Back in 1975 the Tennessee Legislature determined that the only health care providers who could testify against a Tennessee health care provider in a malpractice case where experts from contigious states. This is an assine rule – but it is still the law.

You can avoid the contigious state rule with permission of the trial judge. This opinion in Steele v. Berkman reminds us that we have to have some proof of the efforts made find an expert from a contigious state so that the court can determine that a waiver of the rule is appropriate.

The waiver has been applied in Childress v. Bennett, 816 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tenn.1991) and Steele v. Ft. Sanders Anesthesia Group, 897 S.W. 2d 270, 281 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994). It was denied in Rose v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, 947 S.W. 2d
144, 148 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996).

As I mentioned Sunday, I went to Atlanta Sunday night, locked myself in a hotel room, and spent all day Monday and several hours early Tuesday morning preparing for an argument in the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. As a result, I am very behind in my work and need to concentrate on it today.

Back in the saddle tomorrow!

The Colorado Supreme Court has issued an opinion in Aloi v. Union Pacific R.R.

This is the opening paragraph of the opinion: “Petitioner Frank Aloi brought a personal injury action against Union Pacific Railroad (UP). Prior to trial, UP destroyed documents relevant to the litigation. As a sanction for spoliation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury it could draw an inference that the evidence contained in the destroyed documents would have been unfavorable to UP. The trial court gave the adverse inference instruction three times, one time interrupting a crossexamination to provide the instruction. The jury returned a verdict for Aloi, and UP appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.”

The holding? “We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by providing the jury with an adverse inference instruction as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence where it found that UP willfully destroyed relevant evidence, which otherwise naturally would have been introduced at trial. Second, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by repeating the adverse inference instruction because the trial court addressed appropriate objections and articulated the reasoning for its decision; nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by interrupting the crossexamination because it acted to remedy prejudice and as a result did not depart from the required impartiality so as to deny the defendant a fair trial.”

The Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 was “was passed with the stated intent of encouraging ‘committees made up of Tennessee’s licensed physicians to candidly, conscientiously, and objectively evaluate and review their peers’ professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine.’ The statute further ‘recognizes that confidentiality is essential both to effective functioning of these peer review committees and to continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients.’ Tenn. Code Ann. ㋔ 63-6-219(b)(1). To this end, the statute creates a privilege for certain documents, etc., which are generated or provided during the peer review process.”

Dr. Moore was summarily suspended from his staff privileges in a Chattanooga hospital and sought information from his creditionals file. The hospital refused to provide it, citing the Peer Review Law. The case went to the Eastern Section of our Court of Appeals and the appellate court remanded to case to the trial judge for further action in consideration of the opinion.

Specifically, the appellate court found even though the creditionals file was covered under the Peer Review Law the wording of the statute itself said that “[n]othing contained in this subsection (e) applies to records made in the regular course of business by a hospital or other provider of health care and information, documents or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in any civil proceedings merely because they were presented during proceedings of such committee.”

I was talking with some lawyers lately about an increasing problem of discovery abuse, particularly during depositions. Apparently some lawyers don’t understand the rules or, if they do, they don’t care about them.

Here is an interesting Order entered in a case that put the hammer down on a lawyer who the Court determined had not acted appropriately during depositions. Download file

Do you have any Orders you would like to share? Trial judges need to know that other trial judges have taken aggressive action to stop what they have determined to be inappropriate conduct and the best way to demonstrate that is a copy of an order. If you have such orders, fax or email them to me and I will post them so that other lawyers may utilize them.

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