A temporary order granting a guardianship that had apparently expired by the time of the injury at issue does not meet the standard for proving that an injured party had been “adjudicated incompetent” for the purpose of tolling a statute of limitations.

In Caudill v. Clarksville Health System, GP, No. M2016-02532-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2017), the facts of the matter were not in dispute. Plaintiff and her sister had filed an “emergency petition for the appointment of a guardian for their father” in an Oklahoma court based on the father’s “dementia and mental illness.” On August 27, 2013, that petition was granted and an emergency order was entered finding that “irreparable harm would be done to Decedent if the petition were not granted.” The order was set for review on September 25, 2013, and on October 2, 2013, plaintiff and her sister appeared before the court. The minutes of that hearing indicate that “the emergency guardianship will remain in full force and effect until further orders of the court…,” but no order was ever entered after this hearing.

After these hearings, the father moved to Tennessee, where he was admitted to defendant hospital on March 19, 2014. He was discharged on March 24th, and plaintiff alleged that he suffered sores and ulcers while in the hospital that eventually led to his death on May 24, 2014.

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When relying on vicarious liability in an HCLA (formerly known as medical malpractice or medical negligence) case, a plaintiff must identify the standard of care for a specific agent of the defendant and how that agent deviated from the standard of care.

In Miller v. Vanderbilt University, No. M2015-02223-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017), plaintiff was in a motorcycle accident and sustained several serious injuries. He was taken to defendant hospital for treatment, where he had three surgeries, the last being a surgery on his right knee and left foot on November 2, 2010. Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on November 5th, but two days later he came to the ER with “fever, nausea, blurred vision, and severe pain in his right leg.” His right knee incision had become infected, and his leg was eventually amputated above the knee.

Plaintiff filed this HCLA case for compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff alleged that defendant “failed to recognize and investigate the signs of infection that [plaintiff] exhibited before his discharge,” and that “he was negligently and recklessly discharged from the hospital.” At the close of plaintiff’s proof at trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court first granted as to punitive damages and then granted as to all claims. The trial court found that “plaintiff failed to establish, through expert medical testimony, the standard of care applicable to a specific agent of Vanderbilt, how that agent had deviated from the standard of are, and that deviation had caused an injury that otherwise would not have occurred, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115.” On appeal, the directed verdict was affirmed.

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In a legal malpractice case, a plaintiff must usually present expert testimony regarding the standard of care and causation.

In Franklin-Murray Development Company, L.P. v. Shumacker Thompson, PC, No. M2015-01968-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2017), plaintiff sued defendant attorneys who had represented plaintiff in litigation related to a commercial real estate deal. In the underlying matter, plaintiff had contracted with First American Trust Company (FATC) to purchase property in Williamson County, giving FATC $100,000 in earnest money. Another $100,000 in earnest money was due “on the first business day after the last day on which [plaintiff had] a right to terminate the contract.” Just before the scheduled closing date, plaintiff found out there was a federal estate tax lien on the property, and so the sale did not close. Plaintiff “did not terminate the agreement in accordance with the termination provision, nor did it seek a refund of the earnest money previously paid or pay FATC the additional $100,000 in earnest money. Rather, [plaintiff] contacted FATC regarding the possibility of setting a new closing date.” Negotiations eventually broke down between the parties, and FATC filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the lien did not prevent conveyance of good title and for $200,000 in liquidated damages.

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Showing reliance in a fraud case does not require magic words during a plaintiff’s testimony. In Erwin v. Great River Road Supercross LLC, No. W2017-00150-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2017), plaintiffs sued defendants based on a real estate purchase. Defendants had provided a warranty deed to plaintiffs that “specifically warranted against encumbrances,” but the property was actually subject to a $20,000 mortgage, which was not paid off at the time of closing. As part of this suit, plaintiffs alleged that this misrepresentation constituted fraud.

The trial court found that “[t]here was indeed an intentional misrepresentation made that the real property was unencumbered,” but it held that plaintiffs had not established the required element of reliance. The trial court found that “[o]ne Plaintiff testified that he did not rely on the unencumbered language in the deed when making the decision to purchase the property” and held that the claim failed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision and remanded the intentional misrepresentation claim for further proceedings. The Court reviewed the plaintiff in question’s testimony, and noted that he stated that the warranty deed specifically said the property was unencumbered, that the property was in fact encumbered by a mortgage, and that he did not know about the mortgage until after the purchase had taken place and he received a foreclosure notice. The Court held:

Where plaintiff failed to have service issued for over a year against the defendant driver in a car accident case, her claim against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier was barred.

In Davis v. Grange Mutual Casualty Group, No. M2016-02239-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), plaintiff filed suit on March 20, 2015 after a car accident, naming both the defendant driver and her uninsured motorist carrier. The suit was filed within the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, but plaintiff “did not cause a summons to issue to either defendant” until April 19, 2016, which was thirteen months after the complaint was filed. The summons was issued to the driver at his last known address and was returned unserved on April 21st by the sheriff with a notation that the driver was “not to be found in my county.”

On April 25th, “the trial court sua sponte dismissed the action for failure to prosecute.” Plaintiff filed a motion to set the dismissal aside on May 24th, and on the same day process for the insurance company was returned unserved. Second summonses were issued for both defendants on June 6th and 7th, and the driver’s was returned unserved indicating that he had died.

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Where a defendant knew of decedent’s past suicide attempt, knew she was suffering from depression, and knew he had just ended his relationship with her, the trial court was wrong to grant summary judgment on a negligence case related to him showing her an unsecured gun in his home to which she had access.

In In re Estate of Cotten, No. M2016-02402-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2017), the personal representative of decedent’s estate brought suit against defendant for negligence based on “the defendant’s alleged acts of displaying and failing to properly store and prevent accessibility to the firearm with which decedent ultimately committed suicide.” Decedent was married and had a son when she met and began an affair with defendant. Decedent was a nurse at Skyline Hospital, and defendant was a psychiatrist there. Decedent divorced her husband in 2012, but she retained equal co-parenting time of her son. Two years after beginning the relationship, decedent moved in with defendant, at which time defendant admitted “observ[ing] that Decedent suffered crying spells and appeared to struggle with the loss of her job and eviction from her previous residence.” Decedent began seeing another psychiatrist at the hospital and was given medication for depression. Defendant was aware of decedent’s treatment.

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The statute of limitations for a claim falling under the GTLA is one year. In Thigpen v. Trousdale County Highway Department, No. M2016-02556-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2017), a pro se plaintiff filed suit against the highway department and two individuals claiming that they damaged his home while using equipment to resurface a nearby road. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Because the highway department was a governmental entity, this suit fell under the GTLA. Immunity was waived because the GTLA provides that governmental entities may be sued “for injuries resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other equipment while in the scope of employment.” (Tenn. Code Ann. 29-20-202(a)). The GTLA also provides, however, that any action must be brought within one-year of the cause of action accruing. Here, the alleged damage occurred three years before the complaint was filed. Dismissal was accordingly affirmed.

The Court of Appeals also affirmed dismissal of the two individuals named in the complaint, noting that “the GTLA prohibits claims for damages against governmental employees when governmental immunity has been waived,” and that “the complaint does not allege that the individuals acted in an intentional matter or outside the scope of their employment.”

A claim that a patient who burned himself should not have been left alone with a hot cup of coffee was determined to fall under the Tennessee HCLA.

In Youngblood ex rel. Estate of Vaughn v. River Park Hospital, LLC, No. M2016-02311-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), an 86-year-old patient had hip surgery at defendant hospital. Either the same day or the day after surgery, a nurse brought the patient a cup of coffee and sat it on his bedside table in his ICU room. The patient then spilled the coffee on himself and was burned.

The patient later died of apparently unrelated causes, and his estate filed this action. Plaintiff’s claim was essentially that the patient “was an 86 year old man; who was in ICU following a major surgery; was on pain medication; had visible tremors in his hand; and had an O2 monitor on his index finder. [Patient] should not have been left alone to manage an extremely hot beverage.” Plaintiff did not give pre-suit notice or file a certificate of good faith with her complaint, as she asserted that this claim was not subject to the HCLA. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that it did fall under the HCLA, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

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Where a doctor had time to confer with her colleagues twice, even shortly, before determining a course of action for her patient, the Tennessee trial court erred by giving the jury an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine. The jury verdict for defendants was accordingly vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial.

In Vandyke v. Foulk, No. E2016-00584-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2017), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit related to the death of her newborn son shortly after his birth. Plaintiff was 24 weeks pregnant with twins when she was transferred to defendant hospital for pre-term labor. Once it became apparent that delivery was imminent, plaintiff was moved to the operating room, where her delivery team consisted of Dr. Foulk, the attending physician, and two fourth year residents, Goodwin and Hobbs. Baby A was born vaginally, after which time Baby B “settled into a transverse or sideways position.” Dr. Foulk rotated Baby B to a head-down position, and Baby B suffered a drop in heart rate necessitating a quick delivery. Dr. Foulk had a more senior attending physician, Dr. Herrell, paged, and Dr. Foulk and the two residents discussed what should be done. When Dr. Herrell arrived, he and Dr. Foulk assessed the situation and determined that they would attempt a delivery by forceps. Dr. Herrell tried to place a second forcep two times and “met resistance.” Baby B was then delivered by c-section, and he had a “skull fracture a scalp avulsion, meaning that his scalp was no longer attached…” Baby B was transferred to the NICU and died a few hours later.

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Where a plaintiff who slipped and fell in water at a concert could not show how long that particular spill had been on the floor, and could only show that two other spills had occurred in the same area as her fall, summary judgment was affirmed based on lack of constructive notice.

In Katz v. The Sports Authority of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, TN, No. M2016-01874-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2017), plaintiff was attending a concert at Bridgestone Arena when she slipped on fell in a puddle on the floor. Her fall occurred between sections 115 and 116 of the 100 level concourse. “[J]ust before she fell, she noticed three people standing nearby, one of whom was carrying a small broom and dustpan.”

Plaintiff filed a premises liability suit, and defendant moved for summary judgment. In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff “pointed to evidence that: (1) three of Defendant’s employees were standing nearby at the time that she fell; (2) employees were instructed not to clean up until after the concert was over; and (3) at least one other slip-and-fall incident occurred in the same general area about an hour and twenty minutes before [plaintiff’s] fall.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

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