Day on Torts
Where an 87-year-old driver ran into a street sweeper, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the street sweeper driver was 51 percent at fault.
In Hurst v. City of Morristown, No. E2024-00779-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2025), the plaintiff brought this suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) on behalf of his father. The father, who was 87 years old at the time of the incident, was driving down a city street when he ran into a street sweeper. After the accident, the father stated that he “never saw a thing.” The father passed away from his injuries.
At trial, the evidence showed that the street sweeper driver stated immediately after the accident that he was kicking up a lot of dust. Further, although the street sweeper was equipped with sprayers to reduce dust, the employee had not turned the sprayers on. Much testimony focused on the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”), which requires high intensity lighting or a separate vehicle following behind the sweeper. Although the sweeper in question had many lights, they were not high intensity, and there was no vehicle following the sweeper on the day of the accident.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court found the street sweeper 51 percent at fault, and the father 49 percent at fault. The defendant city appealed this ruling, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
On appeal, the Court first considered the negligence apportionment. The city relied on the employee driver’s testimony at trial that no dust or visual obstruction was present, but the Court pointed out that the trial court found that testimony not credible. Instead, the trial court looked to the employee’s statement immediately after the accident, which was that dust was stirred up. Accordingly, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the employee was negligent in failing to activate the water sprayers.
The city also argued that the trial court relied too heavily on the MUTCD, which the city described as guidance. The Court of Appeals wrote, though, that the trial court correctly considered the MUTCD when determining whether the accident was reasonably foreseeable due to the sweeper’s slow speed. The guidance offered by the MUTCD went to the question of whether the street sweeper was operated with reasonable care, including whether the appropriate lights and warnings were used. The ruling that the city employee was 51 percent at fault was affirmed.
Next, the Court considered the city’s argument that it was immune from suit under the GTLA. The city argued that it was entitled to immunity for a discretionary function, but the evidence did not support this assertion. The trial court noted in its opinion that neither party spent any time arguing the issue of discretionary versus operational decisions, and it therefore ruled that the “operation of the street sweeper was operational.” The Court of Appeals found that the “record contain[ed] no basis upon which to reverse the trial court’s ruling.”
The city also argued that the public duty doctrine provided immunity here. The trial court “determined that with the express waiver of sovereign immunity in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-202 for negligent operation of vehicles, the General Assembly expressed its clear intent to limit the scope of the public duty doctrine by removing immunity for certain claims, such as the one before us.” The Court of Appeals agreed that under the “unique facts of this case,” the public duty doctrine could not apply, as the court “must presume that the General Assembly did not intend to enact a useless statute.” (internal citations omitted).
Finally, the city asserted that Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-190 applied to grant immunity. This statute states: “Absent noncompliance with this section, operator negligence…, operation of a street sweeper in compliance with the section shall not be a violation of law, and shall not subject the street sweeper to liability for claims for personal injury…” The Court of Appeals reasoned, though, that the finding that the street sweeper was operated negligently precluded the applicability of this statute. Because the trial court found the lighting inadequate and ruled that the street sweeper was not operated with reasonable care, this case was removed from the exception to liability provided by this statute.
While the Court affirmed the ruling that the city was 51 percent liable, it also affirmed the ruling excluding many of the driver’s medical bills. To recover for past medical expenses, a plaintiff must show that they were both reasonable and necessary. Here, the bills in question were not introduced into evidence so that the trier of fact could review them. None of the doctors deposed had reviewed the bills, and no doctor had offered an opinion as to the bills’ necessity. Due to this lack of proof, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding these bills from damages.
The ruling of the trial court was affirmed in whole.
Though fact specific, this opinion contains some important reminders for litigants in car accident cases. What a party said at the scene can be difficult to negate later at a trial. In addition, plaintiffs seeking medical expenses need to ensure that they have the proper proof required to recover those damages.
This opinion was released three months after oral arguments.