomplete HIPAA authorizations.

Where an HCLA plaintiff added a claim for wrongful death to her health care liability action after her husband passed away, but she failed to file a certificate of good faith with her amended complaint, dismissal was affirmed.

In Allen v. Dehner, No. M2023-01750-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025), plaintiffs husband and wife filed an HCLA claim against defendant doctor and his medical practice based on their failure to timely diagnose the husband’s cancer. When the plaintiffs filed their initial complaint, they attached a certificate of good faith pursuant to the HCLA requirements.

While the suit was pending, the husband died. The wife continued as the plaintiff and filed a motion to amend her complaint. With the trial court’s permission, she filed an amended complaint that added a claim for wrongful death and added the husband’s death to the damages portion of the complaint. The defendants named in the amended complaint were the same.

A doctor’s experience in an emergency room did not make him competent to testify under the HCLA about the post-surgical care the plaintiff received.

In Hurley v. Pickens, No. E2023-01610-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2025), the plaintiff filed a health care liability claim based on the care he received after a planned bladder surgery in 2014. Despite the plaintiff’s complaints during his hospitalization after the surgery, no follow up testing was ordered until the plaintiff was diagnosed with septic shock. The plaintiff suffered severe complications which resulted in a three-week coma and two additional surgeries.

The plaintiff filed this HCLA case, and he named as his expert Dr. Orr. Dr. Orr was licensed to practice medicine in Mississippi, and during 2013, he entered a surgical oncology fellowship. During 2013, he also worked at least some amount of time in an emergency room.

Because the HIPAA authorizations included with a health care liability plaintiff’s pre-suit notice included limiting language, the authorizations did not comply with the HCLA and thus plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims were dismissed.

In Curtis v. Sharp, No. E2023-01583-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2025), the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice of a her HCLA suit to five health care providers. This notice included HIPAA authorizations. The HIPAA authorizations sent by the plaintiff including the following limiting language: “Any conferences, formal or informal, of any type or oral communication with [the provider receiving the authorization], or any of [his/her/its] representatives is absolutely forbidden.”

The plaintiff filed her HCLA complaint against three of the providers. Although the plaintiff attached the pre-suit notice materials to her complaint, she failed to attach the HIPAA authorization sent to one of the defendants. That HIPAA authorization was subsequently filed as a Late Filed Authorization. The plaintiff eventually voluntarily dismissed this original suit and refiled pursuant to the savings statute. The second set of HIPAA authorizations contained the same limiting language as the first. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply with the HCLA by sending faulty HIPAA authorizations and failing to attach one HIPAA authorization to the original complaint. The defendants argued that because of these errors, the plaintiff was not entitled to the 120-day statute of limitations exception granted by the HCLA, making the original suit untimely. The trial court agreed with both of the defendants’ arguments and found that because the original suit was time-barred, this second complaint should be dismissed. On appeal, this ruling was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The 120-day extension of the statute of limitations granted to health care liability plaintiffs who give proper pre-suit notice under the HCLA does not apply to or extend the Saving Statute.

The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the interplay between pre-suit notice, the 120-day statute of limitations extension, and the Saving Statute in Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, No. M2022-00597-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2025). The plaintiff had filed an HCLA suit against the defendant after giving proper pre-suit notice under the statute. When filing his first case, the plaintiff utilized the 120-day extension of the limitations period granted by the HCLA. The plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit in the first case, and subsequently refiled his case pursuant to Tennessee’s Saving Statute, which allows certain cases to be refiled within a year of the dismissal. The second complaint was filed more than a year after the voluntary dismissal, but the plaintiff argued that because he gave pre-suit notice, he was entitled to the 120-day extension pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c).

The trial court dismissed the refiled complaint, holding that it was time-barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal based on the statute of limitations. In this opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 120-day extension granted by the HCLA does not apply to extend the Saving Statute.