Day on Torts

December 18, 2023

Trial court’s fault allocation in motor vehicle accident case affirmed.

Where the trial court found in a bench trial that plaintiff was 20% at fault for a motor vehicle accident and the bus driver was 80% at fault, that ruling was affirmed based on the testimony of the witnesses and findings of fact of the trial judge.

In Cook v. Jefferson County, Tennessee, No. E2022-01537-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2023), plaintiff was seriously injured and totaled his car when he crashed into a bus on a foggy morning. The accident occurred in a school zone, and the bus was stopped across two lanes of traffic, blocking both lanes, as it attempted to turn left out of the school exit.

Defendant presented testimony from an accident reconstructionist who opined that plaintiff had been traveling 15-20 miles over the 25 mile per hour school zone speed limit when he first began braking, and that plaintiff was the cause of the accident. On cross examination, however, the expert admitted that, due to the foggy conditions, plaintiff would not have been able to stop in time to avoid an accident even if he had not been speeding.

December 15, 2023

Failure to list decedent’s minor children as claimants on HCLA notice should have resulted in dismissal.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where an HCLA pre-suit notice was sent by decedent’s mother, but the notice failed to mention decedent’s two minor children who were the proper parties to bring the action, the trial court should have granted defendant hospital’s motion to dismiss.

In Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, No. E2023-00027-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2023), decedent died of cardiac arrest shortly after being discharged from defendant hospital. Decedent had two minor children who were then placed with their maternal grandmother (decedent’s mother), and the grandmother was named the temporary custodian of the children.

The grandmother sent pre-suit notice of an HCLA claim to defendants, which listed the grandmother as the claimant. The pre-suit notice did not mention the minor children. The grandmother then filed this HCLA suit as “Decedent’ mother and next friend and individually,” and in the complaint, she alleged for the first time that she was bringing the suit “on behalf of…decedent’s surviving minor children…as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.”

December 13, 2023

Defendant was not equitably estopped from limitations defense based on vague statements by insurance adjuster.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Plaintiff’s argument that defendant was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense based on vague statements by defendant’s insurance carrier adjuster that a limitations defense would not be raised and that there was no rush in providing releases was rejected.

In Barrett v. Garton, No. M2022-01064-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2023), plaintiff was injured in a car accident with defendant. Plaintiff filed suit within the one-year statute of limitations, but she failed to have service issued at the time of the filing or within one year thereafter. Defendant accordingly moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, which the trial court granted after rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. This ruling was affirmed on appeal.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 states that filing a complaint commences an action, “but if no process is issued upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff must issue process within one year from the filing of the complaint to rely on the filing of the complaint to toll the statute of limitations.” It was undisputed that plaintiff had failed to have process issued within a year of filing her complaint, but she argued that defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting a timeliness defense based on statements made by defendant’s insurance carrier.

December 11, 2023

Personal Vehicle Sharing Programs (PVSP) Give Rise to Insurance Issues

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

You have undoubtedly read about (and perhaps even used) a personal vehicle sharing program (also known as a peer-to-peer car sharing program) like Turo, which allows you to rent another person’s car for a defined period of time. Turo puts car owners together with people who have a short-term need for a vehicle. Need a 2018 Porsche Macan in Chicago? $312, unlimited miles.

But what happens if the driver of that vehicle causes a wreck? Does the car owner’s liability insurance apply? Is there liability on behalf of Turo? Does the liability insurance of the driver apply?

And what if the wreck is caused by the driver of another vehicle? Does the UM/UIM coverage on the shared vehicle apply? Or will coverage be denied because the car owner received money for sharing the vehicle?

December 8, 2023

Quality Improvement Privilege (QIP) does not apply to meeting between hospital and decedent’s family.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Statements made in a meeting between defendant hospital and decedent’s family were not privileged and did not fall under the QIC statute.

In Castillo v. Rex, No. E2022-00322-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct App. Oct. 4, 2023), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit after the death of her husband. Her husband died shortly after he was discharged from defendant hospital’s emergency room. The hospital held a Quality Improvement Committee (“QIC”) proceeding to investigate the care decedent received. Sometime thereafter, representatives from defendant hospital met with members of decedent’s family at a CANDOR meeting, where “Plaintiff was advised that Decedent should not have been discharged because the CT scan revealed a bleed.”

During depositions in the HCLA case, defense counsel instructed a physician not to answer questions about statements made at the CANDOR meeting. When plaintiff requested documents used in preparation for the CANDOR meeting, defendant moved for a protective order “to prohibit further inquiry into the nature and contents of all statements made at the CANDOR meeting as direct or indirect discovery of the QIC proceeding itself.” The trial court denied the motion for a protective order, and on interlocutory appeal, that denial was affirmed.

December 6, 2023

Recent Cases on Damages for Frivolous Appeal

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

My other blog, Practical Procedure and Evidence, has an updated post discussing the law of damages for frivolous appeal. The post includes citations to cases where damages for frivolous appeal appeal have been granted and denied in the last four months.

Writing a brief on appeal? Save yourself at least thirty minutes of research time checking out this blog post.

December 1, 2023

Defendant only required to produce surveillance videos he intended to use for impeachment at trial.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where surveillance videos of plaintiff were obtained in preparation for litigation and were thus work product, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to require defendant to only produce those surveillance videos he intended to use at trial for impeachment purposes.

In Locke v. Aston, No. M2022-01820-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2023), plaintiff filed an HCLA action against defendant doctor. After plaintiff nonsuited her first case and in anticipation of plaintiff re-filing, defendant’s counsel obtained surveillance videos of plaintiff. After plaintiff re-filed her case, a discovery dispute arose around the production of these surveillance videos. While the trial court originally ruled that the defendants should produce the videos without limitation, it subsequently amended its ruling and ultimately found that the surveillance videos were work product and that defendant was only required to produce those videos he intended to use at trial for impeachment purposes. On appeal, this ruling was affirmed.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3) governs when material that qualifies as work product is nonetheless discoverable by an opposing party. The Rule requires the person seeking discovery to show that they have a “substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and [are] unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” By ruling that only the videos that would be used for impeachment were discoverable, the trial court had agreed with defendant that plaintiff did not have a substantial need of surveillance video that corroborated her claim. Thus, substantial need was the primary issue in this appeal.

November 30, 2023

Law Firm Fights Over the Meaning of “Double-Spaced” in Local Rules

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Check out Practical Procedure and Evidence for a post about a fight over the meaning of “double spacing” in the local rules for the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.

November 29, 2023

Are You Using BirdDog Law?

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

BirdDog Law is my creation to help Tennessee lawyers help their clients.

The site is full of free resources. For example, use these links to access the following:

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure

November 29, 2023

Statute Extending Statute of Limitations Does Not Extend Time for Service of Process

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a car accident plaintiff filed suit, had service issued but not served, and then failed to have new process issued within one year from the issuance of the first service, the plaintiff could not rely on the fact that defendant received a traffic citation in the accident to extend the time within which service was required to be issued.

In Briars v. Irving, No. W2022-01159-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2023), plaintiff and defendant were involved in a car accident, and defendant was given a citation for crossing the center line of the roadway. Plaintiff filed suit within the one-year statute of limitations and had service issued on July 2, 2020, but that summons was not served. A new summons for defendant was not issued until September 3, 2021. After being served, defendant moved to dismiss, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 states that when process is issued but not served, a plaintiff must “continue the action by obtaining issuance of new process within one year from issuance of the previous process.” Here, plaintiff did not have the new process issued until well beyond one-year after the first, unserved process was issued.