Day on Torts

September 6, 2008

Off Topic – Speech to Nowhere

Written by Will Bunch, as found at www.philly.com.

Palin’s Speech to Nowhere

Sarah Palin delivered a great speech tonight — for her party, for John McCain, for herself, for what she set out to accomplish. This was America’s first real glimpse at the Alaska governor, and what we saw was a boffo politician who speaks in a plaintive prairie voice that channels America’s Heartland like a chilling breeze rippling a field of wheat, who knows how to tell a joke, how to bring down the house and bring a tear to a few eyes. She is proud of her family, as she should be, and there is much to admire in her own “personal journey of discovery” (don’t we all have these, by the way?) including her efforts to raise her son Trig. It is indeed nice to think that there would be an advocate for such children inside the corridors of the White House, although I’d surely like to hear what — if anything — she’s done for special needs kids as governor of Alaska.

September 5, 2008

Insurance Coverage Litigation?

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In most states the duty to defend an insured in litigation is broader than the duty to indemnify that insured.

Here is a 50-state survey prepared by the highly regarded Chicago-based firm of Hinshaw & Culbertson on the duty to defend. Here is how they describe the 105-page publication:

Duty To Defend contains a survey of the law of the 50 United States and the District of Columbia on an insurer’s duty to defend a lawsuit against its insured and related topics. Each state entry includes a discussion of the scope of the duty to defend in that state and of the test employed by the state to determine whether the insurer owes such a duty. The state entries also include discussions of whether the insurer may defend pursuant to a reservation of rights and the implications of doing the same, including conflicts of interest which may be created; whether a declaratory judgment action may be brought to determine the insurer’s rights and obligations under the policy; and the consequences of the insurer’s failure to defend where it has an obligation to do so.

September 3, 2008

“Your Plaintiff is a Scumbag”

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

It is not uncommon for the defense in personal injury cases to attack the character of the plaintiff. It seems to me that young defense lawyers particularly enjoy doing this to uneducated, unsophisticated plaintiffs.

The defense in a products case in California introduced evidence that the plaintiff had a mistress and was a bigamist. The jury rendered a defense verdict, and the plaintiff moved to set it aside saying that the admission of the evidence unfairly prejudiced the jury against the plaintiff. The California Court of Appeals, 2nd District agreed, saying

Michelin’s primary basis for introducing evidence of Winfred’s illicit conduct was to contradict his deposition testimony that he could not recall who [his wife and mistress] were. But his extramarital affairs were irrelevant to the substantive issue in the case: the cause of the accident. To the extent the evidence was relevant to Winfred’s credibility, it was more prejudicial than probative. … From start to finish, Michelin painted Winfred as a liar, cheater, womanizer, and a man of low morals based principally, if not solely, on what we have concluded was inadmissible evidence.

September 2, 2008

“The Sun Made Me Do It!”

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A defendant is permitted to argue that the light from the setting sun hindered his vision and that he was not negligent in failing to see (and then striking) plaintiff’s car.

The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the argument of the plaintiff that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law. The Court said

under Kansas law, when a constant condition exists that knowingly blocks or impairs a driver’s vision, the decision to continue driving without exercising reasonable diligence is negligence as a matter of law. The so-called blinding light rule from Diaz [206 Kan. 650], however, provides an exception in cases where a driver’s vision is suddenly blocked by some action beyond his or her control. Under such circumstances, the driver is not necessarily negligent for something that occurs while the driver is temporarily blinded. In other words, a sudden occurrence may create a factual question regarding the reasonableness of the driver’s behavior in reacting to the temporary condition.

August 29, 2008

The Merck Manual

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

It doesn’t necessarily represent the standard of care. It is the place to begin, not end, your medical research. But it is a great place to start. Merck Manual

August 27, 2008

File. Serve. Now.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01(3) provides as follows:

If a plaintiff or counsel for plaintiff (including third-party plaintiffs) intentionally causes delay of prompt issuance of a summons or prompt service of a summons, filing of the complaint (or third-party complaint) is ineffective.

I don’t know what "prompt" means. Is turning process over to a process server in one day "prompt’? I would think so. What about five days? What if it is "promptly" given to a process server who then holds it for twenty days?

August 22, 2008

Court Says Plaintiff is Entitled to Have Her Deposition Videotaped

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A trial judge in New Jersey has ruled that a plaintiff may insist that her discovery deposition be videotaped over the objection of the defense.

The judge ruled that "defense counsel’s objection is devoid of any specificity to constitute good cause. The Court does not wish to make light of any “burden” the video recording will place on defense counsel, but such burden does not rise to good cause, annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden.13 It certainly does not justify denying Plaintiff the use of modern technology." [Footnote omitted.]

Read the 21-page opinion here.

August 20, 2008

Arbitration Agreements UPDATED

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Nursing homes continue to attempt to avoid trial by jury by requiring residents to sign arbitration ageements. And the Tennessee courts continue to insist that if nursing homes are going to do so they must follow the law.

Here are two decisions that refuse to enforce arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts because they contracts were signed by a person other than the nursing home resident or appropriate representative: McKey and Ricketts. Both cases were decided on August 15 by the Tennessee Court of Appeals and were authored by Judge Andy Bennett.

UPDATE: And here is another decision, this one from Special Judge Walter Kurtz: Jones. Jones was released on August 20, 2008.

August 19, 2008

2009 Edition of Handbook Available Shortly

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Day on Torts: A Handbook for Tennessee Tort Lawyers 2009 is almost ready to go to press. The 2009 edition will include reference to all of the Tennessee appellate cases on tort law released in the last year, add over 20 new statutes of interest to tort lawyers, and update rules of civil procedure, evidence, and appellate procedure.

Importantly, the 2009 edition will includes at least 20 new chapters. Each chapter addresses the leading case on an important tort law subject. The additional chapters mean that the book will now include over 250 subjects.

The 2009 edition also includes a much more detailed table of contents in the "Selected Statutes" section. We believe this change will make that section of the book even easier to use.

August 18, 2008

TSC Releases NIED Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has released the opinion in Eskin v. Bartee and expanded the scope of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The bottom line: "we have determined that it is appropriate and fair to permit recovery of damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress by plaintiffs who have a close personal relationship with an injured party and who arrive at the scene of the accident while the scene is in essentially the same condition it was in immediately after the accident."

The key change is found in the words "arrive at the scene of the accident." Before this decision, the plaintiff was required to have seen or heard the injury causing event.