Day on Torts

June 9, 2015

Truck Owner Not Liable for Sister-in-Law’s Tennesssee Truck Accident

In a recent Tennessee car accident case, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant on the theories of family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. In Daniels v. Huffaker, No. E2014-00869-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2015), plaintiff’s vehicle was hit by a truck driven by Huffaker as Huffaker drove to her boyfriend’s apartment. The truck driven by Huffaker was owned by Mr. Norris, Huffaker’s brother-in-law, who was deployed on active duty to Iraq at the time of the accident. While Mr. Norris was in Iraq, Huffaker split her time between her boyfriend’s apartment and her sister’s (Ms. Norris’s) home. Ms. Norris allowed Huffaker to drive Mr. Norris’s truck during his deployment since the truck was not otherwise in use. By the time of the appeal, Mr. Norris had conceded that Huffaker was a permissive user of the truck.

Plaintiff sued Huffaker and Mr. Norris for her damages related to the accident, making claims against Mr. Norris under the theories of the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Because Huffaker was never properly served, Mr. Norris was ultimately the only defendant in the case. After a hearing, the trial court granted Mr. Norris’s motion for summary judgment on both of plaintiff’s theories of liability, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

June 4, 2015

Informed Consent Expert Testimony Not Limited to Risks that Actually Materialized

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A recent informed consent case provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to analyze what risks a plaintiffs’ expert should be allowed to testify about at trial. In White v. Beeks, No. E2012-02443-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. May 18, 2015), plaintiff had undergone spinal fusion surgery after other attempts at pain management were unsuccessful. After the surgery, plaintiff’s pain initially improved but then became worse, and plaintiff alleged that this was because of an ectopic bone growth caused by the surgery. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant doctor asserting that the doctor had not given him adequate information before the surgery to enable him to give informed consent. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the doctor failed to inform him that a bone mass product called InFuse would be used, how such product would be used, or the risks associated with InFuse.

To prove his informed consent case, plaintiff needed to “prove by expert testimony 1) the information that [defendant] should have disclosed to [plaintiff] to obtain his informed consent for the surgery, as established by the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the specialty [in the same or similar community], 2) whether [defendant] disclosed appropriate information to [plaintiff] to comply with the [standard of care], and 3) whether a reasonable person in [plaintiff’s] position would have consented to the surgery if he had been provided with the information required by the recognized acceptable professional practice.”

June 1, 2015

Summary Judgment Reversed Given Evidence of Opposing Party

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Chambers v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., No. W2013-02671-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2015), plaintiffs brought a negligence action against defendant for property damage sustained in a flood. A culvert ran under defendant’s railroad track, and according to plaintiffs, the failure to maintain and keep this culvert free from debris was the cause of the flooding on plaintiffs’ property.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court eventually granted on two grounds. First, the trial court found that a relevant federal regulation “substantially subsumed the subject matter of the plaintiffs’ state law claim,” such that if defendant had complied with the regulation the action was preempted. The trial court determined that defendant had presented uncontroverted testimony regarding the condition of the culvert before the flood and thus proved the “affirmative defense of preemption.” Second, the trial court determined that expert proof was required on this issue of causation, and since plaintiffs had no expert to contradict the condition of the culvert immediately before the flooding, plaintiffs could not prove causation, an essential element of their negligence claim. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed on both of these grounds.

May 11, 2015

Summary Judgment Reversed in Fall-Down Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment in negligence case where plaintiff testified that she was paying attention and evidence presented did not depict scene from plaintiff’s perspective.

In Walden v. Central Parking System of Tennessee, Inc., No. E2014-00939-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 27, 2015), plaintiff sued defendants for negligence after falling in a parking garage. According to plaintiff, she was leaving a doctor’s appointment and walking toward her car when she fell because she did not see a step down from the curb/lobby area to the garage floor. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she was looking down, paying attention, was not distracted, and that everything looked gray and she did not see any yellow or any other reason to notice that there was a step down. Instead, plaintiff testified that from where she was walking, everything looked the same.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting photographs of the place where plaintiff fell as evidence. These photos showed yellow striping on the curb and in the “no parking area immediately in front of the curb.” Defendants admitted, however, that these photographs were taken “from an angle and viewpoint different from the one Plaintiff would have had as she was walking toward her vehicle.” The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that there no genuine issue of fact, that there was no fault on the part of defendants, and that the accident occurred “due to [plaintiff’s] own failure to observe the open and obvious condition of the premises that was there to be seen.” The Court of Appeals reversed.

May 8, 2015

Tennessee HCLA Case Dismissed for Non-Compliant HIPAA Form.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

As HCLA cases continue to make their way through the court system, we are learning more about what will constitute substantial compliance with the pre-suit notice content requirements. In the recent case of Harmon v. Shore, No. M2014-01339-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 23, 2015), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed what seems like an overly harsh result related to substantial compliance with the required HIPAA authorization.

In Harmon, plaintiff was injured by a procedure performed solely by Dr. Shore. Plaintiff submitted pre-suit notice to the two defendants she later named in her suit, Dr. Shore and the relevant hospital. The HIPAA form enclosed, however, only released plaintiff’s medical records to her own lawyer. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was initially denied in 2013, but following a denial of Rule 9 appeal from the Court of Appeals and then a remand from the Supreme Court to reconsider in light of the holding in Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., 418 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2013), the motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court.

Plaintiff did not argue that her HIPAA form strictly complied with the statutory requirements. Instead, her essential argument was that her non-compliance with the technical requirements should be excused because the defendants already had all the records at issue in this case. In her reply to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff stated:

May 7, 2015

Understanding the Discretionary Function Exception to the Tennessee GTLA

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In a recent case that fell under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the discretionary function exception to the GTLA as well as the findings a trial court must make to support a summary judgment decision.

In Lewis v. Shelby County, No. W2014-00408-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 17, 2015), two counselors who worked at a correctional facility in Shelby County sued for negligence related to injuries they sustained when attacked by an inmate. Plaintiffs alleged that on the night of the attack, the facility was understaffed; that they radioed their supervisor two times prior to the attack but he failed to appear; and that they made four “code red” calls for assistance during the attack, but that no one responded. Their suit was based on each of these three allegedly negligent acts.

May 6, 2015

GTLA Complaint Survives Motion to Dismiss

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Holder v. Shelby County, No. W2014-01910-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 21, 2015), a father sued the county for acts of negligence by a county employee that he alleged caused the death of his son. The son was involved in a car accident and subsequently arrested. Upon evaluation, the son was determined to have a mental condition that caused him to be a threat to himself and others. He was accordingly put into a special housing unit for unstable inmates, where policy dictated that a guard perform mandatory safety checks of all inmates every thirty minutes.

Officer Moore was on duty from 2:00 pm to 10:00 pm on the day the son was in the facility. Moore later admitted that he did not do any safety checks during that time, despite writing in the log book that he did and that at 9:16 pm all the inmates, including plaintiff’s son, were resting peacefully. After the 10:00 shift change, another deputy performed a safety check at 10:14 pm and found the son hanging in his cell by a bed sheet. The son still had a pulse but was not breathing, and he eventually died from his injuries.

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that his son died as a “result of Deputy Moore’s negligence and that Shelby County was vicariously liable.” The County filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the grounds that 1) the complaint alleged only intentional acts and 2) Officer Moore was not acting within the scope of his employment, either of which would be enough to find that immunity was not removed under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). The trial court granted the County’s motion, finding that the complaint failed to allege any negligent acts and that Moore’s falsification of the logs was not within the scope of his employment. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision.

May 2, 2015

Real Estate Statute of Repose Wipes Out Fire Loss Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Hayes v. Coopertown’s Mastersweep, Inc., No. W2014-00783-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 17, 2015), plaintiffs brought a negligence claim based on the alleged negligent inspection of their fireplace. Two issues were addressed on appeal—whether defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiffs and whether this case fell under the four-year statute of repose applicable to injuries to real property related to deficient design and construction.

In 2000, plaintiffs purchased a house built in 1964 that had a fireplace, which plaintiffs had remodeled by a third party. Part of this remodel included lowering the firebox to be flush with the floor. The remodeled fireplace did not work well, allowing smoke to escape into the den, the upper floors and the attic. Plaintiffs thus hired defendant to inspect the fireplace and determine what was causing the smoke issues. Plaintiffs did not tell defendant about the previous fireplace renovations or that the firebox had been lowered. Defendant performed the inspection requested, and part of the defendant’s work “went beyond the inspection that [plaintiffs] contracted for,” including inspecting beneath the fireplace from the crawlspace and drilling into the fireplace to determine whether any combustible material was coming into contact with the fireplace. Because of the design and construction of the fireplace, however, “there were areas underneath the fireplace that could not be seen or inspected” by defendant. Defendant made certain redesign recommendations based on his inspection, and plaintiffs hired defendant to perform the recommended work. Defendant completed this work on October 8, 2003. Subsequently, on January 17, 2005, plaintiffs’ home was damaged by fire when “wooden floor joists that had been in contact with the firebox ignited from exposure to heat generated by the fireplace,” a problem related to the first remodel done by the unnamed third party.

April 28, 2015

Signing an “As Is” Agreement Negates Reliance on Alleged Misrepresentation

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Justifiable reliance is one of four elements a plaintiff must prove in a negligent misrepresentation case. In the recent case of Pritchett v. Comas Montgomery Realty & Auction Co., Inc., No. M2014-00583-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 15, 2015), the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff who signed an agreement stating that the sale of real estate was “as is” and that he would only rely upon his own inspection could not prove this essential reliance element of his negligent misrepresentation claim.

The plaintiff in Pritchett went to an auction for commercial real estate that had been advertised as being 11,556 square feet. Before the auction began, plaintiff signed a “Terms of Sale” form that stated that everything was being sold “as is” and that “buyer shall rely entirely on their own inspection and information.” The auctioneer also announced that all property was sold “as is.” Plaintiff was the highest bidder and thus signed a contract of sale. The contract stated that “buyer specifically acknowledges herein that the property is being purchased ‘as is’ and that neither the Seller nor [Defendant] makes any warranties or representations, express or implied, as to the habitability or condition of the real property contained herein.” The sales contract did not state the square feet of the building. After taking possession of the property, plaintiff discovered that the building was actually only 9,353 square feet and accordingly brought this negligent misrepresentation claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, although on different grounds.

April 23, 2015

Is Plaintiff’s Fault Percentage Applied Before or After Tort Reform Damage Cap?

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Court of Appeals recently released an extensive opinion in a Tennessee car accident case, full of issues regarding evidence and trial questions. Three of the findings in this opinion are critical for tort lawyers to familiarize themselves with: (1) that where there is evidence that a plaintiff could not see an approaching car, a directed verdict for the defendant was not negligent would not be appropriate; (2) that long-term care damages can be causally related to the accident and recoverable, despite the age of the plaintiff; and (3) that an award of non-economic damages should be reduced by any comparative fault finding before the statutory cap is applied.

In Monypeny v. Kheiv, No. W2014-00656-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct App. April 1, 2015), a married couple who were 82 and 90 years old were driving in a vehicle that was struck by defendant. Evidence showed that prior to the accident, the husband and wife were both quite active and lived completely independently. Following the accident, however, the wife died a few months later in the hospital as a result of injuries sustained therein, and the husband went through the hospital, rehabilitation facility, and then an assisted living center, never able to live independently again. Plaintiffs filed suit for economic and non-economic damages, asserting that defendant’s driving caused the crash, while defendant responded that plaintiff husband (the driver at the time) was at fault. Because the driver of the other car was not insured, plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist carrier acted as defendant. At trial, the jury found for plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.