Day on Torts

June 24, 2014

Just Give Him the Dang Forms!

Mr. Fleming needed medical forms completed for his workers’ compensation case. He submitted the forms to the defendants but after “20 or more days” he had still not received the completed forms and his phone calls were not being returned. Consequently, a frustrated Mr. Fleming filed a civil warrant in Shelby County General Sessions Court alleging “dereliction of duty, negligence and conspiracy”, which had caused him “financial and stressful harm.” Seven months later, in January of 2012, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (TMMA). Defendants argued Mr. Fleming had failed to provide written notice of the claim and had failed to supply a good faith certificate. The case was dismissed by the General Sessions judge.

Undeterred, Mr. Fleming appealed to Shelby County Circuit Court. In July of 2012, the Defendants again filed a motion to dismiss with the same arguments made in the General Sessions matter. A month later, the Court held a hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Fleming was finally given his completed forms which he had been pursuing for more than one year. Since he had finally received the paperwork, Mr. Fleming did not oppose the motion to dismiss. As such, the trial court entered an order granting the unopposed motion to dismiss and citing the failure to comply with the TMMA.

But that was not the end of the matter because the trial court assessed costs against Mr. Fleming. In response to the assessment of costs, Mr. Fleming filed a “Motion for Judicial Review” In his motion, Mr. Fleming outlined his efforts to obtain the records which included 2 court appearances, 15 phone calls to the Defendants and an appointment with Dr. Sanai. Since he ultimately obtained the relief he sought (his medical forms) at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Fleming argued he was the prevailing party and costs should not have been assessed against him. The Defendants opposed Mr. Fleming’s motion citing the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the TMMA. After a hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Fleming’s Motion for Judicial Review.

June 13, 2014

John Day’s New Book – Tennessee Law of Civil Trial

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

My newest book, Tennessee Law of Civil Trial, will be released on July 1, 2014 and may be ordered now for July 1 delivery.

The book consists of 500+ pages of the law of civil trial in Tennessee, covering the law of scheduling orders to the law of motions for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Also included is a chapter called "Preparing to Win At Trial" which consists of over 75 tips that I have developed over the years and multiple forms and checklists.

Click on the link to see the Table of Contents.

June 6, 2014

Memphis Premises Liability Case Fails

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In the recent premises liability opinion of Wolfe v. Felts, Jr. No. W2013-01995-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2014), the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to grant directed verdict in favor of defendants in a case where plaintiff fell on ice that had formed in front of defendants’ building after the building’s sprinkler system had activated during freezing temperatures.

The plaintiff in Wolfe did not argue, as is customary in most premises cases, that defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition (the sprinkler system operating in freezing temperatures). Instead, plaintiff argued that defendants had created the dangerous condition by negligently failing to properly manage the sprinkler system. Tennessee law holds that a plaintiff is not required to prove that a premises owner had prior notice of a dangerous condition if the premises owner created the condition that caused plaintiff’s injury.

However, according to the appellate court, plaintiff’s case failed because there was no evidence as to what constituted proper sprinkler management or maintenance so as to establish that improper sprinkler management or maintenance had caused the sprinkler to malfunction.

June 4, 2014

Amended Medical Malpractice Complaint Not Subject to Certificate of Good Faith Requirement when Initial Action was Filed Before October 1, 2008

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 29-26-122 requires medical malpractice complaints to be supported by a certificate of good faith. This statute became effective October 1, 2008, yet because health care cases can linger for years in pre-trial stages, many cases filed before that date are still active. The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently considered how the certificate of good faith statute affects amended pleadings in cases originally filed before October 1, 2008.

In Rogers v. Jackson, No. M2013-02357-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2014), plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit regarding the death of his wife. The original complaint was filed on February 1, 2008. Defendants filed an answer, then on October 2, 2008 moved to amend their answer to assert comparative fault against a second doctor’s group as well as the deceased patient. The motion to amend was granted. Based on this amended answer, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 29, 2008, adding this additional doctor and his group as defendants in the suit.

Arguing that the amended pleadings were filed after the implementation of the certificate of good faith requirement, the added defendants filed a motion to strike the allegations of fault in the amended answer and amended complaint based on the argument that no certificates of good faith were filed regarding the claims against them. The trial court denied the added defendants’ The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow the case to proceed against the defendants named in both the original and the amended complaint.

June 3, 2014

Can The Owner of LLC Also Be A Defendant in a Tort Action Against the LLC?

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The plaintiff in Akers v. McLemore Auction Co., LLC, No. M2012-02398-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2014) chose to hire an auction company to sell his real and personal property that the plaintiff valued at more than $350,000, but chose to go pro se in suing the auction company. That might explain why the appellate opinion needed ten pages to summarize – and affirm – the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissals on the plaintiff’s four claims against more than twenty defendants.

One potentially helpful nugget for other cases is the appellate court’s discussion of the dismissal of claims against an individual defendant affiliated with the auction company. The plaintiff alleged, in pertinent part, that the individual defendant was a “person” who called himself the auction company’s President, but who was really the sole member of the auction company’s LLC. The trial court dismissed the claims against the individual defendant under Rule 12.02(6), finding there were no facts to support the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant “was acting outside his capacity as agent for [the auction company] at any time.”

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred on this point. A trial court is bound to review only the complaint for purposes of Rule 12.02(6), and nothing in the complaint alleged that the individual defendant was ever acting on behalf of the auction company. For this reason, he should not have been dismissed.

May 30, 2014

Spoliation of Evidence in Tennessee: Intent v. Prejudice

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

What is it with drillers and spoliation of evidence cases? First it was Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mid-South Drillers Supply, Inc. which is a Tennessee leading case on the subject. And now, we have a new spoliation case with a different drilling company, Griffith Services Drilling, LLC v. Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc. So, let’s drill down on this issue a bit, shall we?

Griffith Services Drilling, LLC (Griffith Drilling) and its insurance carrier sued Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc. (Arrow) for $1.2 million in property damage caused by a fire. On the day of the fire, an Arrow employee, Mr. Burress, delivered fuel to Griffith Drilling. During the refueling, Burress walked away to converse with some of the Griffith Drilling employees. Shortly thereafter, a Griffith Drilling employee yelled that fuel was spraying and a fire ignited. When Burress moved the Arrow truck to get it away from the fire, the fuel nozzle broke off. The next day, Burress took the broken nozzle to a retailer and traded it in for a new nozzle. Griffith Drilling was not provided any notice of Arrow’s intent to replace the nozzle.

After the fire and without notifying Arrow, Grifftih Drilling’s insurance carrier authorized clean up of the site and disposed of all evidence of the fire. One month after the clean-up was completed, Griffith Drilling sent Arrow a notice of its intent to pursue a claim for the fire damage. Suit was eventually filed and Arrow counterclaimed for breach of contract as Griffith Drilling had failed to pay for the fuel delivered to the site. Thereafter, Arrow filed two motions: (1) a motion to dismiss for spoliation of evidence based on Griffith Drilling’s clean up of the site; (2) a motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract counterclaim. The trial court granted both motions. Griffith Drilling appealed alleging the trial court erred by granting both motions.

May 29, 2014

Negligent Failure to Have a Nightlight? Nope

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s premises case in Smith v. Stanley, No. E2013-00886-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2014).

Plaintiff visited a cabin with her sister and cousin. The cabin was owned by defendants, who are plaintiff’s aunt and uncle. Plaintiff was the first to enter the cabin after her cousin opened and held the door open for her. It was nighttime, and the inside of the cabin was completely black. There were light switches inside the cabin beside the entry way, but plaintiff did not turn them on. Plaintiff took at least one step and probably several more before she fell backwards down a staircase. She was knocked unconscious from the fall and suffered multiple injuries.

The trial court granted summary judgment after finding that defendants did not owe plaintiff any duty. Relying on the Tennessee Supreme Court case of Eaton v. McLain, 891 SW.2d 587 (Tenn. 1994), the trial court ruled that it was not reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff would enter an unfamiliar area in the dark without turning on any lights.

May 28, 2014

No Special Requirements for Pre-Suit Notice on the State of Tennessee In Medical Malpractices Cases

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Tennessee, before a party may file a lawsuit against a healthcare provider for medical malpractice, the party must give 60 days’ pre-suit notice pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). In Brown v. Samples, No. E2013-00799-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014), the State of Tennessee was granted permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal when it argued that it was not provided with effective pre-suit notice of a claim for medical malpractice arising out of the death of a child during delivery at a state-run hospital. The claims commissioner disagreed with the state’s position and denied the state’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the claims commissioner finding there was no special requirements for pre-suit notice to the state.

The state argued that in order for pre-suit notice to be effective against it, the notice must be sent to (1) the Attorney General of Tennessee or an Assistant Attorney General, or (2) the Division of Claims Administration of the State. Section 121 provides that the notice must be given “[t]o a health care provider that is a corporation or other business entity at both the address for the agent for service of process, and the provider’s current business address, if different from that of the agent for service of process.” The state argued that its agent for service of process is the attorney general or any assistant attorney general relying on Rule 4.04(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure as authority, which applies to service of the summons and complaint in a lawsuit. However, the court noted that Rule 4.04, by its own terms, applies only to service of lawsuits, not pre-suit notice. The state also argued that because claims against the state must be filed in the Division of Claims Administration, the Division of Claims Administration is an alternate agent for service. However, the court notes that the regulations pertaining to filings with the Division of Claims Administration apply to claims and not pre-suit notice. Also, importantly, the court reminds us that actual notice is the goal, so where this is actual notice, the defendant should not be permitted to complain. There was no dispute that the state had actual notice of this case.

The court also held that to the extent the notice was deficient, the plaintiffs demonstrated “extraordinary cause” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which allows the court to excuse relatively minor technical flaws.

May 27, 2014

Failure to Read a Motion is Not Excusable Neglect under Tennessee Law

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Rule 60.02(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order on grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” This is the rule that the plaintiffs attempted to rely on to set aside an order dismissing their case in Brown v. Juarez, No. E2013-00979-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2014).

In Brown, after about three years of inactivity in the case, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. The motion included a notice of hearing and a statement that the motion would be granted if there was no response. Plaintiffs’ counsel received the motion but failed to file a response and did not appear at the hearing. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the notice was crafted to conceal the hearing date. The court was not persuaded by that argument. Nor was the court persuaded by the argument that the plaintiffs’ failure to appear and to respond was due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.”

The court noted that an absence of willfulness does not equate to neglect that is excusable. So, while the court found that plaintiffs’ counsel did not willfully fail to appear or respond to the motion, the court found that the neglect was not excusable because had plaintiffs’ counsel read the entire motion, he would have noticed the hearing date. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove entitlement to relief under Rule 60.02 and upheld the dismissal.

May 23, 2014

Failure to Timely Appeal Results in Dismissal

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Wright v. Dunlap, No. M2014-00238-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 30, 2014), a jury rendered a defense verdict in plaintiff’s car crash case. The trial court entered a judgment dismissing the case, and then Plaintiff’s case was dismissed on appeal because of her failure to take appropriate action within 30 days following entry of the trial court’s judgment.

After the entry of an adverse final judgment, Tennessee law requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days from the entry of the judgment. However, there are various motions a party can file with the trial court that will extend the deadline to file the notice of appeal as long as the motions are filed within 30 days of the judgment. These motions are listed in Tenn. R. App. P. 4(b) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01. Once the trial court rules on the motion, the party then has 30 days from the entry of the order on the motion to file the notice of appeal.

The trial court’s judgment was entered on October 11, 2013. Plaintiff’s Rule 59 motion to alter or amend was filed more than thirty days later on November 15, 2013. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the Rule 59 motion was timely because a duplicate judgment virtually identical to the October 11, 2013 judgment was entered on October 22, 2013. However, the appellate court disagreed. Tennessee case law holds that where two substantially identical judgments are entered, the time for filing a notice of appeal or Rule 59 motion begins to run upon entry of the first judgment. Ball v. McDowell, 288 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tenn. 2009). The later entry of a virtually identical judgment that doesn’t affect the parties’ substantive rights or obligations resolved by the first judgment does not extend the time for filing a Rule 59 motion or notice of appeal.