The Tennessee Products Liability Act (“TPLA”) does not apply extraterritorially, and therefore dismissal of a case where the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in the Dominican Republic was affirmed.

In Renel v. Drexel Chemical Company, No. W2023-01693-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2025), the plaintiffs worked in the sugar cane industry. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant chemical company, claiming they were injured by chemicals produced and sold by the defendant, which was a Tennessee company located in Tennessee.

The trial court granted the defendant company’s motion to dismiss, ruling that “the TPLA does not have extraterritorial application,” and that “even if a case were to proceed in Tennessee, the applicable law would be the law of the Dominican Republic.” The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal.

The defendant city was immune from suit under the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute for the plaintiff’s personal injuries incurred while he was playing golf on a city golf course.

In Bates v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2024-00857-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2025), the plaintiff fell down steps while playing golf on a city golf course. He filed this personal injury suit, and the defendant city filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“TRUS”). The trial court granted the motion, ruling that golf was comparable to the activities listed in the TRUS and that no exception applied, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

“The TRUS provides an affirmative defense to a landowner when a person is injured while engaging in a recreational activity on the landowner’s property.” (internal citation omitted). Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102(a) includes a list of activities which qualify for immunity under the TRUS, specifically mentioning “hunting, fishing, …water sports, …hiking, sightseeing,…skeet and trap shooting, sporting clay, shooting sports, and target shooting, …off-road vehicle riding” and others. Based on the language of the statute, the Supreme Court has “stated that the list of activities under Section 102 is neither exclusive nor exhaustive,” and activities that are “comparable to those listed” are also included. (internal citation omitted). Various cases have found attending a concert in a park, swimming and diving in a pool, and playing on a playground to fall within the TRUS.

Where the trial court granted a TPPA motion to dismiss on two grounds, but the plaintiffs addressed only one of the grounds in their appeal, dismissal was affirmed.

In Black v. Baldwin, No. M2024-00151-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2025), the defendant’s daughter moved in with the plaintiffs, causing issues between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The defendant made social media posts claiming that the plaintiffs had kidnapped her daughter, that one plaintiff was a pedophile, that the plaintiffs were grooming the daughter, and that the plaintiffs were in a cult. The defendant also reported the plaintiffs to the Department of Children’s Services.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy, intrusion upon section, and other claims. The defendant moved to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”). The trial court granted the TPPA dismissal, finding that the complaint was filed in response to the defendants “exercise of (1) the right to free speech and (2) the right to petition.” In addition to dismissing the case, the trial court awarded the defendant her attorneys’ fees and additional sanctions under the TPPA totaling $40,000. The trial court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal.

An expert witness in an HCLA case who admittedly did not know any information about the hospital that administered treatment, including what services it offered or its size, and had never spoken to anyone who worked there or been there in person, did not satisfy the locality rule.

In Bowen v. Nelson, No. W2024-00749-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2025), the plaintiff filed an HCLA action based on her treatment and the transfer process at Jackson-Madison County General Hospital. The plaintiff identified Dr. Jim as her standard of care and causation expert. In his deposition, Dr. Jim stated that he had spent many years working at a hospital in St. Lous, Missouri. When questioned about his familiarity with the hospital where the plaintiff was treated, he admitted to knowing very little. He did not know the population of the city, did not know how many beds were in the hospital (and guessed very inaccurately), and did not know what services the hospital offered. He stated that he had never spoken to anyone who worked at the hospital or visited the hospital.

Based on this testimony, the defendants filed a motion to exclude Dr. Jim pursuant to the locality rule, as well as a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s inability to prove the necessary elements of her HCLA claim by expert proof. The trial court granted both motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Summary judgment for a nuisance claim was affirmed where the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence beyond their own affirmations that a nuisance existed.

In Heatley v. Estate of Gaither, No. M2024-01097-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2025), the plaintiffs and the defendants lived on two plots of land that were joined as one property until around 1990. While the land was owned by one party, a septic tank was installed on the plaintiffs’ side that serviced the property the defendants eventually owned.

In 2013, the plaintiffs discovered the septic tank, and the defendants had the septic line “permanently severed and sealed under the supervision of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation” in 2014. In early 2014, the plaintiffs filed their first lawsuit related to the septic tank, alleging claims for negligence and trespass. The defendants were granted summary judgment on the nuisance claims in that matter, and the remaining claim was eventually nonsuited in 2022.

Where a trial court’s ruling that a plaintiff’s rotator cuff injury was not caused by a car accident was not supported by the evidence, the ruling was reversed.

In Payne v. Shelby County, Tennessee, No. W2024-00641-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2025), the plaintiff was riding in the front of a small bus while helping to transport a patient as part of her job as a certified nursing assistant. She was buckled with a lap belt. While stopped at a red light, a deputy sheriff stopped in a car behind the bus began moving and struck the back of the bus. The airbags in the rear car did not deploy, but the car was inoperable and had to be towed.

The plaintiff declined ambulance transport but took herself to a medical center to be examined that day. She complained of neck and low back pain, and she was seen at an emergency room later than evening. The next morning, she went to the recommended follow up visit and complained of back, neck and shoulder pain. Over the next few weeks, the plaintiff was seen for follow up visits, and she eventually saw an orthopedic surgeon. The surgeon clinically diagnosed her with a rotator cuff tear and recommended an MRI. Based on the MRI and clinical findings, the plaintiff had surgery on her rotator cuff three months after the automobile accident.

Where an HCLA plaintiff filed unsigned HIPAA authorizations with her complaint, but at least one defendant admitted that the HIPAA authorization it received was actually signed, dismissal was reversed.

In Buckner v. Complete Wellness Chiropractic Center, No. E2024-00698-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2025), the plaintiff suffered long-term complications after several practitioners failed to diagnose the cause of her back pain properly. She filed this healthcare liability suit against twenty defendants and asserted in her complaint that she had sent proper pre-suit notice under the HCLA. The notices attached to her complaint, however, included HIPAA authorizations that were not signed.

Based on these unsigned authorizations, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff did not provide additional proof, but she insisted that she complied with the statute. The defendants argued that the error here was substantive because the plaintiff could not prove compliance, and dismissal was therefore appropriate. During oral arguments, counsel for one of the defendants was asked by the trial court whether the HIPAA authorization his client received was signed, to which he admitted that it was. The trial court nonetheless granted the motion to dismiss, but that ruling was reversed on appeal.

When a trial court’s denial of a TPPA petition for dismissal had been appealed, and the Court of Appeals had remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the plaintiff was not entitled to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice.

In Richman v. Debity, No. E2024-00919-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2025), the defendants’ request to their HOA to install a fence had been denied. In an effort to show that the HOA did not apply the rules consistently, the defendants took photos of the plaintiffs’ home and yard from the public street. Based on these photos, the plaintiffs filed this suit in general sessions court alleging harassment and invasion of privacy, and asking for a restraining order.

The defendants filed a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tennessee’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the TPPA petition to dismiss, and the defendants appealed that denial to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the statute’s provision that decisions thereunder are immediately appealable. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s “ruling does not indicate why the trial court dismissed the TPPA Petition within the context of the burden shifting mechanism found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-17-105(a) through (c).” The Court thus vacated the order and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The special duty exception to GTLA immunity did not apply where the police department in question owed a duty to investigate a crime to the public at large, and the plaintiff could not use the reckless misconduct special duty exception because the GTLA does not remove immunity for recklessness.

In Franklin v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, No. W2023-01142-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2025), the plaintiff was kidnapped and raped at gunpoint. She reported the crime to the local police immediately, but the plaintiff alleged that in the following months the police failed to investigate and pursue the case diligently. The plaintiff asserted in her complaint that the police had information pointing to the perpetrator but failed to make an arrest, and that they failed to process her rape kit in an expedited matter. When the rape kit was processed, the perpetrator was identified and arrested, but by that time he had already kidnapped and murdered another woman.

The plaintiff filed this claim under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), asserting that the defendant city was liable for the police department’s negligence. The city moved for dismissal, which the trial court granted pursuant to the public duty doctrine of the GTLA. Dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

A Tennessee dog bite victim who cannot make a successful claim under the Tennessee Dog Bit Statute may not be precluded from pursuing a common law negligence claim.

In Hudson v. Gravette, No. M2022-01787-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2025), the plaintiff was an employee at a dog boarding kennel. The defendants owned two English bulldogs that were often boarded at the kennel. In fact, between May 2018 and February 2019, the dogs were at the kennel almost 50% of the time.

On the day of the incident, the plaintiff was the first employee to arrive at the kennel, and she let all the dogs out in groups. When she released the defendants’ dogs, one began nipping at her ankle, causing her to fall. Both dogs then attacked her for five to ten minutes. The plaintiff required emergency surgery, and she suffered from continued painful nerve damage and post-traumatic stress.

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