My other blog, Practical Procedure and Evidence, has an updated post discussing the law of damages for frivolous appeal. The post includes citations to cases where damages for frivolous appeal appeal have been granted and denied in the last four months.
Writing a brief on appeal? Save yourself at least thirty minutes of research time checking out this blog post.
Where surveillance videos of plaintiff were obtained in preparation for litigation and were thus work product, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to require defendant to only produce those surveillance videos he intended to use at trial for impeachment purposes.
In Locke v. Aston, No. M2022-01820-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2023), plaintiff filed an HCLA action against defendant doctor. After plaintiff nonsuited her first case and in anticipation of plaintiff re-filing, defendant’s counsel obtained surveillance videos of plaintiff. After plaintiff re-filed her case, a discovery dispute arose around the production of these surveillance videos. While the trial court originally ruled that the defendants should produce the videos without limitation, it subsequently amended its ruling and ultimately found that the surveillance videos were work product and that defendant was only required to produce those videos he intended to use at trial for impeachment purposes. On appeal, this ruling was affirmed.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3) governs when material that qualifies as work product is nonetheless discoverable by an opposing party. The Rule requires the person seeking discovery to show that they have a “substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and [are] unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” By ruling that only the videos that would be used for impeachment were discoverable, the trial court had agreed with defendant that plaintiff did not have a substantial need of surveillance video that corroborated her claim. Thus, substantial need was the primary issue in this appeal.
Check out Practical Procedure and Evidence for a post about a fight over the meaning of “double spacing” in the local rules for the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.
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Where a car accident plaintiff filed suit, had service issued but not served, and then failed to have new process issued within one year from the issuance of the first service, the plaintiff could not rely on the fact that defendant received a traffic citation in the accident to extend the time within which service was required to be issued.
In Briars v. Irving, No. W2022-01159-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2023), plaintiff and defendant were involved in a car accident, and defendant was given a citation for crossing the center line of the roadway. Plaintiff filed suit within the one-year statute of limitations and had service issued on July 2, 2020, but that summons was not served. A new summons for defendant was not issued until September 3, 2021. After being served, defendant moved to dismiss, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 states that when process is issued but not served, a plaintiff must “continue the action by obtaining issuance of new process within one year from issuance of the previous process.” Here, plaintiff did not have the new process issued until well beyond one-year after the first, unserved process was issued.
About eight months ago I started another blog, Practical Procedure and Evidence. I blog about issues relating to civil and appellate procedure and evidence that impact civil trial lawyers in Tennessee.
Here are some recent posts:
Where a car accident plaintiff responded to a motion for summary judgment by relying on his own deposition testimony and defendant’s interrogatory responses, the Court found that he had created a genuine issue of material fact.
In Arnold v. Malchow, No. M2022-00907-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2023), a pro se plaintiff brought a negligence claim against defendant driver and defendant underinsured motorist insurance company based on a car accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that plaintiff’s response to the summary judgment motion was insufficient and relied only on inadmissible facts. On appeal, summary judgment was reversed.
Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts stated that plaintiff did not see anything other than “something white” and that plaintiff did not see defendant driving her car before the accident. While plaintiff’s response to these facts included reliance on several inadmissible sources, he also relied on defendant’s interrogatory responses and his own deposition, both of which were admissible evidence.
Where there were questions of fact regarding how much mud was on a road and whether defendants were the cause of the mud, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for defendant trucking company in a car accident negligence case.
In Sullivan v. Carden, No. E2022-01234-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2023), plaintiff had a car accident when he allegedly hit a patch of frozen mud on a rural road. Plaintiff filed this negligence action against defendant trucking company and its owner, asserting that “his accident was caused by Defendants’ failure to remove excessive mud they had deposited onto the rural road he drove on.”
Defendants were running a logging operation in the area. The access road to the logging site was gravel, and only the logging equipment touched the mud/dirt rather than the gravel. Two days before the accident, the logging equipment was loaded onto trailers and driven to another site. Plaintiff argued that defendants’ actions caused mud on the road to the extent that it created an unreasonably dangerous condition. Plaintiff had a witness who stated that he had taken photos of frozen mud on the road at the site of the accident, that he had seen mud streaming from the logging site, and that he had seen another driver slip on the mud.
Where plaintiff signed an informed consent document and failed to present any expert testimony regarding the sufficiency or circumstances of the document, summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s informed consent HCLA claim was affirmed.
In Jarnagin v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, No. M2022-01012-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023), plaintiff met with defendant doctor about a possible procedure related to potential kidney cancer. Plaintiff asserted that during that meeting, the doctor said the only possible side effect was infection at the insertion site, yet the doctor asserted that she went through all of the possible side effects. The notes from the visit supported the doctor’s testimony, and defendants produced an informed consent form signed by plaintiff on the day of the visit that listed the potential side effects of the procedure. Plaintiff stated that he did not specifically remember signing the document, but that the doctor’s assistant had asked him to sign paperwork that explained what the doctor had discussed with him.
After the procedure, plaintiff suffered a complication and later filed this HCLA informed consent action. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the signed informed consent document, which the trial court granted, finding that the only expert testimony presented by plaintiff did not address the sufficiency or circumstances of the signed document. Summary judgment was affirmed on appeal.
Where an arbitration agreement had been signed by a decedent’s attorney in fact upon the decedent’s admission into a nursing home, and on a motion to compel arbitration filed by the nursing home the trial court considered evidence on whether the decedent had the mental capacity to execute the power of attorney for healthcare, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s consideration of such evidence. The Supreme Court held that the immunity provisions in Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act and the Health Care Decisions Act did not bar the trial court from considering evidence of the decedent’s mental capacity.
In Welch v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis, No. W2020-00917-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. Aug. 31, 2023), plaintiff was decedent’s brother and brought this wrongful death claim against defendant nursing home. Decedent had been diagnosed with down syndrome when he was born, and he could not read and had difficulty understanding instructions. In connection with an eye surgery in 2012, plaintiff had helped decedent scratch his name on a durable power of attorney for healthcare (“POA”). Plaintiff had printed and filled out the POA.
In the subsequent years, plaintiff used the POA several times when assisting decedent with obtaining healthcare. In 2016, plaintiff had decedent admitted to defendant nursing home. Plaintiff filled out several documents in connection with the admission, including an optional arbitration agreement, on behalf of decedent. It was uncontested that plaintiff would have shown defendant the POA during the admission process.
