The Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel Quarterly magazine has published an interesting article about jury questionnaires. The authors of the article are John P. Daniels and Annie L. Knafo.
The article includes a sample questionnaire that can serve as a starting point for drafting your own.
Read the article here.
Have you ever had an opponent attempt to back-out of a stipulation? This post on the Federal Evidence Review blog tells us about a new case on the subject and gathers other cases on point.
The post explains that "after a stipulation is freely entered, the courts will view with great disfavor any efforts to walk from the stipulation."
This post will save you hours of legal research on the topic.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee has released a new administrative order concerning the use of laptops, cell phones and other electronic devices in the federal courthouses in the Middle District.
The devices have to go through the screening process and cannot be used in courtrooms without permission. Laptops and electronic calendering devices can be used in the courtroom unless the presiding judge prohibits there use.
One more thing to think about before going to federal court.
From time to time, some lawyer undertakes an effort to educate other lawyers on how to conduct cross-examinations. Francis Wellman did so over 100 years ago in his excellent book, The Art of Cross-Examination. In my generation, Irving Younger’s Ten Commandments of Cross-Examination was treated by law professors as if it was handed down by the Almighty. Now, Ronald H. Clark, George R. Dekle, Sr. and William S. Bailey add to these excellent works with the Cross-Examination Handbook: Persuasion Strategies and Techniques.
The book begins by quoting the words of Wellman, who aptly explained the challenge of cross-examination with these words:
Cross-examination … requires the greatest ingenuity; a habit of logical thought; clearness of perception in general; infinite patience and self control; power to read men’s minds intuitively, to judge their motives; ability to act with force and precision; a masterful knowledge of the subject matter itself; an extreme caution and, above all, the instinct to discover the weak points in the witness under examination.
Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc. , __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. March 30, 2011) (No. 09–15417), is a interesting decision that addresses the issue of the admissibility of videos made by third parties.
The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s use of the video and maintained that it
depicted a recreation of his accident. In order for the video to be admissible, Burchfield asserts that CSX was required to prove that the testing on the video was performed under substantially similar conditions as those surrounding his accident. To make that showing," the defendant sought the testimony of the maker (Wolf, a rail consulting expert for the third party employer) of the video. The defendant proceeded on a different theory, The defense insisted that the "video was not a recreation such that it would be subject to a heightened foundational standard" of substantial similarity. Rather, the defendant contended that "the video was properly admitted because it was authenticated under Fed.R.Evid. 901(a), which requires a lesser showing from a witness laying a foundation for a photograph or motion picture.
When Senator Campfield slammed lawyers on March 29, 2011 in a Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Doug Overbey let it be known that he did not appreciate the unkind words of his fellow Republican.
See the debate on SB 0127 here. Debate on the bill starts at 2:04:44. Campfield’s remarks begin at 2:07:44 and his lawyer slam starts at 2:10:25. Senator Overbey makes his statements beginning at 2:17.
Senator Campfield is a real estate developer from Knoxville. Senator Overbey is a lawyer from Maryville.
The Tennessee Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on May 11, 2011 in Holder v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd., E2009-01312-SC-R11-C (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Here is the summary of the opinion prepared by the Court of Appeals:
Plaintiff sustained personal injuries resulting from a fall on defendant’s premises
On a weekly, if not daily, basis, plaintiff’s personal injury lawyers have to deal with subrogation interests. Many of those subrogation claims involve the law of ERISA.
This opinion out of the Illinois Court of Appeals addresses the issue of disputes over the amount of money to be re-paid to the holder of the subrogation interest.
Defendant had a personal injury claim. Plaintiff sought subrogation and claimed that it was due almost $63,000. Defendant claimed that some of the expenses sought did not arise from medical treatment caused in the incident giving rise to the personal injury claim. Plaintiff countered with answers to interrogatories in the personal injury claim, in which Plaintiff contended that back surgery (the subject of the disputed medical claim) was related to the accident). Defendant argued that her physicians did not causally link the back problems to the accident, and therefore Plaintiff’s subrogation interest in any future personal injury settlement or judgment proceeds should be reduced accordingly. Plaintiff countered that one physician said the link was possible, that it determined the subrogation amount, and that under ERISA the court should defer to its decision and order that the amount of the subrogation interest include amounts for the surgery.
Thomas Redmon gave the plaintiff herpes. He knew that he had the disease for over 25 years before he had sexual relations with the plaintiff. He knew that there was some risk in transmitting the disease even if he was lesion-free. He did not tell plaintiff that he had the disease before their first several sexual interactions, but later told her that he had the disease. He also told her that it was safe to have unprotected sex if he was lesion-free.
Plaintiff contacted herpes and sued Redmon. The jury awarded her $6.7 million.
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the liability aspect of the verdict but cut the compensatory damages award by over $2 million. (Note: the press reported that the award was affirmed. Here is one example of such an error.) The punitive damage award of $2.75 million was affirmed.
Lawyer A is hired to bring a personal injury case on behalf of an injured person. With the consent of the injured person, Lawyer A associates Lawyer B. The contract between A and B includes a fee split arrangement. Injured person consents to fee split and the contract. Injured person then fires Lawyer A. Lawyer B prosecutes case and resolves it. Lawyer A is not paid any portion of the fee. Lawyer A sues Lawyer B under a myriad of theories.
he California Court of Appeals, Third District, rules that Lawyer A has no claim against B. The personal injury client employed and fired Lawyer A and it was her responsibility to pay a fee if it was due under either a breach of contract theory or a quantum meruit theory. The Court also ruled that the litigation privilege barred Lawyer A’s fraud claims against Lawyer B.
Find the opinion in Olsen v. Harbison, C058943 (Cal. Ct. App. 3rd Dis. Dec. 28, 2010) here.
