Articles Posted in Medical Negligence

Where a  Tennessee HCLA complaint was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to file a certificate of good faith with her first complaint and the certificate of good faith filed with her amended complaint was not sufficient, but the plaintiff only addressed one ground in her appeal, dismissal was affirmed.

In Moses v. State of Tennessee, No. W2025-00386-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026), the plaintiff filed a pro se HCLA claim against the state after experiencing complications after a root canal. When the plaintiff filed her initial complaint with the Claims Commission, she failed to file a certificate of good faith. After the state filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and included a certificate of good faith. The plaintiff asserted that “her amended complaint cured any issues related to her original failure to file a certificate of good faith.” The state then filed a motion to strike the amended complaint and certificate of good faith, as well as a brief in support of its motion to dismiss.

The Claims Commission granted the motion to dismiss, finding that 1) the plaintiff failed to file a certificate of good faith with her original complaint as required in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 or to file a “properly supported motion for an extension of time,” and 2) that the certificate filed with her amended complaint was insufficient under the HCLA, as it “merely stated that [the plaintiff] had consultations with experts, and…she failed to identify individual defendants in the certificate.” Dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

Where a surviving spouse gave pre-suit notice under the HCLA of a wrongful death claim, but the surviving spouse was later found to have abandoned the decedent, the correct party plaintiff could rely on the pre-suit notice sent previously by the surviving spouse.

In Anderson v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, No. M2024-00687-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2026), the decedent died after receiving care at defendant hospital. After the death, the decedent’s mother attempted to give pre-suit notice of a potential HCLA claim to the hospital, but the hospital refused to identify other potential defendants because it could not confirm that the mother was authorized to act on behalf of the decedent.

The decedent had a surviving spouse, who gave timely pre-suit notice of a wrongful death claim under the HCLA. The decedent’s mother filed a motion to replace the surviving spouse as administrator of the estate, asserting that the decedent was abandoned by the surviving spouse. The probate court did not grant the mother’s motion until after the one-year statute of limitations for the medical malpractice claim had expired.

Where the trial court found that the statute of limitations barred an HCLA claim based on two different grounds, but the plaintiff only appealed one of those grounds, dismissal was affirmed.

In Bartsch v. Premier Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine, PLC, No. M2024-00971-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2025), the plaintiff filed a health care liability suit against his surgeon’s employer based on a surgery that occurred in April 2022. Pre-suit notice letters were sent to several providers, and one of the addresses listed for the surgeon was “Hughston Clinic Orthopaedics, PC.”

The plaintiff first filed suit in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction in July 2023, naming only The Hughston Clinic Southeast, PC as a defendant. According to the complaint, the clinic was the surgeon’s employer. The clinic responded by stating that it was not the surgeon’s employer and not a proper party to the lawsuit. In its answer, the clinic named Premier Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine, PLC (“Premier”), as the surgeon’s actual employer.

The decedent’s mother, who was the guardian of the decedent’s two minor children, was the proper person to be listed on the HCLA pre-suit notice as the “claimant authorizing the notice.”

In Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, No. E2023-00027-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2025), decedent died of cardiac arrest shortly after being discharged from defendant hospital. Decedent had two minor children who were then placed with their maternal grandmother (decedent’s mother), and the grandmother was named the temporary custodian of the children.

The grandmother sent pre-suit notice of an HCLA claim to defendants, which listed the grandmother as the claimant. The pre-suit notice did not mention the minor children. The grandmother then filed this HCLA suit as “Decedent’ mother and next friend and individually,” and in the complaint, she alleged for the first time that she was bringing the suit “on behalf of…decedent’s surviving minor children…as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.” Eventually the grandmother’s individual claims were dropped, and she pursued the case only on behalf of the minor children.

Where an HCLA (medical malpractice) plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to an address that was neither the defendant doctor’s business address nor the place where the plaintiff received treatment, dismissal based on the failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements was affirmed.

In Springfield v. Eton, No. W2024-01024-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2025), the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants based on a failed surgical artery graft which eventually necessitated the amputation of her right leg. Defendant Dr. Eton was the surgeon, who at the time had been placed with UT Regional One Physicians (“UTROP”) through a placement company. Dr. Eton was from Chicago, but he was working with UTROP in Memphis at the time.

The plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to both Dr. Eton and UTROP, with the claim against UTROP based solely on vicarious liability. At the time, Dr. Eton’s address on the Tennessee Department of Health’s website only listed “Chicago, IL 60614.” The plaintiff sent Dr. Eton’s pre-suit notice to the address in Memphis “for an ambulatory outpatient surgery center owned by Regional One.” This was not the address at which the plaintiff had received treatment.

An HCLA pre-suit notice that was sent to two former employees of a rehabilitation center, rather than to the appropriate address or agent for the rehabilitation center, was not sufficient under the statute.

In Anderson v. Alexian Village of Tennessee, No. E2024-00977-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2025), the plaintiff filed a health care liability suit against the defendant rehabilitation center. Before filing suit, the plaintiff sent two copies of pre-suit notice—one addressed to the CEO of the center and one addressed to the president of the center. Neither of these individuals were named as defendants.

The defendant moved to dismiss the case based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of the HCLA. The defendant asserted that the pre-suit notice had only been sent to two former employees, neither of whom had worked for the defendant for at least five years. The trial court agreed that the pre-suit notice was deficient and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Where an HCLA plaintiff filed unsigned HIPAA authorizations with her complaint, but at least one defendant admitted that the HIPAA authorization it received was actually signed, dismissal was reversed.

In Buckner v. Complete Wellness Chiropractic Center, No. E2024-00698-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2025), the plaintiff suffered long-term complications after several practitioners failed to diagnose the cause of her back pain properly. She filed this healthcare liability suit against twenty defendants and asserted in her complaint that she had sent proper pre-suit notice under the HCLA. The notices attached to her complaint, however, included HIPAA authorizations that were not signed.

Based on these unsigned authorizations, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff did not provide additional proof, but she insisted that she complied with the statute. The defendants argued that the error here was substantive because the plaintiff could not prove compliance, and dismissal was therefore appropriate. During oral arguments, counsel for one of the defendants was asked by the trial court whether the HIPAA authorization his client received was signed, to which he admitted that it was. The trial court nonetheless granted the motion to dismiss, but that ruling was reversed on appeal.

Where a HIPAA authorization had blanks beside the names of all the providers listed under who was authorized to make disclosures, but none of the blanks were marked or checked, the HIPAA authorization was not compliant with the HCLA requirements.

In Crenshaw v. Methodist Healthcare- Memphis Hospitals, No. W2024-00682-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 7, 2025), the plaintiff filed a health care liability suit on behalf of her deceased mother. Per the HCLA statutory requirements, the plaintiff included a HIPAA authorization for the release of the decedent’s medical records with her pre-suit notice. Under the heading “The following individual or organization is authorized to make the disclosure,” the plaintiff listed thirteen providers. Beside each provider’s name there was a small blank. On the authorizations sent with the pre-suit notice, none of the small blanks were checked or marked in any way.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss asserting, among other arguments, that the HIPAA authorizations did not substantially comply with the HCLA statute. The trial court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Statements made that were related to a QIC meeting on a patient’s care were subject to the QIC privilege, but the hospital administrator waived that privilege to the extent he disclosed the privileged information to the patient’s family.

In Castillo v. Rex, No. E2022-00322-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. May 9, 2025), the plaintiff filed an HCLA suit after her husband died shortly after being discharged from defendant hospital. Following the husband’s death, the hospital held a quality improvement committee (“QIC”) meeting to discuss his care. The hospital then invited the plaintiff wife and her parents to what the hospital labeled a CANDOR meeting. (Note: The Supreme Court specifically pointed out that Tennessee has not adopted a statute creating CANDOR meetings, so this meeting had no additional statutory protections, but the Court referred to the meeting in this way for simplicity). During this meeting, the plaintiff did not sign any documents and was not told that any information being shared was privileged. The hospital told the plaintiff that the CT scan performed on her husband showed an internal bleed and that he should not have been discharged.

After this suit was filed, counsel for the hospital deposed the plaintiff. Defense counsel asked the plaintiff about the CANDOR meeting and made “detailed inquiries into the statements” made therein. When the plaintiff’s attorney deposed hospital representatives, however, defense counsel instructed the witnesses not to answer questions about what was said in the CANDOR meeting because it was subject to the QIC privilege. The defense also asserted the QIC privilege in response to some written discovery requests.