Day on Torts

December 22, 2016

Open and Obvious Danger Not Automatic Bar to Fall-Down Claim

In Matherne v. West, No. E2015-02061-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2016), the Tennessee Court of Appeals overturned summary judgment in a premises liability case notwithstanding a claimed “open and obvious” danger.

Plaintiff’s family was renting a cabin in the mountains from defendants. The pictures online showed that the cabin had two parking spaces, one being elevated several feet along a slope from the other. A safety rail went around a portion of the upper parking space but did not cover the entire drop-off area. On plaintiff’s second day at the cabin, she was stepping out of her vehicle after buckling her daughter into a the car when her first foot landed on the concrete but her second foot did not, causing her to fall onto the lower parking area and injure her arm.

Plaintiff filed suit, and defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. In its findings of fact, the trial court noted that plaintiff had seen the two separate parking levels and knew about them; that she saw that the rail covered only a portion of the upper space; that she had told the children in her family not to play on the upper parking space, as they could fall and be injured, and had asked her husband to park on that space to prevent the children from playing there; that it was light when she fell; that nothing prevented her from having someone back the car off the parking space before entering it; that the parked car was approximately three to three and a half feet from the edge of the drop-off; and that there was sufficient room for her to get into and out of the car without falling. The trial court concluded that “plaintiff had absolute and actual knowledge of the potentially dangerous condition,” that the condition was “open and obvious,” and that plaintiff “was at least 50% at fault for her fall and any injuries allegedly sustained therefrom.”

On appeal, the Court overturned the trial court, reversing the grant of summary judgment. The Court quoted extensively from several Supreme Court decisions, noting that “an owner…of premises has a duty to exercise reasonable care with regard to…business invitees on the premises,” and that a Supreme Court decision “held that a duty may exist even where the injury-causing condition is alleged to be ‘open and obvious’ to the plaintiff.” (quoting Rice v. Sabir, 979 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1998)). In Coln v. City of Savannah, 966 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1998), the Supreme Court stated:

December 14, 2016

Rental Car Driven by Renter Considered an Uninsured Motor Vehicle

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Martin v. Powers, No. M2014-00647-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2016), the Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether a rental car being driven by a renter qualified as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the plaintiff’s car insurance policy.

Plaintiff owned a bar, and he refused to serve alcohol to the defendant. When plaintiff followed defendant out to the parking lot, defendant got into a rental car that he had rented from Enterprise and intentionally drove into plaintiff, causing a knee injury.

During the course of the litigation, plaintiff “served [his insurance] with a copy of the summons and complaint for the purpose of bringing a claim under his uninsured motorist coverage.” The insurance company argued that Enterprise was a self-insurer under certain Tennessee statutes, and that the accident thus “did not arise out of the ownership or use of an uninsured vehicle.” The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment, but the Supreme Court reversed.

December 12, 2016

Issue Concerning Naming Proper Defendant in Complaint

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Robinson v. Robbins, No. W2016-00381-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2016), the Court of Appeals addressed an issue regarding whether the savings statute applied when the defendant argued that the party in the second suit was different from the party named in the first suit.

This was an HCLA case, and plaintiffs first filed suit pro se. Their first complaint named the defendant as “Edward Todd Robins, MD, PC.” Within the body of the complaint, however, defendant was described in his individual capacity. When filing his answer, defendant included the language: “Comes now, Dr. E. Todd Robbins, P.C. as proper party for the above named Edward Todd Robbins, M.D., P.C…” Later in the suit, plaintiffs retained an attorney, who at some point in the first suit filed a motion “to clarify their intent to seek recovery from Defendant as an individual.” The trial court orally denied this motion, but “advised Plaintiffs that it would reconsider its ruling if they provided authority in support of their argument.” Before the order denying the motion was entered, plaintiffs took a voluntary dismissal of the first suit.

After giving proper pre-suit notice, plaintiffs filed their second suit, wherein they named “Edward Todd Robbins, M.D.” as defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, arguing that the first suit was filed against him in his corporate capacity and that the savings statute thus did not apply to a suit filed against him in his individual capacity, as the parties were not identical. The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit, but this dismissal was reversed on appeal.

December 6, 2016

Security Guards and the Independent Contractor Rule

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Estate of Cunningham v. Epstein Enterprises LLC, No. W2015-00498-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016), the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in a premises liability case where an armed security guard was shot and killed while on duty at an apartment complex.

The guard worked for a security company, and the company contracted with the apartment. The contract between the two entities provided that the security company was making “no representations that the security requested is reasonably adequate for the Client’s purpose,” and that the apartment was “relying upon its own knowledge and investigation as to the number and type of security personnel required.” On the night in question, the armed guard was on duty when “criminals, apparently fleeing from a nearby apartment complex, shot and killed [him].”

The guard’s wife filed a premises liability suit against the apartment, and the defendant apartment filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant argued that “they did not owe a duty of care to [the guard] because the risk by which he was fatally injured was inherent in the performance of his duties as a security guard.” Defendant filed a statement of undisputed, material facts, to which plaintiff did not respond. Instead, plaintiff filed a memorandum stating that she did not dispute the facts and arguing that the apartment “owed [the guard] a duty as an employee of an independent contractor working within the bounds of an invitation to perform work,” and that because the criminal acts here were foreseeable, the apartment “owed a duty to protect [the guard] from such acts.” The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, holding that the apartment had “no duty to [the guard] to protect him from a risk inherent in the task which he was hired to perform,” and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

December 3, 2016

Statute of Limitations Bars Legal Malpractice Claim

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Athena of S.C., LLC v. Macri, No. E2016-00224-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2016), the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a Tennessee legal malpractice claim on the basis that the claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

In the underlying matter, plaintiffs had purchased promissory notes from an individual and a business, and defendant attorney represented the sellers of the notes during the transaction. Thereafter, plaintiffs hired the same attorney to help them collect on the notes they purchased. Defendant attorney drafted two complaints and two agreed judgments against the debtors on the notes, which were entered in circuit court in November 2011. During the same time period, the debtor on the notes was involved in litigation in federal court, where his former business partner had sued him.

In May 2012, plaintiffs published a notice of foreclosure for condominiums that secured the notes, but the former business partner filed a motion in federal court to enjoin the sale. Finding that the transfer of the notes was likely fraudulent, the district court entered an order in May 2012 enjoining the sale. In July 2012, plaintiffs published a notice of foreclosure for lots that secured the note, and the same scenario played out, with the federal court enjoining the sale in August 2012.

December 2, 2016

Notice and HIPAA Form Also Required for Re-Filed HCLA Claim

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Tennessee Courts continue to make it clear that each time you re-file a previously dismissed Tennessee medical malpractice (now health care liability) claim, you must abide by the statutory requirements. In Cright v. Overly, No. E2015-01215-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2016), the Court of Appeals addressed the need for a plaintiff who was re-filing a previously nonsuited complaint to attach a new HIPAA-compliant release to the second pre-suit notice letter, determining that her failure to do so meant the complaint should be dismissed.

Plaintiff sued multiple defendants related to the treatment and death of her husband. In August 2009, before filing the first suit, plaintiff sent pre-suit notices with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization to each of the defendants. This action proceeded through discovery and eventually made it to trial, but three days into trial plaintiff moved for a voluntary dismissal.

After the dismissal, plaintiff sent pre-suit notices to the defendants again, but this time she did not include a HIPAA release. Instead, the letter stated: “Medical records of the entire UT Hospital admission at issue have been previously provided to you, as well as any other records you wished to obtain pursuant to an Agreed RAS Order entered in the [original suit].” When plaintiff filed her second complaint, defendants all filed motions to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to include a HIPAA-compliant release with her pre-suit notice pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. Plaintiff’s attorney asserted that a HIPAA release “was not attached, because the parties had previously entered an agreed order that the RAS service and record ordering procedure was to be the exclusive means for obtaining the deceased’s medical records, to the exclusion of any medical authorizations previously provided.” The trial court, however, granted the motions to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

November 23, 2016

Suit Against Local Government Over Sewer Issues

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Nickels v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville and Davidson County, No. M2015-01938-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2016), the Court of Appeals went through a thorough analysis of Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) as it related to a claim regarding the malfunction of a sewer and stormwater system.

Though the facts here were quite detailed, the gist of the matter was that plaintiff owned a dentist office in midtown Nashville, and the land surrounding the office “generally [rose] in every direction.” This area of Nashville has a combined sewage and stormwater system, and there was a catch basin behind the office parking lot where stormwater was intended to be integrated into the sewer line. From this catch basin, the mixed water was fed downstream “into a twelve-inch line,” which then connected to a much larger 108-inch pipe.

In 2005, plaintiff built an addition onto his dental office. Later that year, plaintiff’s office manager called Metro Water Services for the first time to report that plaintiff believed the storm drain was clogged, as there was flooding in the alley behind the office. Plaintiff called Metro again in May 2006 to report that water was coming out of the catch basin, after which Metro did a video inspection of the water line that showed concrete in the 12-inch line. This concrete was not removed. In September 2006, plaintiff’s office flooded from the back door and the shower drains, and the floodwater contained sewage. On June 3, 2007, the office flooded again. Metro inspected the pipe again, and found “four to five inches of concrete and debris in the line.” Metro removed two sections of the pipe but did not compensate plaintiff for repairs to his office. Metro did, however, install a back-trap device on plaintiff’s service line.

November 22, 2016

Ex Parte Communications With Treating Physicians – TN Statute Ruled Unconstitutional

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Judge Thomas Brothers of Nashville has declared Tenn. Code Ann. Section 29-26 -121(f)(1) and (2) unconstitutional. Memorandum Order – Judge Brothers

The code section allows defense lawyers in Tennessee health care liability actions virtually unfettered ex parte communications with the plaintiff’s non-party health care providers. The code section was adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in an attempt to override two Tennessee Supreme Court decisions.

The first of those cases was Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 20o2), which held that a covenant of confidentiality between patients and their treating physicians arises because of an implied understanding between patient and doctor and from a public policy concern that private medical information should be protected.

November 13, 2016

Upcoming Seminar – Knoxville, Nashville and Memphis

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Justice Programs will present its annual seminar program in Knoxville, Nashville and Memphis in a few weeks. Former Justice Penny White and former Judge Joe Riley and I started this seminar over a decade ago. Famed mediator Howard Vogel joins us as a participant this year.

I will be speaking about torts, comparative fault, and preparation for taking meaningful depositions. Other topics are listed on the Justice Programs website. Fifteen continuing legal education credits (which includes four ethics / professionalism / dual credits) will be awarded for those that attend the entire program

Hundreds of people attend this program every year, many coming year after year. Please join us in

November 6, 2016

Lawyer Wisely Drops Chicken-Choking Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Lawyer Paul Newton of Gulfport, Mississippi filed a lawsuit against Popeye’s for not supplying him with a knife in his take-out chicken bag. He says the lack of a knife (he did receive a spork) caused him to use his teeth to tear the chicken from the bone when he was consuming it back at his office. According to the complaint, he choked on a piece of chicken.

Newton later dismissed the case, reportedly because of “extreme comments directed to me and my family.”

Newton’s unclaimed Avvo profile indicates that he has been practicing law for 35 years.