The Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted proposed amendments to several rules of civil procedure.
Rules 5 and 5B have been amended to account for changes in the court system given the expansion of e-filing across the state.
Rule 33 has been amended in the hope of eliminating gamesmanship in answering interrogatories.
In a Tennessee defamation case, statements made in an email regarding a deposition in a federal lawsuit fell under the litigation privilege and dismissal was affirmed.
In Kilgore v. State of Tennessee, No. E2018-01790-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019), plaintiff had been involved in a previous federal lawsuit. In the federal case, plaintiff, who owned a towing service, had brought an action against certain highway patrol officers. During that case, the officers were represented by two attorneys, Ms. Jordan and Ms. Lyford. Shortly before the scheduled deposition of a witness, the witness’s son’s business caught fire. The day before the deposition, Ms. Jordan sent an email to plaintiff’s counsel in the federal case stating that one of the co-plaintiff’s emissaries had told the witness to “watch out” and that “the timing [did] not seem to be coincidental.” The email stated that the incident would be fully investigated and that witness intimidation was a crime, and also stated that future depositions would be held at secure locations with metal detectors. Later that day, Ms. Lyford sent an email explaining that she was attempting to locate a secure location for the deposition the following day.
Where defendants’ truck rolled into a duplex owned by plaintiff causing real property damage, a directed verdict for defendants on all but plaintiff’s negligence claim as well as a jury verdict for diminution in value to the property was affirmed.
In Twenty Holdings, LLC v. Land South LLC and Brandon Majors, No. M2018-01903-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2019), plaintiff owned a duplex in Nashville, and defendant Majors lived nearby. Majors drove a tractor trailer truck for defendant Land South, and on the day of the incident, he “parked the truck, with an attached 53 foot trailer…, near his residence at the top of a steep hill with the front of the truck pointing toward the drop off of the hill and toward Plaintiff’s property.” Within hours of the truck being parked, it rolled down the hill. The trailer detached from the truck, but the truck portion struck the duplex and stopped in one of the living rooms, causing significant damage to the building. According to Majors, he had parked the truck on a safe area and “took various precautions in securing the tractor-trailer, including engaging the parking brake, placing garden timbers under the wheels, letting the trailer down, and placing the tractor-trailer in reverse.”
Where plaintiffs failed to file any post-trial motions, most of the issues they tried to raise on appeal were waived.
In Smith v. Benihana National Corp., No. W2018-00992-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2019), plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of decedent’s family members after decedent died while dining at a Benihana restaurant. Plaintiffs essentially alleged that defendant knew that decedent was allergic to seafood, and that they were negligent in preparing his food and allowing seafood particles to be present and/or in allowing him to inhale seafood particles through steam at the restaurant.
This case had a long procedural history, but it was finally tried in front of a jury who returned a verdict for defendant, finding that the restaurant was not liable for decedent’s death. Plaintiffs did not file any post-trial motions, but did appeal the case.
Where a defendant (who happened to by a psychiatrist) knew of decedent’s past suicide attempt, knew he had just ended his relationship with her, and let the decedent stay in his home alone with an unsecured gun, the Tennessee Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on a negligence case against defendant related to decedent’s suicide, holding that the “suicide constitutes a superseding intervening event that breaks the chain of proximate causation.”
In Cotten v. Wilson, No. M2016-02402-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. June 19, 2019), the personal representative of decedent’s estate brought suit against defendant for negligence, seeking to “hold the defendant liable for negligently facilitating the decedent’s suicide.” Decedent was married and had a son when she met and began an affair with defendant. Decedent was a nurse at Skyline Hospital, and defendant was a psychiatrist there. Decedent divorced her husband in 2012, but she retained equal co-parenting time of her son. Two years after beginning the relationship, in October 2013, decedent moved in with defendant, at which time defendant “noticed that [she] was having frequent crying spells and seemed to be struggling with eviction, job loss, and her new job not working out.” Defendant stated that decedent was “not as energetic and motivated as she once was, and on certain days she did not take care of herself.”
Where plaintiff’s expert witness in an HCLA case unexpectedly decided to no longer provide testimony soon before plaintiff’s response to a motion for summary judgment was due, and plaintiff sought to continue the motion and hold a hearing on possible witness tampering, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to some defendants. For defendants not affected by the allegedly tampered-with witness, however, summary judgment was affirmed due to the plaintiff’s failure to obtain an expert affidavit in the eight months the case was pending.
In Stubblefield v. Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association, No. E2017-00994-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 2019), plaintiff filed an HCLA claim related to allegedly negligent post-operative care after a cardiac catheterization. Plaintiff named as defendants the hospital, the nurse who treated her overnight after her surgery, a physician group, and the physician who was first paged when a complication was discovered and who ordered treatment for plaintiff without actually going to the hospital to see her.
The printer just sent word that the proof for the second edition of Tennessee Law of Civil Trial has been shipped to my Brentwood office. I intend to review the proof over the weekend and place the order next week. The books should be in-hand by mid-September.
Those of you who purchased the first edition of the book should have received a letter from me giving you a discount on the second edition if you ordered it by August 10. Those who order by that date will save over 50% of the cost of the book. Those who order the book after August 10 will pay the full retail price, $119.00 plus shipping and handling and sales tax.
The second edition includes updated case law released since the book was first published in 2014. Several chapters have been substantially rewritten and updates have been made to virtually every chapter.
An interesting article in The Atlantic about how the law came to treat corporations as people.
An excerpt:
Somewhat unintuitively, American corporations today enjoy many of the same rights as American citizens. Both, for instance, are entitled to the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion. How exactly did corporations come to be understood as “people” bestowed with the most fundamental constitutional rights? The answer can be found in a bizarre—even farcical—series of lawsuits over 130 years ago involving a lawyer who lied to the Supreme Court, an ethically challenged justice, and one of the most powerful corporations of the day.
The Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance has released the 2018 Tennessee Health Care Liability Claims Report (“Report”). The 2018 Report was released in 2019 but contains data for 2017. The Report is required as a result of legislation passed by the Tennessee General Assembly in 2004.
Some 1589 claims against Tennessee health care providers were closed in 2017. Of those, 1242 (78.6%) were claims closed other than as the result of judgment, settlement or ADR.
Some 33 claims (2.08%) were closed as a result of judgment, 8 of which were defense verdicts in prior years but affirmed on appeal in 2017. A total of 253 cases (15.92%) were settled, and another 61 (3.84%) were resolved via ADR. (Do not ask me why these numbers are kept separately or whether they are accurate.)
When a motion for summary judgment in an HCLA case was based solely on the failure to file a certificate of good faith with the complaint, the trial court rightly considered it a motion to dismiss and allowed plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal.
In Renner v. Takoma Regional Hospital, No. E2018-00853-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019), plaintiff filed an HCLA claim against defendants, but failed to file a certificate of good faith with her complaint. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on this basis, and plaintiff subsequently filed and served a certificate of good faith. Defendants then filed motions for summary judgment, with attached affidavits, arguing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the failure to file the certificate of good faith with the complaint. Plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, and defendants argued that Rule 41.01 prohibited voluntary dismissal when a motion for summary judgment was pending. The trial court ruled that the proper way to challenge the lack of a certificate of good faith was a motion to dismiss, and that the motion for summary judgment filed in this case was “in fact just a restyled motion to dismiss in that there are no facts that are necessary here.” The trial judge ruled that he was going to consider the motion a motion to dismiss, and thus allowed plaintiff to take a nonsuit.
Day on Torts