The Tennessee General Assembly has passed a new dog bite liability statute, known as the "“Dianna Acklen Act of 2007”.

Section 44-8-413. (a) (1) The owner of a dog has a duty to keep that dog under reasonable control at all times, and to keep that dog from running at large. A person who breaches that duty is subject to civil liability for any damages suffered by a person who is injured by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in or on the private property of another.

(2) Such a person may be held liable regardless of whether the dog has shown any dangerous propensities or whether the dog’s owner knew or should have known of the dog’s
dangerous propensities.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has released two opinions on the issue of apparent agency in a hospital setting.  One case concerns an emergency room doctor, the other a radiologist.

The law?  Both decisions contain these paragraphs: 

"Apparent agency is essentially agency by estoppel. White v. Methodist Hosp., 844 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Its existence depends upon such conduct by the principal as would preclude the principal from denying another’s agency. Kelly v. Cliff Pettit Motors, 234 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1950). The liability of the principal is determined in any particular case by what authority the third person, exercising reasonable care and prudence, was justified in believing that the principal had by his acts under the circumstances conferred upon his agent. Southern Ry. Co. v. Pickle, 197 S.W. 675, 677 (Tenn. 1917).

Need to go to back to school on the neck and back?  Check out Spine University.

Click on the Spine Wizard, select the area of the spine that you are interested in, and read a detailed description of the various procedures that can be used to treat pain in that area.

There are also printable booklets on these subjects:

Robert Bork, the man who gave us the verb "borked," has sued The Yale Club in a trip-and-fall case.  Read the NYT article about the case here.

Here is a copy of the complaint.  Note that Judge Bork seeks punitive damages.  I guess that it possible that conduct in a premises case like this can give rise to punitive damages, but it is difficult for me to imagine what that conduct would be.  He also seeks attorneys’ fees, which I did not think were recoverable in premises liability cases in New York.  Then again, I’m just a tort lawyer who went to public school.

His law firm?  Gibson Dunn, a great firm that is known for, among other things, its advocacy against punitive damages.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has ruled that a jury may consider a defendant’s three convictions for drunk driving in deciding the punitive damages issue in a personal injury case arising out of yet another drunk driving episode. 

The opinion has great language about why the evidence of the prior convictions is probative.

The opinion is Yeakley v. Doss,  06-851 (Ark. S.C. May 31, 2007).  Read the opinion here.

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Association recently released a Large Truck Crash Causation Study in response to a federal law that  required the organization "to determine the causes of, and contributing factors to, crashes involving commercial motor vehicles."

From the Executive Summary:

"A nationally representative sample of large truck fatal and injury crashes was investigated during 2001 to 2003 at 24 sites in 17 States. Each crash involved at least one large truck and resulted in at least one fatality or injury. Data were collected on up to 1,000 elements in each crash. The total sample involved 967 crashes, which included 1,127 large trucks, 959 non-truck motor vehicles, 251 fatalities, and 1,408 injuries.
An action or inaction by the drivers of the truck or the other vehicles involved were important reasons leading to crashes in a large majority of the cases. Driver recognition and decision errors were the type of driver mistakes coded by crash investigators or law enforcement officials most often for the trucks and passenger vehicles. Truck drivers, however, were coded less frequently for both driving performance errors and non-performance problems (e.g., asleep, sick, incapacitated) than passenger vehicle drivers. In crashes between trucks and passenger vehicles, driving too fast for conditions and fatigue were important factors cited for both drivers. However, fatigue was coded twice as often for passenger vehicle drivers and speeding more often for truck drivers.
Brake problems were coded for almost 30 percent of the trucks but only 5 percent of the passenger vehicles. Roadway problems were present in 16 percent of the two-vehicle cases, and adverse weather conditions were present in approximately 13 percent of the crashes. Interruption in the traffic flow (previous crash, work zone, rush hour congestion, etc.) was coded in almost 25 percent of the two-vehicle crashes."

Can a motorcycle dealer be held liable for selling a motorcycle to a person who did not have a motorcycle license?

Not in Mississippi.  The Mississippi Supreme Court recently considered a case where a dealer sold a motorcycle to an 18-year who it knew was not a licensed operator.  A representative of the dealer who knew the buyer was not licensed allowed him to leave the dealership on the bike and saw him operating it in town.  The buyer died in a motorcycle wreck three days later.

The Court first rejected a claim for negligent entrustment, saying that it did not exist in the context of a sales transaction.  It also found no duty under the common law for selling the motorcycle to an unlicensed driver. 

The California Supreme Court has ruled that a court may issue an order prohibiting a defendant in a defamation case from repeating statements about the plaintiff that were deemed defamatory at trial.

The concern about such a ruling is that an injunction is a "prior restraint" and would be a violation of the right of free speech.  But the California Court thought to the contrary, and said that "preventing a person from speaking or publishing something that, allegedly, would constitute a libel if spoken or published is far different from issuing a posttrial injunction after a statement that already has been uttered has been found to constitute defamation. Prohibiting a person from making a statement or publishing a writing before that statement is spoken or the writing is published is far different from prohibiting a defendant from repeating a statement or republishing a writing that has been determined at trial to be defamatory and, thus, unlawful." 

The opinion has a nice collection of law around the country that reaches a similar result.  The dissent does a fine job collecting opinions to the contrary.

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