Articles Posted in Motor Vehicle Cases

It is a classic line in the movie Caddyshack, but it quickly sums up the end result in this case too.  This is a two car, intersection case in which both drivers sought damages from the other.  After a two day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding both the plaintiff and the defendant 50% at fault.   Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial which was denied.  An appeal followed.

The following relevant facts were established at trial:

1.     Plaintiff was traveling south on U.S. 11-E with the intention of turning right on Allison Road.

Recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the case of Lake v. The Memphis Landsmen in its third trip to the court. A number of issues were raised in the appeal, but by far the most interesting one concerned the plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred in including a non-party who plaintiffs previously settled with on the jury verdict form. The plaintiffs also contended that to the extent the non-party was properly included on the form, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the effect of allocating negligence to the non-party. Why is this issue important to the plaintiffs? Because the jury handed down an $8,543,530 verdict but attributed 100% fault to the non-party. 

This case concerned a wreck between a passenger bus and a concrete truck. The concrete truck took a left turn and struck the bus causing it to collide with a light pole and eject the plaintiff and resulting in a traumatic brain injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs settled with the concrete truck defendant before trial and then proceeded to trial against several other defendants on various theories of liability concerning the passenger bus.

In this appeal, the Court of Appeals first explained that Tennessee has a system of modified comparative fault, adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1992 in the landmark case of McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52,56 (Tenn. 1992). Under this system, fault is apportioned among all parties in proportion to their degree of culpability, and a defendant is only liable for the percentage of damages that his or her own negligence caused. In McIntyre, the court also adopted the non-party defense, allowing juries to apportion fault to non-parties with culpability. McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58. 

The Tennessee Court of appeals recently affirmed a jury’s defense verdict in a rear-end car crash case in Hicks v. Prahl, No. E2013-00285-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 25, 2014). Plaintiff was driving on an entrance ramp trying to merge onto a highway when, according to her testimony, she slowed down to negotiate a sharp curve on the entrance ramp and was rear-ended by defendant’s vehicle. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that plaintiff slowed to a complete stop twice while attempting to merge onto the highway, the second of which immediately preceded the collision. According to defendant, plaintiff came to a complete stop on the entrance ramp and then began moving forward again. Defendant then rotated her neck over her left shoulder to look for approaching traffic and lifted her foot off the brake, causing her car to move forward. Defendant testified that when she returned to looking ahead she discovered that plaintiff had stopped in front of her again. Defendant stated that she quickly applied her brakes but was not able to avoid crashing into the rear end of plaintiff’s car. Defendant explained that she had no reason to suspect that plaintiff would stop a second time because the curve on the entrance ramp allowed defendant to see that there were no cars in front of plaintiff’s car and no other reason for such a stop.

Plaintiff was talking on her cell phone at the time of the crash. Plaintiff’s daughter testified that she was talking with her mother who was using the speaker phone while driving. Daughter and husband also corroborated plaintiff’s testimony about the sharp curve on the entrance ramp requiring significant deceleration. The opinion mentions that plaintiff amended her complaint to seek $1.5 million dollars in damages, although there’s no description of plaintiff’s injuries, medical expenses, or other damages. Plaintiff refused medical treatment at the scene because she did not think it was a “major accident,” but she did go to the emergency room later that day.

At trial, plaintiff testified that she did not ever stop on the entrance ramp while attempting to merge onto the highway, but instead she merely lifted her foot off the gas pedal. When impeached with the averment in the complaint that she was “stopped to wait for traffic,” plaintiff testified that the pleading was in error. Plaintiff also testified that she could not remember making the statements to personnel in the emergency room that she was rear-ended while “sitting stopped in her car.”

Many people are unaware that local governments often have ordinances that can form the basis of a negligence per se case – ordinances that may create a responsibility greater than that imposed by state statues or the common law.

Consider this ordinance from Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee:

  • It is unlawful for any person to drive any vehicle upon the streets of the metropolitan government or upon any private road or driveway or parking area in a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Any person who drives any vehicle at a speed of fifteen or more miles per hour than the posted speed limit upon any streets of metropolitan government or upon any private road or driveway or parking area in any residence district shall be presumed to be driving in a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property and the burden of proof shall be upon the driver to establish that they were not driving with such disregard.

Code, 12.68.180 Reckless driving(emphasis added).

Successfully bringing suit in Tennessee for an injury or death allegedly caused by the acts or omissions of a governmental employee is more difficult than a claim against a private citizen or business. Consider, for example, the case of Lynch v. Loudon Cnty., No. E2013-00454-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2013).

On a cold, wet, icy winter morning, a deputy sheriff arrives at the scene of a minor, single car accident. The car’s front tires had slid off the roadway preventing the driver from backing the car up. The driver is a woman, alone, wearing a bathrobe and naked underneath. She is not injured, nor is her car damaged.

Before reaching the woman’s vehicle, the deputy encounters the passerby who first stopped to assist the woman and called 911. The passerby tells the deputy that “something is not right” with woman and that she cannot provide a phone number or answer any questions about where she was coming from or going. The passerby will later testify that the woman appeared “sleepy,” “zoned out,” and “not real steady.”

Remittiturs are court-ordered reductions in a jury verdict because the trial judge thought that the jury awarded too much money in compensatory or punitive damages.  They are a common sense, common law "tort reform" measure, designed to permit a judge who actually heard the evidence (or, in rare cases, the judges on an appellate court) to alter the amount of the jury’s verdict.

This case arises from a collision between a motorcycle and a car. Following a jury trial, fault was allocated 40% to the motorcyclist and 60% to the defendant motorist. The total damages awarded were $317,000.00 which based on fault allocations was reduced to $190,000.00. Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court granted a remittitur finding the jury’s awards for future pain and suffering and future loss of enjoyment of life were excessive. Accordingly, the court reduced those awards and approved a judgment for the motorcyclist in the amount of $54,192.10. The remittitur was accepted under protest and an appeal was taken.

Pursuant to T.C.A. 20-10-102, trial courts are statutorily authorized to grant a remittitur as necessary to cure an excessive jury verdict and avoid the expense of a new trial. When reviewing a trial court’s grant of remittitur, Tennessee appellate courts will conduct a three-step review consisting of (1) the trial court’s reasons for granting a remittitur; (2) the amount of the reduction to ensure it does not destroy the jury’s verdict; (3) the evidence related to damages to assess whether the proof is consistent with the remittitur.

The sender of a text message to a person faces potential liability if the recipient of the message negligently causes a wreck injuring others, according to a recent opinion of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

In Kubert v. Best, A-1128-12T4 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 27, 2013), the Kurberts were seriously injured when a young drivers who was texting while driving crossed the center-line of the road and hit them.  Their case against the young driver was settled, but the Kuberts appealed a decision of the trial court that dismissed their claims against the young driver’s friend who was texting the driver much of the day and sent a text message to him immediately before the accident.  Texting while driving is illegal in New Jersey.

No other appellate court has addressed this issue:  whether one who is texting from a location remote from the driver of an automobile can be liable to persons injured because the driver was distracted by the text.  The court answered the question "yes," but only if the sender knew or had special reason to know that the recipient would view the text while driving and thus be distracted."  The court issued a 30-page opinion on the issue, which employs duty analysis to arrive at the conclusion that a duty should be imposed on the sender.  To reach its result, the majority of the court discusses the duty of a passenger in a vehicle at great length.

State Farm, a leading auto insurer, has sued a referral service, chiropractic  firm and others alleging, inter alia, that they engaged in a fraudulent scheme of referrals to and from a plaintiff’s firm that resulted in monetary loss to State Farm via it medical payments and personal injury protection (PIP) coverage.   

Here is a summary of the action as set forth in the federal court complaint:

 This action involves a massive fraud scheme by the Defendants to obtain from State Farm Personal Injury Protection (“PIP Benefits”) and Medical Payments Coverage (“MPC Benefits”) insurance benefits (collectively, PIP Benefits and MPC Benefits are referred to as “No-Fault Benefits”) for services and treatments purportedly rendered to patients at Physicians Group clinics in Florida, which are owned by Kompothecras [a chiropractor]. The services and treatments were not lawful when they were rendered because the Defendants intentionally violated several important criminal, civil and administrative laws to lure unwitting motor vehicle accident victims to receive the services and treatments at the Physicians Group clinics, namely the Patient Brokering Act (Fla. Stat. § 817.505), the Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992 (Fla. Stat. § 456.053), the Anti-Kickback Statute (Fla. Stat. § 456.054), the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq.) (“FDUTPA”), the laws establishing grounds for disciplinary action against chiropractors who engage in false and misleading advertising (Fla. Stat. § 460.413(d), (f) and (l)), and administrative rules prohibiting chiropractors from engaging in deceptive and misleading advertising (F.A.C. Rule 64B2-15.001(2)(a), (b) and (k)). The driving force behind the Defendants’ scheme is to exhaust their unsuspecting patients’ limited No-Fault Benefits, without regard to whether the patients may have health insurance that might otherwise cover some or all of Physicians Group’s charges, thereby preserving their No-Fault Benefits for other medical services that the patients may truly need.

Tennessee law permits the recovery of punitive damages when a defendant has engaged in reckless conduct.  Because the standard for criminally negligent homicide mirrors the standard for recklessness necessary to recover punitive damages, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ affirmation of the guilty verdict against a criminal defendant in a recent case could be pertinent to a punitive damages claim in a personal injury or wrongful death case.

 
In State of Tennessee v. Christopher Vigil, No. E2011-00259-CCAR3- CD (Tenn. Crim. App. February 9, 2012), the Court  summarized the evidence supporting the verdict:
 
Leading up to the incident, the proof showed that Appellant and the victim had a rather torrid relationship. The victim was staying with a friend because she had been arguing with Appellant. The two were seen arguing on the day of the offense and at least one witness saw Appellant swipe his open hand toward the victim, causing

U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood  has announced a final rule specifically prohibiting interstate truck and bus drivers from using hand-held cell phones while operating their vehicles. The joint rule from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is the latest action by the U.S. Department of Transportation to end distracted driving.  The new rule went into effective on January 3, 2012.
 
The final rule prohibits commercial drivers from using a hand-held mobile telephone while operating a commercial truck or bus. Drivers who violate the restriction will face federal civil penalties of up to $2,750 for each offense and disqualification from operating a commercial motor vehicle for multiple offenses. Additionally, states will suspend a driver’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) after two or more serious traffic violations. Commercial truck and bus companies that allow their drivers to use hand-held cell phones while driving will face a maximum penalty of $11,000. Approximately four million commercial drivers would be affected by this final rule.

While driver distraction studies have produced mixed results, FMCSA research shows that using a hand-held cell phone while driving requires a commercial driver to take several risky steps beyond what is required for using a hands-free mobile phone, including searching and reaching for the phone. Commercial drivers reaching for an object, such as a cell phone, are three times more likely to be involved in a crash or other safety-critical event. Dialing a hand-held cell phone makes it six times more likely that commercial drivers will be involved in a crash or other safety-critical event. 

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