A recent opinion from the Alabama Supreme Court reminds us that  many things – even obscure things –  can cause a reversal of jury verdict.

        In Ford Motor Co. v. Duckett, No. 1090833, (Ala. 2/11/2011) a unanimous Alabama Supreme Court reversed a multi-million dollar verdict in favor of a plaintiff because the trial judge did not properly handle the jury selection process. The products liability trial was expected to last as many as four weeks, and the trial judge asked all potential jurors who were gathered in a jury assembly room to indicate whether they could serve during a three or four week trial. Those who indicated “yes” went through traditional voir dire. The defense objected to this course of action, saying that the judge was “asking for a jury of volunteers” in violation of Alabama law and that they were entitled to a randomly selected jury. 

        Despite the absence of any case law directly on point, the Alabama Supreme Court held this method of selecting jurors for participation in the ultimate jury selection process was inappropriate under Alabama law. The Court noted that while no one challenged the composition of the original jury pool, the trial judge committed reversible error when he reduced the size of the pool by asking who could serve for a trial expected to last three to four weeks. 

Yesterday I shared data on auto negligence cases from Shannon Ragland’s Tennessee Jury Verdict Reporter Year in Review 2010.  You can order your own copy of the publication here

Here is some other data of interest:

  • There were 33 medical malpractice  jury trials in the covered one-year period.  The patient prevailed in 10 of those case.
  • There were 16 premises liability jury trials.  The plaintiff prevailed in 4 of those cases.
  • There were 2 product liability jury trials, and the plaintiff won both.
  • There was one dog bite trial, and the plaintiff won it.

There is 15 verdicts of $1,000,000 or more, increasing the total number of million dollar verdicts for the last six years to 84.  The two million dollar verdicts in auto wreck cases last year involved drunk drivers.  One such verdict was discussed in the previous post.   I have been told, but do not know with 100% certainty, that the other $1 million verdict was against a man with very few assets and only $25,000 in liability coverage.

Shannon Ragland from Louisville, KY has a company called Jury Verdict Publications.  Shannon gathers jury verdict data in several states and  publishes a monthly report for each state.  He also publishes an annual review for each state, which includes all of the jury verdicts for the prior year and analyzes the data that he has gathered.  The annual review also includes data from previous years.

Over the next few days I will be sharing some of the data in the Tennessee Jury Verdict Reporter Year in Review 2011.  You can order your own copy of the book from Shannon here.

What I like about Shannon’s work is that he actually analyzes the information he gathers, unlike those that prepare the annual report on civil filings issued by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts.  Please note that I do not intend to criticize the AOC by comment – it gathers data from others (court clerks) and simply publishes it.  Shannon gathers data and studies it.  Big difference.

 

Experienced trial lawyers – heck, people with experience in life – know that when people have a valid point to make they don’t have any reason to misrepresent facts.

So when Justin Owen of Tennessee Center for Policy Research talks about the need for tort reform, you would think he would make an effort to state facts.  Real facts.  Facts presented in a non-misleading way.

And you would think that to the extent that he stated a fact he would not leap or attempt to cause another to leap to a conclusion not reasonably supported by the fact.

From Reuters: 

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal regulations setting vehicle safety standards do not bar lawsuits seeking damages from automakers for installing lap-only seat belts.

The unanimous ruling held that a California lawsuit against Mazda Motor Corp. over a fatal 2002 collision involving a 1993 Mazda minivan could proceed. A passenger sitting in a rear seat and wearing a lap-only seat belt was killed.

The Arizona Supreme Court has reversed prior law and held  that a claim for medical expenses arising out of a personal injury to a child may be asserted by the child or the parents, but not both.

The case is Estate of Madison Alexis Desela v. Prescott Unified School District,  No. CV-10-0172-PR  (AZ  1/18/11).

Historically, Arizona law provided that the medical expense claim belonged to the injured child’s parents, who had the obligation to assert that claim within the statute of limitations applicable to adults.

With the current effort to help health care providers avoid full responsibility for their actions gaining steam in our state legislature, it seems appropriate to re-print this post from five years ago, with slight modifications.

I found this memo at an empty corner table in the bar in the basement of the Hermitage Hotel in downtown Nashville, sitting on table next to an empty bottle of Opus and two wine glasses.

To: Tennessee Medical Association  Director for Tort Reform

The Missouri Supreme Court has determined that comparative fault principles should apply to cases where the loss suffered by the plaintiff is purely economic.

In Children’s Wish Foundation, International, Inc. v. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C.,   No. SC9094 (Missouri S.C. 2/8/11)  plaintiff brought a professional negligence claim against the accounting firm that provided it auditing services and another firm that provided tax services.   Defendants persuaded the trial court to charge the jury that any contributory negligence of plaintiff barred its claim.  The jury returned a verdict for defendants.

The issue on appeal was whether comparative fault applies in a professional negligence action alleging only economic damage.  (Missouri adopted comparative fault in personal injury cases in 1983).  Defendants argued that contributory negligence should bar the claim because the relationship between them and the plaintiff was governed by a contract and that contract gave the parties the opportunity to allocate risk of loss.

Governor Haslam (R-Tenn.) has introduced his tort reform bill which, among other things, imposes an arbitrary cap on  the damages a jury may award for pain, suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium (in both personal injury cases and wrongful death cases).  The proposed cap is $750,000. 

The stated reason?  According to the Times Free Press, the Governor thinks we need to “make sure there aren’t states around us that don’t have more welcoming climates around us than we have.”   My guess is that he means that Tennessee needs to more welcoming to those who negligently  cause harm as opposed to those who suffer from that harm.

One positive thing can be said for the Governor’s proposal – it is more generous to the maimed and survivors of the dead than that of the Republicans who have sponsored bills in the House and Senate.

The Board of Commissioers on Grievances and Discipline of The Supreme Court of Ohio has released an opinion of the issue of whether, during settlement of a matter, it is ethical for a lawyer to propose, demand, and or agree to personally satisfy any and all claims by third persons as to settlement funds. 

Here is the Syllabus of the Opinion 2011-1: 

It is improper for a plaintiff’s lawyer to personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from any and all claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such agreements are not authorized by Prof. Cond. Rule 1.15(d) and violate Prof. Cond. Rules 1.8(e) and 1.7(a)(2). Further, it is improper for a lawyer to propose or require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from any and all claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such conduct violates Prof. Cond. Rule 8.4(a). The Board recommends that this advisory opinion be prospective in application.

Contact Information