A decision released yesterday by the Court of Appeals confuses me greatly.  Defendant 1 blamed Nonparty in an answer.  Plaintiff sued Nonparty, who then became Defendant 2.  Defendant 2 moved to dismiss, saying  inter alia that the complaint against it was barred by the statute of repose.  Then, according to the opinion, Defendant 2 said that "argued that Tennessee’s  comparative fault joinder statute, which would operate to toll the three-year statute of repose, was  inapplicable in the current litigation."

Well, I sure hope that Defendant 2’s lawyers did not say that because that is not the law.  In fact, it is 180 degrees wrong. 

T.C.A. Sec. 20-1-119 has a dangerous subsection  and this is as good of time to talk about it as any.  Subsection  (b) of the statute says as follows: "A cause of action brought within ninety (90) days pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be barred by any statute of limitations. This section shall not extend any applicable statute of repose, nor shall this section permit the plaintiff to maintain an action against a person when such an action is barred by an applicable statute of repose." (Emphasis added).

Efforts to improve teamwork and communication have substantially  reduced births resulting in traumatic injury .

Many of the Seaton hospitals have worked with the Institute for Healthcare Improvement to reduce preventable childbirth injuries by " improving communications, standardizing procedures and reducing risky methods that speed deliveries, including forceps use, vacuum deliveries and medication to induce labor," according to an article in the American-Statesman.

The paper reports that overall the actions have "reduced traumatic birth injuries from 3.2 per 1,000 in 2004 (less than half the national average) to 0.3 injuries per 1,000."

"What duty  does an HIV-positive individual have to avoid transmitting the virus? What level  of awareness should be required before a court imposes a duty of care on an HIVpositive  individual to avoid transmission of the virus? What responsibility does the victim have to protect himself or herself against possible infection with the virus?"  Those are questions raised in a recent case before the California Supreme Court.

Why did Bridget sue her husband? : "Bridget [the wife] allege[d] that John [her husband] became infected with HIV first, as a result of  engaging in unprotected sex with multiple men before and during their marriage,  and that he then knowingly or negligently transmitted the virus to her. John, who  now has full-blown AIDS, allege[d] in his answer that Bridget infected him and  offers as proof a negative HIV test conducted in connection with his application for life insurance on August 17, 2000, six weeks before Bridget discovered she  was infected with HIV."  Bridget sued John for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,  fraud and negligence.  John not only alleged that Bridget gave him HIV but also alleged that fault should be assessed against her because she did not insist that he wear a condom.

The case went up a discovery issues:  what scope of discovery should be permitted the alleged negative HIV test results six weeks before Bridget’s diagnosis?  And what about the right to privacy? Of course, the scope of discovery is in some ways depend on the viability of the various causes of action and that is where the Court got into substantive tort law.

The case: Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital,   984 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1999).  Author:  Justice Janice M. Holder.

Why it is a Blue Chipper"  Jordan overruled past precedent that misread the wrongful death damages statute and permitted, for the first time, a factfinder to award damages for the loss of love, society and affection in a wrongful death case.  It recogized that the value of human life exceeded the dollar value of the decedent to earn money.   The case allowed the factfinder to consider such damages when the deceased was survived by a spouse or children, whether the children were minors or adults.

The bottom line:

Insurance Journal reports that a lawsuit has been filed against Bacardi, the manufacturer of 151 rum. 

The article says that "a bartender, who was not identified in the lawsuit, was pouring shots when a customer lit a menu on fire and placed it in the stream of alcohol. A bottle of Bacardi 151 that was being used to pour the shots turned into a flame thrower and sent flaming rum all over " the plaintiff.

I was involved in a similar case that went to trial in 1983.  Our client, an off-duty waitress in a restaurant in Alabama, was burned when a bottle of 151 rum exploded after a stream of the alcohol was exposed to flame.  The trial of that case resulted in the first million-dollar verdict in Nashville.

A website has been launched that will help doctors and the public identify patients and lawyers who filed medical malpractice cases.

Here is a nice summary: "The LitiPages.com Attorney Database allows victims of medical malpractice to screen prospective attorneys and, if they so choose, avoid lawyers who consistently fail to obtain jury verdicts for their clients. The LitiPages.com Patient Database allows physicians to identify individuals who have demonstrated unrealistic expectations of the health care system through their participation in a medical malpractice lawsuit whose merit was not supported by a jury verdict. Finally, LitiPages.com also provides informational resources to patients who have been the victims of legal malpractice. "

Why is the site necessary?  "A physician may feel that a patient who has filed a medical malpractice suit and lost a trial before a jury of their peers harbours unrealistic expectations of their physician and probably of the health care system at large. In the same way, a physician may feel that a patient who files a medical malpractice case only to later withdraw it (or have it dismissed) likewise must have held unrealistic expectations of their physician. The patient who files "shotgun" lawsuits against every doctor listed in their chart when only one (if any) of those doctors was negligent may be perceived by a physician to be out of touch with medical reality. Accordingly, a responsible physician who feels that a patient’s behaviour demonstrates unrealistic medical expectations has both a right (and arguably a responsibility) to refuse elective care to that patient. The attorneys who counseled such patients and filed their cases must subscribe to similarly unrealistic expectations of physicians and of the health care system in general. Appropriately, a physician who feels that an attorney’s behaviour demonstrates unrealistic medical expectations has the right to refuse elective care to such an individual."

You resolve a case by settlement or judgment and the check is sent to your office.  The check has been deposited in your trust account, has cleared the bank, and the proceeds are now ready for distribution.  There are several health care providers who gave care to your client concerning the injuries she received in the wreck.  Can you (as a lawyer) be held liable if you don’t pay their bills out of the settlement proceeds?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently answered that question, with a slight twist on the facts.  In a 20-page opinion brought by a chiropractor against an attorney, the WSC held that "We determine that Dr. Yorgan may not hold Attorney Durkin liable for payment because Durkin did not sign the  agreement or otherwise agree to be liable. Additionally, we  determine that imposing liability on Durkin is not dictated by  public policy. Finally, we determine that Yorgan is not  entitled to an equitable lien enforceable against Attorney  Durkin."  (Paragraph 2).

Note the additional facts I left out of the hypothetical in the first paragraph:  the attorney did not sign the agreement between the chiropractor and the patient providing that the patient was to direct her attorney to pay the chiropractor out of the settlement proceeds and purporting to give a lien against the recovery.  However, the attorney received a copy of the document at the time he got medical records from the chiropractor.  Moreover, the attorney had a conversation with the chiropractor after the claim was settled about reducing the bill.

My friend Keith Williams posted a comment that asked about the Tennessee ethics opinion that discusses how to handle the issue raised in the proceeding post – how should we handle liens asserted by health care providers when we have not  signed a contract obligating us (as lawyers) to recognize the lien.

There is a Tennessee Ethics Opinion on point.  Here it is:

FORMAL ETHICS OPINION 87-F-109

Contact Information