You know the drill by now – here is an article reflecting what happened yesterday.

An excerpt: “They also got to watch a movie: ”V Squad,” a campy, 12-minute sales-training video played in court, which showed two Merck salespeople dressed as superheroes — each in a black suit, with an orange ”V” on the chest — fending off human ”obstacles” who represented questions from doctors to whom the company pitched its blockbuster arthritis drug.”

I confess to being somewhat of a law geek. After almost 25 years of practice, I still enjoy reading opinions and getting my head in the books. I readily confess to not doing much legal writing in my practice anymore – I have several bright young lawyers who help with that part of preparing a case for trial. But I still love to read opinions, and still get a real thrill out of an extraordinarily well-written opinion.

This is one. It is written by Judge William Bedsworth on the California Court of Appeals. The opinion involves a probation revocation hearing; the defendant lost and got sent to prison for seven years. To get a feel for the opinion, consider this, the first paragraph of the opinion: “Occasionally, we see a case that “fell through a crack.” This case fell through a chasm. And no one, not the trial attorney, not the prosecutor, not the court – and certainly not the probation officer – can escape some degree of responsibility for the existence of that chasm. When the issue is whether a defendant goes to prison for seven years or to a drug rehabilitation program, someone should be paying attention. In this case, it appears no one but the defendant really was.”

This is the last paragraph of the opinion: “Finally, we must emphasize that if this case is not an utter anomaly, it is a
frightening example of what can occur when all the participants forget how high the stakes are in a probation revocation hearing. We have no problem concluding Gayton’s counsel had the primary obligation to review and present the evidence that might have assisted his cause. But prosecutors always bear some responsibility for the evidence they offer. And when it became clear during the hearing that the facts were so hotly contested, and that the probation officer had neither brought the file nor reviewed it in the last three months, it was perhaps incumbent upon the court to consider issuing an order to produce the file on its own motion. In short, it must be remembered that everyone in this case had a stake in getting at the truth: All failed.”

Plaintiff Stanton’s photograph was placed alongside a article entitled “The Mating Habits of the Suburban High School Teenager” that ran in Boston magazine. The opinion describes the photograph this way: “[Stanton’s] is one of five young people pictured in a photograph that occupies the entire first page of the article and half of the facing page. The photograph, taken at a high school dance, depicts its three male and two female subjects in formal attire, sitting and standing near an open exit door in the background. Stanton’s image occupies most of the left-hand side of the photograph, where she appears standing, with her face and most of her body fully visible. Although three of the subjects are smoking cigarettes, and another holds a plastic cup, Stanton simply looks at the camera, smiling faintly.” The article talked about the level of sexual activity among high schoolers, etc. Stanton sued, saying that she was defamed.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of the case, stating that the article “would tend to hold [her] up to scorn, hatred, ridicule or contempt, in the minds of [a] considerable and respectable segment in the community. A reasonable reader could believe that Stanton, who appears in the lead illustration for the article, is in fact one of the teens whose promiscuous behavior is described in its text.
Metro concedes for purposes of this appeal that “a statement that [Stanton] was ‘promiscuous’ might damage her reputation in the community.” Accordingly, we need not decide whether a false accusation of promiscuousness is defamatory. At the risk of repeating ourselves, we allow that other reasonable readers may take a different view. We conclude only that the article is susceptible to the defamatory meaning Stanton alleges, i.e., that she engages in sexually promiscuous conduct.” [Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

Tort reform swept through Georgia in 2005, and now the harm and the potential for harm is beginning to be felt. This article from Atlanta’s leading newspaper explains the consquences of the offer of judgment rule.

I hasten to note that the Tennessean has editorialized against tort reform for years.

Thanks to Ken Shigley from telling us about this article.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi has granted summary judgment in favor of a physician when the plaintiff failed to timely respond to discovery seeking information about plaintiff’s expert witnesses and did not timely file an expert affidavit opposing the summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff maintained that she was entitled to more time to get an affidavit from an expert.

From the opinion: “In his final judgment, the trial judge denied Stallworth’s request for a continuance and granted the Doctors’ summary judgment motion based on Stallworth’s failure to substantiate the claims of medical negligence. The trial judge based his decision on the fact that in June of 2004, the Doctors served Stallworth with interrogatories to identify a medical expert, and Stallworth never filed sworn answers to those interrogatories. Instead, Stallworth served unsigned and unsworn interrogatory answers by facsimile and mail subsequent to the filings on summary judgment. The trial judge also based his decision on the fact that Stallworth acquired records of her condition and had notice of a possible claim as early as March of 2002, and retained counsel in April of 2002. The trial court also stated Stallworth’s attorney’s affidavit filed on October 22, 2004, was not compliant with the rules requesting the supplementation of the answers to the interrogatories and did not excuse Stallworth from having an expert to support her claim. Based on these facts, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Stallworth’s request for an additional thirty days to obtain a medical expert’s affidavit. Rule 56(f) is not designed to protect litigants who are lazy or dilatory. We find Stallworth had ample time to locate a medical expert to assist with her claim. Therefore, we find the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Doctors was proper.” [Citations omitted.]

The Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals has ruled that comparative fault applies to cases tried under a nuisance theory.

According to the opinion, “[t]he Complaint alleged that plaintiffs and defendants own adjoining property and that defendants constructed a private road on their property through an area of natural drainage adjoining the Plaintiffs’ property. Further, that the road “impeded and/or altered the natural flow of rainwater runoff such that the private road acts as a dam.” The road caused damage to Plaintiff’s home and personal property. Plaintiff brought a nuisance action.

The Court said that “a nuisance action based upon a “wrongful” interference with the natural drainage of surface water necessarily involves fault because such an interference is an act violating the plaintiff’s property rights and imposing liability upon the defendant. Because such an action necessarily involves fault, applying principles of comparative fault is in keeping with McIntyre’s principle of linking liability with fault.”

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