The Oklahoma Supreme Court has struck down a requirement that an affidavit of merit  from an expert be filed with medical negligence lawsuits.

The statute at issue "requires that a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice attach an affidavit to the petition stating that the plaintiff: 1) has consulted with a qualified expert; 2) has obtained a written opinion from a qualified expert that the facts presented constitute professional negligence; and 3) has determined, on the basis of the expert’s opinion, that the malpractice claim is meritorious and based on good cause. Plaintiffs may petition the trial court for an extension for filing the affidavit of merit not to exceed ninety days. The request must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. Although the defendant may obtain a copy of the expert’s opinion, upon which the affidavit of merit is based, the opinion is inadmissable at trial and may not be utilized in discovery."

The requirement was struck down as a violation of a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution that provides that ""The Legislature shall not except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law … Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts."

The Federal Court for the Middle District of Tennesse has a local rule on  expert witness that has been criticized for decades.   The rule provides as follows

"Expert witness disclosures shall be made timely in accordance with any order of the Court, or if none, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Expert witness disclosure statements shall not be supplemented after the applicable disclosure deadline, absent leave of Court. No expert witness shall testify beyond the scope of his or her expert witness disclosure statement. The Court may exclude the testimony of an expert witness, or order other sanctions provided by law, for violation of expert witness disclosure requirements or deadlines. …"

Rule 39(c)(6)(d).  Not all of the judges enforced the Rule.

The Illinois Supreme Court held that it was not appropriate to certify a class of personal injury plaintiffs who received injuries as a result of chemical exposure after a train derailment.

The holding:  "Although proof of the cause of the derailment will be relatively straightforward, this alone will not establish the Railroad’s liability. Proof of proximate causation and damages will be highly individualized and will consume the bulk of the time at trial. Because the statutory requirement of predominance cannot be met in this case, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in certifying the class."

The case is Smith v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,  Docket No. 102060 (Ill. S. Ct. 11/30/06);  read it here.

The Court of Appeal of California has ruled that a lawyer may be sued for failure to warn a client that the failure to settle a claim against the client  would put the client at risk for paying the adversary’s attorneys fees.  The Court held that it was not appropriate to dismiss the client’s claim against the attorney on that issue, and remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the merits.

There is no need to state all of the facts here, but suffice it to say that the plaintff was upset about having the pay their original adversary’s attorney’s fees of over $600,000 (and their own attorney over $350,000) in a dispute that originally involved less than $20,000.

The case is Charney v. Cobert, B188087 (Cal. Ct. App. Div. 7 11/28/06); read it here.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that a parent corporation may be sued for intentional interference with a contractual relationship between a partially owned subsidiary and a third party.

The Court had ruled in an earlier case that " a parent corporation has a privilege pursuant to which it can cause a wholly-owned subsidiary to breach a contract without becoming liable for tortiously interfering with a contractual relationship.”  However, in this case the Court said that "[w]e conclude that the privilege does not extend when a parent owns less than 100% of a subsidiary.  The foundation of [our prior decision in] Waste Conversion and the reasoning upon which it rests is that the qualified  privilege should be extended when there is a full and complete identity of interest between a parent  corporation and its subsidiary. When there exists such an identity of interest, courts are justified in  treating two legally separate entities as one and in extending the immunity from tortious interference  that is normally enjoyed only by the parties to a contract. However, courts are not justified in  extending the privilege when the interests of the parent and the subsidiary are not identical."

The Court said this as well:  "Having availed themselves of the benefits of separate corporations, the [defendant] Companies argue that we should now disregard their corporate structure in order to shield them from liability. … Because we respect the separate legal status of a corporation and its shareholders, we are equally reluctant to disregard corporateness to create liability as we are to disregard corporateness to remove liability."

Merck won another Vioxx case in federal court, but when you hear the background of the plaintiff it is easy to understand why.

According to an AP report posted on Law.com, the plaintiff "had other risk factors for his heart attack, including tobacco use, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, diabetes and cocaine use."  The article goes on to state that defense lawyer "Phil Beck attacked [plaintiff] Dedrick’s credibility, noting five worthless-check convictions and allegations that Dedrick lied under oath at a disability hearing.   Beck questioned whether Dedrick was telling the truth when he said he continued taking Vioxx even after being prescribed a narcotic painkiller. "

You have to wonder why the hell that case was filed, much less tried.  My guess is that it was filed to toll the one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee and that it was tried because it was part of the case-picking process used by the federal court in New Orleans to establish some benchmarks for the balance of the cases.

Well, yesterday I had to be a lawyer again, taking a deposition in a matter pending in Bankruptcy Court where we have been hired to represent the Trustee.  I find myself doing more and more commercial litigation and, quite frankly, it is quite enjoyable.  I majored in business and economics in undergraduate school and like to have the opportunity to put some of what I learned into use.  Of course, I will always love tort law, but the fact of the matter there is a good deal of that can be put to use in commercial litigation.

Today I am in court in Clarksville on some motions in limine for a trial I have next month.  Therefore, I lack the time to write a substantive post. 

I’ll have something for you on Friday.

Law.com has published an interesting article titled "Who Killed the Mass Tort Bonanza?"

The opening paragraph:  "The power of the plaintiffs bar is on the wane in this country, and will be for a long time to come."  Followed shortly thereafter by this:  "Neither [business interests or trial lawyers], however, would deny that the civil justice system looks drastically different than it did even two years ago. The true triumph (or tragedy, depending on your perspective) of the tort reform movement has been its ability to leverage the success of its public relations campaign into concrete and hard-to-reverse changes. State legislatures have passed laws that undercut the trial lawyers’ successes in Washington, D.C. — especially in the asbestos litigation, which has declined precipitously since the early 2000s. "

This article has done a nice job of explaining the current lay of the land in mass tort litigation.

In Pruitt v. Hancock Medical Center,  NO. 2005-CA-00132-SCT (Miss. S. Ct.  11/16/06),  Plaintiff had a personal injury claim that was not disclosed in a bankruptcy filing.  The injury occurred before the bankruptcy petition was filed.  She received a discharge of her debts in her Chapter 7 proceeding, and then took action in state court to seek damages from the alleged tortfeasor for the injury.  Her claim was dismissed for lack of standing, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.

The Court said as follows:  "This Court concludes that the Pruitts’ cause of action accrued prior to the filing of the Pruitts’ voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on August 21, 2002. As this Court finds that the cause of action existed at the time of filing the bankruptcy petition, the cause of action became property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). ‘If a cause of action belongs to the [bankruptcy] estate, then the trustee has exclusive standing to assert the claim.’" [Citation omitted.]

Read it here.

This fascinating article is written by J.D. Hull, a lawyer from San Diego.  It is called "Professionalism Revisited: What About the Client?

It makes some wonderful points about the client view of what we call in the South the "good ol’ boy system" of law practice.  We are seeing increasing problems with adverse counsel who claim they are too busy to take depositions for, say, five or six months – but not to busy to accept representation in a new case.  Or adverse counsel who cannot set a case for trial in 2007 – just too busy.

When push comes to shove we have to count on judges to remind lawyers that litigation is about clients, not about lawyers.  Judges have to create and enforce deadlines, and judges have to require people to make themselves reasonably available to advance cases toward trial.  There is no reason that 90% of cases cannot be tried in one year.  There is no reason that the other 10% cannot be tried within 18 months.  What it takes to accomplish this goal is for lawyers and judges to remember that the system exists for the benefit of the clients and the public, not for the convenience of the Bench and Bar.

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