Day on Torts

July 22, 2020

Large jury award affirmed in negligence case against Kroger

Where plaintiff fell and broke her hip in a grocery store due to her shopping cart missing a wheel, yet she mostly recovered from the injury, a jury verdict of approximately $90,000 in medical expenses and the maximum allowable amount of $750,000 in noneconomic damages was affirmed.

In Wortham v. Kroger Limited Partnership I, No. W2019-00496-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2020), plaintiff, an 88-year-old woman, went to defendant grocery store with her adult daughter. The daughter retrieved a shopping cart from the vestibule for plaintiff’s use, and plaintiff proceeded to shop for around thirty minutes. Near the end of her shopping trip, plaintiff turned her cart to the right and it tipped over, causing her to fall. After plaintiff fell, it was discovered that the shopping cart was missing one wheel, and despite searching the property, the missing wheel and/or parts that would have held the wheel in place were not found. Plaintiff broke a bone and injured her hip in the fall, and she required surgery. She spent time four days in the hospital and fourteen days in a rehabilitation center, and despite doing well, she testified that the she still had some pain and had lost much of her independence due to the fall.

July 21, 2020

Chairs stacked on top of table not a dangerous condition

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a middle school student was injured when he tripped on his backpack strap, beginning a chain of events that knocked down a chair that was stacked on top of a table and injured his hand, summary judgment was affirmed based the lack of a dangerous condition and the injury not being foreseeable.

In Landry v. Sumner County Board of Education, No. M2019-01696-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2020), plaintiff was an 11-year-old student sitting with friends in his school cafeteria as he waited for the bell to ring to begin the school day. At this school, the chairs were always placed upside down on the top of the tables the day before so the custodians could clean. In the mornings, the kids would take down a chair to sit. On this particular morning, plaintiff’s backpack strap had unknowingly become wrapped around the leg of his chair. When plaintiff stood to leave, he tripped on the strap. As he fell, he pushed his chair away, and that chair hit a chair that was still upside down on a table. The upside down chair fell and hit plaintiff’s hand, severing the tip of one of his fingers.

July 20, 2020

No duty to remove snow from parking lot while snow is still falling.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where plaintiff slipped on ice in a hotel parking lot during a snowstorm, summary judgment for defendant hotel was affirmed.

In Chittenden v. BRE/LQ Properties, LLC, No. M2019-01990-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2020), plaintiff checked into defendant hotel during a snowfall that had already produced two inches of snow on the ground. It was still snowing when plaintiff went to his hotel room. When plaintiff left his room fifteen minutes later, it was still snowing, and he slipped in the parking lot. Plaintiff brought this premises liability action, and the trial court granted summary judgment, which was affirmed on appeal.

July 17, 2020

No damages to plaintiff despite fault of defendant in car accident affirmed.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where defendant admitted liability for a car accident but denied that the accident caused plaintiff’s alleged injuries, a jury verdict for defendant was affirmed where there was material evidence showing that the accident was minor, evidence showed plaintiff had a history of back and/or neck pain, and plaintiff’s expert witness admitted that “she based her opinion on purely subjective findings[.]”

In Bell v. Roberts, No. M2018-02126-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2020), plaintiff, a 70-year-old woman, filed suit after her vehicle was rear ended by a car driven by defendant. Defendant admitted fault, but he denied that the accident caused any injury to plaintiff.

During a jury trial, plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff’s doctor, and the police officer who responded to the accident testified. Plaintiff stated that she drove herself to the ER after the accident, and “scans of her spine showed changes consistent with degenerative disc disease.” After the medicine prescribed at the ER failed to alleviate her neck pain, she went to her doctor 15 days later and was given “additional pain relief measures and physical therapy.” Plaintiff admitted that she had a history of degenerative disc disease and back surgery, but she stated that she had never had neck pain before the accident. On cross examination, however, defense counsel pointed out that her testimony about previous pain was different in her deposition. Plaintiff also admitted that she did not complain about neck pain to her doctor past April 2016, although she maintained that she did not fully recover.

July 16, 2020

Dismissal of libel and false light invasion of privacy claims affirmed.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Dismissal of claims of defamation and false light invasion of privacy by the former CEO of a credit union was affirmed where the email she cited “was not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning” and could not “be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person;” the statement she cited was “not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning” and was not sufficiently publicized; and the audit report she cited was not given the requisite publicity.

In Tidwell v. Holston Methodist Federal Credit Union, No. E2019-01111-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020), plaintiff had been the CEO of defendant credit union and was fired after an audit by a regulatory agency. Several issues were identified by the audit, and plaintiff claimed “she became the scapegoat for these problems.” Plaintiff brought suit against the credit union, the chairman of the Board of Directors, the chairman of the Supervisory Committee, and an independent auditor for libel, false light invasion of privacy, and retaliatory discharge.

The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims. Plaintiff appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal.

July 7, 2020

Expert proof needed on standard of care in legal malpractice case.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where defendant attorneys presented expert proof consisting of their own affidavits and the affidavit of another attorney stating that they complied with the applicable standard of care in their previous representation of plaintiff, the testimony of plaintiff and another witness, neither of whom were attorneys, was not enough to defeat summary judgment in a legal malpractice case.

In Hobson v. Frank, No. M2019-01556-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2020), plaintiff filed a pro se legal malpractice case against the two attorneys who had previously represented her in a “federal failure to hire case.” In her federal case, plaintiff had claimed that the Department of Defense committed racial discrimination by not hiring her. She originally filed that case pro se, but defendants were appointed to be her trial counsel. Defendants worked on the case for around seven months and “filed several motions in limine, frequently communicated with Plaintiff…, participated in several pre-trial conferences, reviewed thousands of pages of discovery…, and litigated the three-day jury trial.” Defendants and their staff worked around 700 hours on the case and were not paid for their representation of plaintiff, but the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.

July 2, 2020

Damage Award Affirmed in Brachial Plexus Injury Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a $8.3 million damage award in the brachial plexus injury case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

The damage award was broken down as follows:

$64,967.77 for past medical expenses
$80,000 for future medical expenses
$2,653,000 in lost earnings
$1,500,000 for the permanent disfigurement of his right arm
$2,000,000 for the deprivation of a normal life and
$2,000,000 for pain, suﬀering, and emotional distress.

July 1, 2020

College had duty to student where fraternity hazing was foreseeable.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where plaintiff knew that he would likely be paddled before joining a fraternity but did not understand the full scope of the hazing he would endure, summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s comparative fault was overturned. Further, where the college had received previous reports of hazing from the fraternity in question, summary judgment based on a lack of duty was overturned.

In Halmon v. Lane College, No. W2019-01224-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2020), plaintiff joined a fraternity at defendant college. He admittedly knew that he would be paddled as part of his initiation process, but he alleged that he was unaware of the extent of the hazing that would be involved. He claimed that he was subjected to extreme hazing, including being beaten, burned, sleep deprived, and compelled to drink concoctions. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries, forcing him to withdraw from college, and he filed this action for negligence and vicarious liability against defendant.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant college was vicariously liable based on “the actions (and failures to act) of a Lane College employee, Calvin Walker.” Mr. Walker was the faculty adviser for the fraternity at issue, as well as a member of the fraternity, and plaintiff asserted that “Mr. Walker had failed to prevent injuries to him by failing to properly intervene in the hazing and by failing to report it.” Plaintiff also asserted that defendant was directly negligent in its hiring, supervising, and retention of Mr. Walker.

June 30, 2020

Second HIPAA authorization sent after statute of limitations had run could not cure previous defects.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where plaintiff’s initial HCLA pre-suit notice included HIPAA authorizations that were left blank, and plaintiff’s supplemental authorization that attempted to correct the problem was sent after the one-year statute of limitations on his claim had run, dismissal was affirmed.

In Carrasco v. North Surgery Center, LP, No. W2019-00558-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2020), plaintiff filed a health care liability suit against defendants based on “injuries sustained by a guidewire left in the plaintiff’s neck following a procedure.” Prior to filing his suit, plaintiff sent defendants a pre-suit notice letter on August 31 and September 1, 2016, that was accompanied by the HIPAA authorizations required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The authorizations, however, contained blanks that were not filled in, and “plaintiff concede[d] that the authorizations did not substantially comply with the requirements of the [HCLA].” Later, on November 2, 2016, plaintiff sent new authorizations which purportedly corrected the issues with the first set of authorizations. In paragraph three of the new authorizations, however, the information to be used or disclosed named “Narinder Sanwal, Deceased,” instead of plaintiff.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the noncompliant HIPAA authorizations, which the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

June 29, 2020

Determining reasonable attorneys’ fees in post-settlement dispute.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

When determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to award in a post-settlement attorney fee dispute, the trial court should have considered the relevant facts and factors contained in Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a).

In Cordova v. Nashville Ready Mix, Inc., No. M2018-02002-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2020), the issues at play were “post-settlement disputes concerning an attorney’s fee lien filed by the plaintiffs’ first attorney, a subrogation lien filed by the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, and the assessment of post-settlement discretionary costs against the carrier.” In the underlying case, Sergio Lopez had died from injuries he sustained at work. The injuries were caused by a third party (defendant), and Mr. Lopez’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier had been paying benefits to his wife and children. The wife filed a wrongful death claim against defendant company and its employee, alleging that the employee caused her husband’s death and that the company was vicariously liable.

In the wrongful death action, plaintiffs were initially represented by attorney Gary Hodges, whose fee agreement “entitled him to 33% of the gross recovery obtained through arbitration, settlement conference or trial.” The agreement also provided that if Mr. Hodges was discharged and plaintiff recovered after the discharge, Mr. Hodges would be entitled to “a reasonable attorney’s fee and reimbursement for all costs advanced.” Notably, the agreement did not differentiate between “discharge for good cause and discharge without cause.” After he was hired by the plaintiffs, “Mr. Hodges entered a separate fee-sharing agreement with another solo practitioner, Robert L. Martin.” Plaintiffs never had an agreement with Mr. Martin and were not told about the agreement between Mr. Hodges and Mr. Martin.