During the last five years the Tennessee General Assembly has passed dozens of bills that can be properly classified as "tort reform" statutes.   Over fifty cases have already interpreted these statutes.

My latest book, Compendium of Tennessee Tort Reform Statutes and Related Cases (2nd ed. 2013) has the full text of all of these statutes and a summary of each of the cases interpreting them. The book will help you readily identify which segments of Tennessee common law have been modified by statute and additional statutes that change the practice of tort lawyers.

The 187-page book is available for purchase by clicking on the link embedded in the title.

Tennessee medical malpractice (now called "health care liability") cases remained essentially flat for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013, according to data recently released by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

For the twelve month period ending June 30, 2013, there were a total of 385 health care liability actions filed in Tennessee state courts.  This number compares with 369 cases filed for the twelve month period ending June 30, 2012 and 343 cases filed for the twelve month period ending June 30, 2011.

Medical malpractice filings took a big hit effective October 1, 2008, when the first round of legislation concerning pre-suit notice and certificates of good faith went into effect.     For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, there were 537 medical malpractice cases filed and for the prior year (ending June 30, 2007) there were 638 cases filed.  So, when one compares filings from the year ending June 30, 2007 with the year ending June 30, 2013, filings are down about 40%.

Pre-suit notice in Tennessee health care liability cases continues to be a huge problem for victims of medical malpractice. In this case, Plaintiff sent notice, included all of the necessary forms and paperwork, and attached it to the complaint – but it turned out to be sent to the wrong legal entity, one who had a business name extremely similar to the company who provided the care at issue in the case.

Plaintiff’s brother was a patient at a mental health facility who died allegedly due to substandard care.  Plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to Foundation, who she thought ran the facility, and filed suit against Foundation after waiting the requisite 60 days.  Foundation’s answer, however, said that it was a fund-raising company that provided no health care whatsoever.  Foundation’s answer stated that Cooperative, a related company, was actually who provided care to Plaintiff’s brother. 

Plaintiff moved and was granted leave to amend.  The Court of Appeals described it as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 motion to correct the misnomer.  However, it is unclear from the opinion if that is how Plaintiff herself described her motion.  It is also unclear if the motion was to add Cooperative as an additional defendant based on Foundation’s answer, or if the motion was to substitute Cooperative for Foundation.

The fights over the Tennessee health care liability pre-suit notice statute, T.C.A. Sec. 29-26-121, have steadily increased and now loom over virtually every Tennessee health care liability lawsuit  In short, motions to dismiss cases are being filed because of the alleged failure of the plaintiff’s lawyer to perfectly comply the statute. In many of the cases, the defendant is not denying that notice was in fact received and, indeed, usually admits that the failure to strictly comply with the statute did not result in any prejudice whatsoever. Rather, the defendant argues that if every statutory "i" is not dotted and  "t" is not crossed,  the defendant has the absolute right to insist that the lawsuit be not only dismissed but that it be dismissed with prejudice i.e. any deviation, no matter how minor, requires the death penalty.

It is important to point out that the Tennessee Supreme Court has not addressed the issue to date. True, the court says giving pre-suit notice is mandatory but (a) expressly left open the question about what sanction, if any, is required when the notice statute is not complied with and (b) has not addressed the issue of imprecise compliance. Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012);   Aubrey E. Givens, Administrator of the Estate of Jessica E. Givens, Deceased, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University D/B/A Vanderbilt University Hospital, et. al.,   M2013-00266-COA-R3-CV  (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2013) and Foster v. Chiles, No. E2012-01780-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 3306594 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2013).  The latter issue is the subject of this post: how should our courts address the issue of a failure to strictly comply with the notice statute, especially in the absence of prejudice to the defendant?  

I submit that the answer to the question asked is relatively easy.  It is easy because our law has answered substantially similar questions dozens of times over the decades, albeit in different contexts, and thus one need only apply decades-old law to reach resolve these cases in a way that furthers both the cause of justice and the familiar, worthy goal of resolving cases on the merits.  Thus, I urge any lawyer who is confronting a notice issue to consider the following cases and argue for the trial and appellate courts to apply the "substantial compliance" test.

Under Tennessee wrongful death law, the distribution of proceeds obtained after a settlement for wrongful death are governed by common law not statute. Basically, the law provides that the wrongful death proceeds are distributed under the law of intestate succession.

Thus, if a decedent left behind a surviving spouse and one child, each would receive one-half of the proceeds. If the wrongful death decedent left behind a surviving spouse and two children, each of them would receive one-third of the wrongful death proceeds. A surviving spouse would never receive less than a one-third share of the recovery, even if there were three or more surviving children.

A recent case from the Tennessee Court of Appeals faced a question never addressed before in Tennessee: what happens to wrongful death proceeds when the surviving spouse entered into a postnuptial agreement agreeing to waive all rights which she acquired as a result of her marriage to the defendant?

No, you did not read the headline wrong.  The company that insures doctors for medical malpractice claims in Georgia is opposing a tort reform measure being pushed by a group of healthcare administrators.

What is going on?  A group of  healthcare administrators in Georgia  has formed an organization called "Patients for Fair Compensation" (has a nice ring to it, doesn’t it?) that is seeking a new law which would move medical malpractice claims out of the courts and into an administrative system overseen by a "Patient Compensation Board" within the Department of Community Health.

Those supporting the legislation say that the new system, which would be similar to the way Georgia  worker’s compensation claims are processed,  would reduce healthcare costs.  In essence, the proposed legislation would create a no-fault system for awarding limited compensation for victims of medical malpractice.  It would be funded by fees that would be paid by doctors and by hospitals.

A dispute between a Tennessee plaintiffs’ firm and a Maryland plaintiffs’ firm over responsibility for litigation expenses will be resolved in Tennessee, says the Tennessee Court of Appeals.

The Wolff Ardis firm in Memphis and the Law Offices of Jonathan Dailey in Washington, D.C. teamed up together to work on a auto glass product liability case in Maryland.  They had a written agreement on the division of case expenses; the agreement was governed by the law of Virginia.  There was a defense verdict in the case, and Wollf Ardis billed Dailey  for $48,63.45 it claimed it was owned under the agreement.  Wolff Ardis filed suit against Dailey in Memphis, and Dailey contested the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts.

The Court of Appeals held that Dailey could be sued in Tennessee.  Applying the recent opinion of specific personal jurisdiction set forth in State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Training Co., 403 S.W.3d 726 (Tenn. 2013), the court noted that a two-part test must be applied in determining whether Dailey could be sued in Tennessee:  (1) are minimum contacts present (a fact fathering exercise) and (2) if minimum contacts exist, is the exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable or unfair. 

I know – I have gone off the grid.  For the past couple of months I have been extremely busy and my law practice has simply consumed the vast majority of my time.  I have also worked on an article that I was asked to write for the inaugural edition of Belmont University Law Review  and  also the 2013 edition of my most recent book, Compendium of Tennessee Tort Reform Statutes and Related Case Law, 2008-2013.  (This book will be available October 20, 2013.)  I have also been preparing for my presentations at the 10th annual Tennessee Justice Programs seminar series. 

Well, I’m back.  Look for several posts every week about tort law in Tennessee and around the nation. Your comments are always welcome.

 

The sender of a text message to a person faces potential liability if the recipient of the message negligently causes a wreck injuring others, according to a recent opinion of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

In Kubert v. Best, A-1128-12T4 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 27, 2013), the Kurberts were seriously injured when a young drivers who was texting while driving crossed the center-line of the road and hit them.  Their case against the young driver was settled, but the Kuberts appealed a decision of the trial court that dismissed their claims against the young driver’s friend who was texting the driver much of the day and sent a text message to him immediately before the accident.  Texting while driving is illegal in New Jersey.

No other appellate court has addressed this issue:  whether one who is texting from a location remote from the driver of an automobile can be liable to persons injured because the driver was distracted by the text.  The court answered the question "yes," but only if the sender knew or had special reason to know that the recipient would view the text while driving and thus be distracted."  The court issued a 30-page opinion on the issue, which employs duty analysis to arrive at the conclusion that a duty should be imposed on the sender.  To reach its result, the majority of the court discusses the duty of a passenger in a vehicle at great length.

A Texas police officer has sued a 9-1-1 caller for failing to warn the 9-1-1 official (and thus the police officer) that the police responding to the call would be walking into a dangerous situation.  The responding officer was attacked by a man at the home who had allegedly been using bath salts for several days.

That dog would not hunt in Tennessee. Tennessee (and most states) have what was historically known as the "policemen and firemen’s" rule which, by the way, applies to female police officers and firefighters as well.

Here is a general statement of the rule from Tennessee’s leading case on point, Carson v. Headrick , 900 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. 1995):

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