Day on Torts

April 24, 2014

Health Care POA Must Have Specific Authority to Agree

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently decided Wilkins v. GGNSC Springfield, a case involving alleged nursing home abuse and neglect in which the decedent’s health care power of attorney signed an optional arbitration agreement on behalf of the decedent. The nursing home sought to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion holding that the POA did not have authority to sign the arbitration agreement on behalf of the decedent. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision of the trial court.

n this case, the Court of Appeals reminds us of Tennessee law regarding powers of attorney:

The execution of a power of attorney creates a principal–agent relationship. Tenn. Farmers Life Reassurance Co. v. Rose, 239 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tenn. 2007). “[A] person executing a power of attorney may empower his or her agent to do the same acts, to make the same contracts, and to achieve the same legal consequences as the principal would be personally empowered to do.” Id. “The language of a power of attorney determines the extent of the authority conveyed.” Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Roberts, 211 S.W.3d 867, 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). “The more specific a power of attorney is concerning the performance of particular acts, the more the agent is restricted from performing acts beyond the specific authority granted.” Id. A power of attorney evidences to third parties the purpose of the agency and the extent of the agent’s powers. Id. A power of attorney “should be construed using the same rules of construction generally applicable to contracts and other written instruments, except to the extent that the fiduciary relationship between the principal and the agent requires otherwise.” Id. at 749–50 (footnote omitted). The legal effect of a written contract or other written instrument is a question of law. Id. at 750.

April 23, 2014

Tennessee Court of Appeals Reverses Finding of No Liability of Jailer for Failure to Provide Proper Medical Care to Inmate

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The recent case of Payne v. Tipton County gave the Tennessee Court of Appeals the opportunity to review the finding of the trial court of no liability on the part of the defendant, Tipton County, for failure to provide appropriate and timely medical care to an inmate. The inmate suffered a severe hypertensive crisis while in custody of the county, leading to renal failure, a stroke, heart attack, hemorrhage on his brain, anemia, seizures, kidney failure, and other conditions and resulting in a 45-day hospital admission.

The inmate appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the trial court. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals addressed what duty was owed to the inmate by Tipton County. The court noted that under Tennessee law prison officials have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of those in their custody, but that they are not insurers of a prisoner’s safety. Instead, prison officials must act reasonably in light of the inmate’s known condition. The court went on to discuss the duty of a prison to provide inmates with access to proper medical treatment.

The court reviewed the evidence and testimony presented at trial and found that the County failed to provide the inmate with appropriate medical care and failed to follow its own procedures with regard to providing the inmate with medical care. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that Tipton County breached its duty to provide proper medical treatment during the inmate’s confinement by:

April 22, 2014

Tennessee Court Holds that Jury Need Not Be Instructed on Financial Effect of Fault Being Assessed Against a Non-Party That Had Previously Settled

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the case of Lake v. The Memphis Landsmen in its third trip to the court. A number of issues were raised in the appeal, but by far the most interesting one concerned the plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred in including a non-party who plaintiffs previously settled with on the jury verdict form. The plaintiffs also contended that to the extent the non-party was properly included on the form, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the effect of allocating negligence to the non-party. Why is this issue important to the plaintiffs? Because the jury handed down an $8,543,530 verdict but attributed 100% fault to the non-party.

This case concerned a wreck between a passenger bus and a concrete truck. The concrete truck took a left turn and struck the bus causing it to collide with a light pole and eject the plaintiff and resulting in a traumatic brain injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs settled with the concrete truck defendant before trial and then proceeded to trial against several other defendants on various theories of liability concerning the passenger bus.

In this appeal, the Court of Appeals first explained that Tennessee has a system of modified comparative fault, adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1992 in the landmark case of McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52,56 (Tenn. 1992). Under this system, fault is apportioned among all parties in proportion to their degree of culpability, and a defendant is only liable for the percentage of damages that his or her own negligence caused. In McIntyre, the court also adopted the non-party defense, allowing juries to apportion fault to non-parties with culpability. McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58.

April 21, 2014

Poor Lighting Leads to Reversal of Summary Judgment for Defendant in Tennessee Fall Down Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Knowledge of inadequate lighting was enough to create a jury issue of dangerous condition in Christian v. Ayers L.P. d/b/a Ms. Lassie’s Lodge, No. E2013-00401-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 2014), according to the Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff attended an event for “Relay for Life” sponsored by the American Cancer Society at defendant owned Ms. Lassie’s Lodge. When plaintiff left the event between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m., it was dark outside. Plaintiff testified that she had trouble seeing the ground and walked slowly with extra caution to her car in the parking area adjacent to the lodge. There was no lighting on the walkway or in the parking area. Plaintiff fell mid-stride after her left foot went down further than her right foot near the edge of the walkway. She suffered a four-part humerus fracture and incurred $52,000 in medical expenses after hospitalization and surgery.

Owner’s representative and partner testified that she had opened and closed the lodge that evening. Upon arriving, owner’s representative flipped “some switches” and became aware that the lights on the walkway and in the parking lot were not on, causing her to look unsuccessfully for the switch for the outside lights. She was then told that there was no switch and the lights should come on automatically. It was later determined by workers after plaintiff’s fall that multiple exterior bulbs, including the lights in question, were burned out.

April 14, 2014

Tennessee’s Three-Year Health Care Liability Statute of Repose Bars Claim

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

This case involves the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act and the application of the three-year statute of repose. On December 19, 1999, Jessie Bentley suffered severe injuries during labor and delivery by the defendant medical providers. Suit was not filed until February 1, 2013 and the defendants all immediately moved for dismissal citing the three-year statute of repose and the Calaway decision. Relying on the Crespo decision, plaintiff defended by arguing application of the statute of repose violated his due process rights and violated the equal protection clause. The trial court granted the dismissal and the appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis with the proposition that vested rights of action in tort are constitutionally protected property interests and thus they are protected by both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Next, the Court turned to the Calaway decision, 193 S.W. 3d 509 (Tenn. 2005), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a "plaintiff’s minority does not toll the medical malpractice statute of repose". In short, the Calaway Court reasoned that to allow disability or minority to toll the statute of repose would defeat the very purpose of the statute. However, the Court was mindful of those plaintiffs and lawyers who had relied upon prior decisions and ruled the statute of repose would only have prospective application to cases commenced after December 9, 2005.

The Court of Appeals also found the plaintiff’s reliance on the Crespo decision was misplaced. In Crespo, approximately one year after the birth of their minor child, the parents hired counsel to pursue a medical malpractice claim. Relying on prior precedent, the malpractice investigation proceeded at a "relatively leisurely pace, which was perfectly reasonable given the clearly stated law at the time." Four years after the birth, as the plaintiff’s were awaiting responses to requests for medical records and were preparing to file suit, the Calaway decision was rendered and Crespo’s case was instantly gone. Under those circumstances, the Court of Appeals found the Crespos had been denied due process and their right to equal protection were violated.

April 9, 2014

Not All Rear-End Collisions Result in Plaintiff’s Verdicts

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Court of appeals recently affirmed a jury’s defense verdict in a rear-end car crash case in Hicks v. Prahl, No. E2013-00285-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 25, 2014). Plaintiff was driving on an entrance ramp trying to merge onto a highway when, according to her testimony, she slowed down to negotiate a sharp curve on the entrance ramp and was rear-ended by defendant’s vehicle. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that plaintiff slowed to a complete stop twice while attempting to merge onto the highway, the second of which immediately preceded the collision. According to defendant, plaintiff came to a complete stop on the entrance ramp and then began moving forward again. Defendant then rotated her neck over her left shoulder to look for approaching traffic and lifted her foot off the brake, causing her car to move forward. Defendant testified that when she returned to looking ahead she discovered that plaintiff had stopped in front of her again. Defendant stated that she quickly applied her brakes but was not able to avoid crashing into the rear end of plaintiff’s car. Defendant explained that she had no reason to suspect that plaintiff would stop a second time because the curve on the entrance ramp allowed defendant to see that there were no cars in front of plaintiff’s car and no other reason for such a stop.

Plaintiff was talking on her cell phone at the time of the crash. Plaintiff’s daughter testified that she was talking with her mother who was using the speaker phone while driving. Daughter and husband also corroborated plaintiff’s testimony about the sharp curve on the entrance ramp requiring significant deceleration. The opinion mentions that plaintiff amended her complaint to seek $1.5 million dollars in damages, although there’s no description of plaintiff’s injuries, medical expenses, or other damages. Plaintiff refused medical treatment at the scene because she did not think it was a “major accident,” but she did go to the emergency room later that day.

At trial, plaintiff testified that she did not ever stop on the entrance ramp while attempting to merge onto the highway, but instead she merely lifted her foot off the gas pedal. When impeached with the averment in the complaint that she was “stopped to wait for traffic,” plaintiff testified that the pleading was in error. Plaintiff also testified that she could not remember making the statements to personnel in the emergency room that she was rear-ended while “sitting stopped in her car.”

April 2, 2014

Nurse Practitioners Now Exempt From Subpoena to Trial

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee General Assembly has passed, and the Governor has signed, legislation adding nurse practitioners to the list of people who are ordinarily exempt from subpoena to trial. Nurse practitioners are still subject to being subpoenaed to give a deposition.

Here are the other people who are exempt from subpoena to trial under T.C.A. Section 24-9-101(a):

An officer of the United States;
An officer of Tennessee;
An officer of any Tennessee court or municipality;
The clerk of any court of record other than that in which the suit is pending;
A member of the Tennessee general assembly while in session, or clerk or officer thereof;
A practicing physician, physician assistant, advanced practice nurse, psychologist, senior psychological examiner, chiropractor, dentist or attorney;
A jailer or keeper of a public prison in any county other than that in which the suit is pending; and
A custodian of medical records, if such custodian files a copy of the applicable records and an affidavit with the court and follows the procedures provided for producing records as required by law.

April 1, 2014

Preserving Timely Filings of Tort Actions in Tennessee General Sessions Court

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently held that a General Sessions plaintiff cannot skip the procedure for filing unserved process to avoid letting the statute of limitations run.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-902 requires a plaintiff in General Sessions court to return process within 60 days of issuance. § 16-15-902 does not explicitly state that a plaintiff must return the process if it is unserved. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-710, however, a plaintiff who does return process as unserved must take action to rely on the original filing date for the statute of limitations. Once the plaintiff returns the process as unserved, the plaintiff has to either have process reissued within 9 months or refile the case within one year.

In Gates v. Perry, No. 2013-01992-COA – R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 26, 2014) the plaintiff never filed the unserved process with the court, and instead had a new warrant issued eighteen months later. The plaintiff argued that, since he never filed the unserved process, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-710 was never triggered. The trial court agreed, and denied a motion to dismiss by the defendant.

March 31, 2014

Close Enough for Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: Substantial Compliance Rather Than Strict Compliance in HealthCare Liability Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

This is yet another Tennessee medical malpractice (health care liability) notice case and the issue is whether strict compliance is required for T.C.A. § 29-26-121 (a)(3) and (4), which requires an affidavit from the party mailing the notice. The underlying procedural facts were not in dispute: plaintiff fully and strictly complied with the pre-suit notice provisions of T.C.A. § 29-26-121(a) but failed to simultaneously file an affidavit of the party mailing the pre-suit notice. Instead, the plaintiff filed it after the notice was given and before the defendants filed any responsive pleading. In response, the defendants filed a “gotcha” motion to dismiss arguing the failure to simultaneously file the affidavit required a dismissal of the case.

The trial court disagreed noting the error had been remedied prior to the defendants filing a responsive pleading and ultimately finding the plaintiff had complied with the notice provision of the Act. An interlocutory appeal was granted pursuant to Rule 10 and the Court of Appeals made quick work of the issue relying on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., No. M2012-00582-SC-SO9-CV, 2013 WL 61580000.

In Stevens, the Tennessee Supreme Court had been asked to decide whether strict compliance was required with T.C.A. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) (the HIPPA compliant medical authorization section of the Act). Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that substantial compliance rather than strict compliance was all that was required for that particular section because the provision was non-substantive and no prejudice had befallen the defendants as a result of the non-compliance.

March 28, 2014

Tennessee Medical Malpractice Case Rich With Law on Speculative Damages, NIED Claims and Whether Disruption of Family Planning Is A Valid Claim

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Memphis, Tennessee medical malpractice cases always seem to have a more than their fair share of twists and turns. This health care liability case has more twists and turns than the Cherohala Skyway TN 165 / NC143 from Tellico Plains to Robbinsville ( a great road for our motorcycling friends).

During her third pregnancy, Plaintiff Michelle Rye was under the care of Dr. Diane Long, a physician with Women’s Care Center of Memphis. Because Ms. Rye has Rh negative blood, the standard of care dictated she be given a RhoGAM injection during her pregnancy. The defendants failed to give Ms. Rye the RhoGAM injection and she developed Rh-sensitization as a result. Rh-sensitization is a condition in which, if the in utero child has Rh positive blood, the mother’s antibodies attack the baby’s blood cells causing injury to the baby.

The defendants admitted they failed to comply with the standard of care but denied the plaintiffs had suffered any damage. In particular, in support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants attached the affidavit of Dr. Stovall who opined it could not be said with any reasonable degree of medical certainty that any Rh-sensitized female would ever sustain any injuries or damage and the same was true even if the woman conceived another child as the child would have to have Rh-positive blood for the condition to be in play.