The Tennessee Supreme Court will hear two health care liability disputes among four cases scheduled for oral arguments March 4, 2015 in Jackson, Tennessee, one of which will address an interesting civil procedure question.

The first case concerns the procedures required when filing a health care liability lawsuit. At the time the suit was filed, state law required a plaintiff to file a certificate within 90 days of the initiation of a lawsuit, confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with medical experts before filing the suit and stating whether the plaintiff’s lawyer has ever been in violation of the law requiring the certificate. In this case from Dyer County, the attorney, who had never violated the statute, filed the required certificate but did not state that he had zero prior violations of the statute. The defendants sought dismissal of the case based on that omission. The plaintiffs sought to dismiss the case with the option to refile it.

The trial court allowed the dismissal and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court will consider whether the failure to indicate zero prior violations of the law constitutes a failure to comply with the law requiring the good faith certificate.  The case is Timothy Davis v. Michael Ibach, M.D. and Martinson Ansah, M.D. 

         The interplay between the saving statute and the 120-day extension provided by the HCLA in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) continues to be a hotly litigated topic, with the Tennessee Court of Appeals adding another opinion to the mix this week. In 2013, the Supreme Court held that transitional plaintiffs (those whose initial suits were filed before the pre-suit notice requirement was enacted but who nonsuited and re-filed after the pre-suit notice requirement went into effect), who were required to give pre-suit notice before re-filing their lawsuit, were entitled to the 120-day extension even though they were filing their second suit pursuant to the saving statute instead of the traditional statute of limitation. Rajvongs v. Wright, 432 S.W.3d 808 (Tenn. 2013). Then just a month ago, the Supreme Court held that the HCLA “requires that plaintiffs provide pre-suit notice to prospective health care defendants each time a complaint is filed,” meaning that a plaintiff who gives proper notice, nonsuits, then re-files must give a second notice before the re-filing of the claims, even if the claims are identical. Foster v. Chiles, 2015 WL 343872 (Tenn. Jan. 27, 2015). Now, in Tinnel v. East Tenn. Ear, Nose, and Throat Specialists, P.C., No. E2014-00906-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2015), the Court of Appeals has interpreted these prior cases to find that a plaintiff who nonsuits an HCLA case and then gives proper notice and re-files is entitled to the 120-day extension on the re-filed complaint.

            In Tinnel, plaintiff suffered an injury during an outpatient procedure resulting in blindness in one eye. The procedure was performed on February 3, 2009. Plaintiff gave proper pre-suit notice on May 19, 2009, then filed suit on February 3, 2010. On December 14, 2010, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the first lawsuit. Subsequently, on October 18, 2011 and within one year of the nonsuit, plaintiff provided a second set of pre-suit notices to defendants. Plaintiff filed her second suit on April 3, 2012, which was more than a year from the date of her previous nonsuit but within the time that would be included if the 120-day extension were applied. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that the second suit was not timely.

            Plaintiff argued that the reasoning the Supreme Court used in Rajvongs should not be confined to transitional plaintiffs and should apply to provide her with the 120-day extension. Moreover, she asserted that since her first suit was filed within the traditional one-year statute of limitation, she had not yet utilized the 120-day extension. Defendants asserted that the Rajvongs holding should be limited only to transitional plaintiffs and that plaintiff automatically received the 120-day extension on her first suit, whether she used it or not, and was therefore not entitled to another extension. The trial court dismissed the case, and plaintiff appealed.

The Tennessean has a fascinating video interview of Todd Easter, one of the jurors in the Corey Batey and Brandon Vandenburg rape trial.    Juror feedback in any case gives trial lawyers helpful information about how to present information to a jury.  Mr. Easter’s interview yielded the following reminders:  

1.     Under Promise and Over Deliver —  In the Vanderbilt rape trial, one of the areas in which the lawyers over promised was the expected length of the trial.  The initial projection by the lawyers was 9 days.  Instead, the trial took 3 weeks.   Mr. Easter mentions this twice in his interview.  Since it sounds like both sides underestimated the time needed, the jurors were probably not mad at either side. But, if one side unilaterally makes a commitment on time (or evidence) and does not deliver, it could get ugly.  So,  Mr. Easter’s interview reminds us to be respectful of jurors time and under promise and over deliver.

2.     Digital Evidence is Hard to Overcome – If you are unfamiliar with the Vanderbilt rape case, the rape of the unconscious woman was videotaped and then shared with friends.  In addition, cameras in the dorms captured the defendants carrying the unconscious victim into the dorm and then later depositing her naked in the hallway.   Not surprisingly, the jurors found this evidence to be compelling and “impossible to refute”, which takes us to the next point.

            In Overton v. Westgate Resorts, LTD., L.P., No. E2014-00303-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015), the Court of Appeals recently affirmed a punitive damage award in a fraud and misrepresentation case. Plaintiffs had traveled to Gatlinburg to look for and purchase a timeshare. Their primary concern was being able to accommodate their extended family for a trip the same week each December. While in downtown, they saw a Westgate booth and made arrangements to attend a presentation. According to plaintiffs, the presentation was “high pressure” and salespeople spent almost eight hours with plaintiffs on the relevant day. Plaintiffs found a unit that would fit their needs and decided to purchase the timeshare from Westgate.

            Plaintiffs asserted that their decision to purchase was based on assurances from the Westgate salespeople. Specifically, the Westgate representatives stated that plaintiffs would be able to retain the unit they looked at for the same week in December each year; that they would be able to book unlimited additional nights at any Westgate resort at a promotional price; that the two salespeople they worked with would refund part of their commission; and that the salespeople would purchase a foosball table to be kept at the resort for plaintiffs to use during their stays. The agreements regarding the commission and foosball table were put in writing, but the other two were not. Plaintiffs closed on the timeshare at 11:00 pm that night and were given copies of their closing documents and three CD-ROMs. The purchase price was just under $40,000.

            After closing, plaintiffs tried to confirm their December reservation, and after some unsuccessful attempts were informed that the booking would not be guaranteed for the unit they had looked at and that units were not assigned until a few days before arrival. After speaking to several customer service individuals, they also found out that they did not have the ability to book unlimited nights at other resorts as described during the presentation. Plaintiffs retained counsel, who realized that plaintiffs had not been given a current copy of the Westgate’s public offering statement, as required by the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Instead, plaintiffs had received an old version on CD-ROM which was extremely difficult to access and navigate. Plaintiffs sought to rescind the contract based on the TCPA, but Westgate refused. Plaintiffs then brought this action. 

Here are the civil cases set for oral argument in Nashville on February 4 and 5, 2015:

  • The Chattanooga-Hamilton Co. Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health Systems v. United Healthcare Plan of the River Valley, Inc. d/b/a Americhoice and TN Attorney General Erlanger Hospital in Chattanooga filed suit against Americhoice claiming that the TennCare-managed health plan did not pay in full for services rendered in its emergency room. Americhoice, which did not have a contract with the hospital, said they were only responsible for the rates specified in the TennCare regulations. The hospital’s claims were dismissed by the trial court, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court will hear the appeal of Americhoice and the Tennessee Attorney General.
  • Action Chiropractic Clinic, LLC v. Prentice Delon Hyler & Erie Ins. ExchangeThis case involves a patient of Action Chiropractic Clinic of Nashville who assigned his rights to an insurance settlement over to the clinic, which was treating him for injuries caused in an automobile accident. Erie Insurance Exchange did not honor the assignment. Action Chiropractic Clinic sued, but the trial court ruled for Erie. The Court of Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court will consider whether such assignment of insurance proceeds is allowed.
  • Richard Moreno v. City of ClarksvilleMr. Moreno filed a claim with the State Division of Claims Administration after a tree on state property fell on his car and injured him. The claim was then passed along to the Claims Commission and Mr. Moreno filed a complaint there. The state then alleged that the City of Clarksville was also to blame for the injury. When Mr. Moreno filed suit against the City of Clarksville, the city said the deadline for filing a complaint had passed. The trial court agreed, but the Court of Appeals said he had met the requirements by filing the original Claims Commission complaint on time. The Supreme Court will consider whether the requirements were indeed fulfilled.
  • In re Estate of Sarah Margaret WilkinsThis case from Robertson County considers whether a son who had a health care power of attorney for his mother was required to submit to arbitration before proceeding with a lawsuit against the nursing home for abuse and neglect of his mother. The trial court said the arbitration was required, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. The Supreme Court will determine if the son was authorized to execute an arbitration agreement on behalf of his mother.

 

Attorneys for one of the defendants convicted of raping an unconscious student intends to file a motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct. Specifically, the juror in question was a rape victim and allegedly failed to disclose that fact during voir dire questioning. Defense attorneys contend the juror was asked about past experiences with the criminal justice system as either a victim or defendant, and this juror failed to respond. Yet, an attorney for the juror has issued a statement there was not any misrepresentation. 

Of course, this situation is every trial lawyer’s nightmare, right? There are two possibilities here. First, as the defense contends, the juror concealed her past in the face of a question specifically posed to unveil such an issue. This scenario is a nightmare mostly for the prosecution as now they have a new issue to handle on appeal while trying to hold on to the guilty verdict.

The second possibility is the defense lawyers did not ask the right question to elicit the juror’s past as a rape victim. If this juror did not report the rape to the police, then it is unlikely she had any interaction with the criminal justice system as a victim. Since rape is thought to be one of the most underreported crimes with only about 16% of victims reporting, this scenario is more probable than possible. Needless to say, this is the defense lawyer’s worst nightmare because he failed to simply ask whether any prospective juror was a rape victim.  Instead, he asked a much more general question.

In case you have been living under a rock and have not heard, there are at least 121 confirmed cases of the measles traced from an outbreak at Disneyland in California in December.  The outbreak is significant for a number of reasons:

1.     Last year, the U.S. had a record number of measles cases since the virus was officially declared eliminated in 2000.

2.     Health officials including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are linking the current outbreak to non-vaccinated individuals;

          In 2011, the Tennessee legislature amended the Health Care Liability Act (“HCLA”) to add language regarding governmental entities to the chapter. Per the amendments, health care liability action now specifically includes “claims against the state or a political subdivision thereof,” and health care provider includes “those physicians and nurses employed by a governmental health facility.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101. The Court of Appeals first found that this language meant that the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations applies to HCLA cases that fall under the Governmental Tort Liability Act in Harper v. Bradley County, No. E2014-00107-COA-R9-CV, 2014 WL 5487788 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2014). Now the Court has come to that same conclusion in two additional opinions.

            Before the 2011 amendments took effect, the HCLA contained no reference to governmental entities. In Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the HCLA, as it existed prior to the 2011 amendments, did not “evince an express legislative intent to extend the statute of limitations in GTLA cases.” Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing an HCLA claim against a governmental entity was still constricted by the one-year statute of limitations and unable to take advantage of the 120-day extension granted to plaintiffs who give proper pre-suit notice.

            Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the interplay of the GTLA and HCLA since the 2011 amendments took effect, the Court of Appeals has now found in three cases that, pursuant to the new language, plaintiffs suing governmental entities under the HCLA are entitled to the 120-day extension so long as they provide proper pre-suit notice. After Harper, the Court reaffirmed its reasoning in Banks v. Bordeaux Long Term Care, 2014 WL 6872979 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2014). Here, plaintiff sent pre-suit notice prior to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations then filed suit within the subsequent 120-day window. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim as untimely, but the Court of Appeals reversed. After citing the changes to the HCLA and the reasoning from Harper, the Court held that “Plaintiff’s pre-suit ‘notice’ to the governmental entities was sufficient in all respects; therefore, the GTLA statute of limitations was tolled for an additional 120 days.”

          As Tennessee courts continue to decide new Health Care Liability Act (“HCLA”) cases, nuances of the law are beginning to be parsed out for practitioners’ guidance. The Tennessee Supreme Court recently took up such a nuance, determining that pre-suit notice must be given before the filing of each complaint under the HCLA.

            In Foster v. Chiles, No. E2012-01780-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Jan. 27, 2015), plaintiffs filed an HCLA claim against multiple defendants on March 17, 2011, which was within the appropriate statute of limitations. In connection with this first complaint, plaintiffs gave proper pre-suit notice under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). On May 6, 2011, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. On May 4, 2012, within the one-year savings statute, plaintiffs filed a new complaint asserting the same claims against the same defendants. This second complaint stated that the notice requirements had been met as shown by an attached affidavit, but nothing was attached. The plaintiffs, in fact, did not give pre-suit notice after dismissing their first complaint and before filing their second. Instead, they relied on the first notice given to comply with the HCLA.        

            Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the HCLA required plaintiffs to give notice each time a complaint was filed. The trial court agreed, dismissing plaintiffs’ second complaint with prejudice. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, finding that the HCLA “required only that Defendants be notified once.” The Supreme Court then took up the issue on appeal.

The most recent version of my book, Compendium of Tort Reform Statutes and Related Case Law, 2008-2014, is now available.  

The book includes tort reform statutes enacted by the Tennessee General Assembly in the period indicated and reference to the appellate court decisions to-date that have interpreted those laws;

The book contains over 200 pages of references to important changes in Tennessee common law of torts and statutory changes to the law of civil procedure that impact tort lawyers.

Contact Information