The male plaintiff said that he slipped, fell, and sustained various injuries on the sidewalk outside of his apartment early one morning. He and his wife brought suit.

Defendant found a medical record (from a provider not listed in answers to interrogatories by the plaintiffs) that indicated that plaintiff was treated for a dog bite on the morning of the alleged incident. He made no reference to his alleged fall. A scar he said was related to the fall was in a location similar to the site of the dog bite.

There were other problems with plaintiff’s medical history as well – the type of stuff that a defense lawyer drools over. This defense lawyer, however, stopped drooling long enough to file a motion to dismiss the case for fraud. The case was dismissed, and the Florida District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed.

Lay and Skilling have been found guilty of multiple crimes that contributed to the fall of Enron and the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars of shareholder value.

How much time should these men spend in prison?

I know little about the federal sentencing guidelines. But I think back to Anna Ayala, who got nine years for saying that she found a finger in the chili she purchased at Wendy’s when in fact she planted the finger. (Prior posts.) If that sentence was fair – and I don’t think that it was – then each of these men deserve to spend the rest of their lives in prison.

I love to ride a jet ski. In fact, I have had a Yahama Waverunner since 1999 and my beautiful wife just bought me the Mac- Daddy Seadoo (which will go 80 MPH and will rock your world).

So it was with more than my usual “I-love-torts-so-I-will-read-dang-near-court-opinion-on-the-subject” attitude that I picked up the opinion in Ford v. Polaris Industries, Inc., A106375 (Cal. App. 4th Div. 4 May 18, 2006). The facts: “Susan Ford sustained severe orifice injuries after falling off the rear of a twoseater Polaris personal watercraft. The jet-powered nozzle propelled a high-pressure stream of water that tore apart her internal organs. Today she uses a colostomy bag, urinates through a catheter, and her lower right torso and leg are numb from nerve damage. Susan and her husband sued the manufacturer and distributor of the watercraft on a strict products liability theory.”

OK.

Don’t count on it. Read this new opinion from the Tennessee Supreme Court which affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant when the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in opposition to the motion after the date required by a previous order of the trial judge.

The core holding: “We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for an enlargement of time under Rule 6.02 after finding that there was no excusable neglect. The trial court held an extensive hearing and considered the factors identified above. The trial court considered the reasons for the plaintiffs’ delay, the length of the delay, the prejudice caused to the defendants, and the potential impact on the proceedings. Although the inquiry of prejudice and the effect of the delay generally should focus on the plaintiffs’ failure to identify expert witnesses by the deadline set by the trial court, this failure cannot be isolated from the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with other deadlines and magnifies both the prejudice to the defense and the effect of the delay.”

The case also held that the expert affidavit submitted by the plaintiff to oppose summary judgment was deficient: “Here, the plaintiffs relied on the affidavit of Dr. Robert Gordon. Dr. Gordon, a board-certified anesthesiologist who practiced in Winchester, Tennessee, stated that he was “familiar with the recognized standard of acceptable professional medical care in the metropolitan areas of Tennessee and specifically in Memphis, Tennessee and similar communities . . . .” The affidavit contains no information regarding the basis for Dr. Gordon’s familiarity with the standard of care in Memphis, Tennessee, nor does it contain a basis for finding that the standard of care in Memphis is similar to that in the community in which Dr. Gordon practices. In short, Dr. Gordon’s affidavit simply asserts that he is familiar with the applicable standard of care. As we have explained in prior cases, a bare assertion of familiarity is insufficient under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(a)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the affidavit was legally insufficient.”

This is a brief in response to a defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the expert witness testimony of an economist. The economist was disclosed in a wrongful death case arising out of the drowning of a three-year-old boy. The economist is expected to testify about the present value of the child’s loss of earning capacity.

Obviously, with a child so young there is very little empirical evidence to establish the child’s likely career path. The economist was asked, then, to simply address the likely present value of the child’s earnings had he graduated high school and entered the workforce, and alternatively had he graduated college and entered the workforce. We are prepared to prove the child’s likely success in life through other witnesses, to let the jury decide his probable earning capacity, and to let the economist explain how to calculate that in today’s dollars.

The Defendants moved to exclude the economist’s testimony in part because he did not have a sufficient basis on his own for the assumptions of educational achievement. The Defendants also moved to exclude his testimony because the economist’s original report did not include a deduction for personal maintenance expenses, which the Defendants’ termed as “mandatory” under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Wallace v. Couch. A careful reading of Wallace and Tennessee evidentiary law on expert witnesses demonstrates the Defendants in our case were wrong.

The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled on Friday that the failure of a plaintiff to get leave to amend a complaint before adding a nonparty as a defendant to not permit the newly-added party to raise the statute of limitations as a bar.

Key to the holding was the fact that the plaintiff got permission to amend after serving the “amended complaint” on the new defendant.

The holding: “When a plaintiff utilizes section 20-1-119 to amend a complaint to name a nonparty as a defendant, the plaintiff must first seek permission of the trial court or adverse parties as provided by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. However, on the facts of this case, failure to file the motion to amend before filing the amended complaint and securing service of process is not fatal when all requirements of Rule 15.01, including the trial court’s grant of the motion to amend, occur within the ninety-day window created by section 20-1-119. Plaintiff has substantially complied with Rule 15.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and should be allowed to amend her complaint to add Defendant as a party.”

Last week Tennessee’s health care industry tried to hijack the Governor’s Cover Tennessee bill in an effort to obtain caps on their liability. The effort failed, thanks to the efforts of the entire Democratic Caucus in the Senate, Chairpman Person (R-Memphis), Senator Williams, and others.

The industry worked to amend the Cover Tennessee bill on the floor to limit their responsibility after a jury determines that medical negligence occurred. Usually, measures of this type are brought up through the committee system and, in fact, a similar piece of legislation was defeated in a House subcommittee this year. But the doctors alone had spent no less than $500,000 this year to get the special treatment they think they deserve so they decided to use the Governor’s health care bill to get what they wanted.

What is even more interesting is that they denied doing it. Why would they deny responsibility for trying to limit their responsibility? Because it is considered bad manners on Capitol Hill to try to bypass the committee system. And because you don’t mess with the Governor’s legislation without risking his ire. So, when the health care industry decided to do so, I guess they decided it was best to lie about what they were doing.

The property and causalty insurance cycle, understood by everyone except some (but not all) Republican lawmakers, continues to turn.

Insurance company profits are swelling and insurance price increases have come to a virtual halt. Last year premiums rose an average of one-half of one percent and net income increased 12%, despite record catastrophe losses. Surpluses (think “net worth”) in the industry now exceed $427 Billion. The average rate of return on surplus was 10.5%.

This article tells us that one expert predicts that premium growth will slow in 2006 and, in fact, may be less than the rate of inflation. Insurers will have cut prices to maintain premium volume, which will cause underwriting losses. Some degree of underwriting losses are ok (last year the companies paid loss and loss adjustment expenses of $100.90 for every $100 in premium) so long as the companies can earn a decent rate of return on their investments. If they don’t, however, they have to raise rates to maintain profitability. Of course, the companies then will blame those increases on GREEDY TRIAL LAWYERS.

OK, so it is a compromise and settlement of a divorce case. The fact remains that the law of compromise and settlement in Tennessee has been in disarray and the Tennessee Supreme Court has taken a step in the right direction to get it fixed.

In Barnes v. Barnes, No. W2004-01426-SC-R11-CV, ( Filed May 17, 2006) the TSC reversed an appellate court opinion which held that an MDA signed by the parties was not an enforceable agreement. The husband admitted executing the agreement but tried to back out of it two weeks after he signed it.

Read the opinion here.

The SCOTUS has decided the Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. case – the long awaited case that was to tell us about an ERISA plan’s right to seek reimbursement of medical payments from a tort recovery.

The Court held that the payments were recoverable.

The case was decided on May 15, 2006. The case number is 05-260.

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