Day on Torts

September 7, 2018

Deficient HIPAA Authorization Not Grounds for Dismissal

Where an HCLA plaintiff sent defendants a HIPAA authorization that “failed to include the mother’s authority to sign the document, the expiration date of the document, and the names of all healthcare providers authorized to use or disclose the requested information,” plaintiff was still deemed to have substantially complied with the statutory requirements, and dismissal of the complaint was reversed.

In Martin v. Rolling Hills Hospital, LLC, No. M2016-02241-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 2018), plaintiffs were the parents and children of a patient who was admitted to defendant hospital for suicidal ideation and detoxification, and was found unresponsive two days after her admission, dying later that day.

The death occurred on June 28, 2013, and the first complaint was filed on October 17, 2014, which was outside the one-year limitations period but within the 120-day extension period. That complaint was nonsuited, and a second complaint was filed naming the same defendants within a year of the nonsuit. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs did not comply with the pre-suit notice requirements, which meant they were not entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, defendants argued that the first suit was time-barred, making the second suit also time-barred. The trial court granted to motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs’ incomplete HIPAA authorization, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

August 27, 2018

No Liability When Customer Broke Chair

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Evidence of an accident or injury alone is not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment in a premises liability case.

In Jobe v. Goodwill Industries of Middle Tennessee, Inc., No. M2017-02299-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2018), plaintiff was a shopper at a Goodwill store. When she “attempted to sit in a plastic chair that was displayed for sale,” the chair collapsed, causing plaintiff to fall and injure herself. Plaintiff filed this premises liability action, and defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

In a premises liability case, a plaintiff must be able to prove the elements of a negligence claim, and also that “the condition was caused or created by the owner, operator, or agent or that the owner or operator had actual or constructive notice that the condition existed prior to the accident.” (internal citation omitted). While business owners must keep their properties reasonably safe, they are “not responsible for removing or warning against conditions from which no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated.” (internal citation omitted).

In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted deposition testimony from two employees who stated that donated items are “visually inspected and examined by a donation attendant when received and inspected again by a processing employee before merchandise is priced and placed on the sales floor.” One employee stated that while they do not sit on furniture to inspect it, they move it around and check its sturdiness. Further, defendant cited part of plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein she answered that there was nothing “apparent or obvious to [her] in looking at [the chair] while it was still intact that told you it might not be safe to sit on.”

August 23, 2018

“Excusable Neglect” As A Grounds For Extending Time for Service of Process

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

When a plaintiff files a complaint within the statute of limitations but fails to have process issued and served within the required time parameters, an extension of time for service of process may be granted if a trial court finds excusable neglect.

In Edwards v. Herman, No. E2017-01206-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2018), plaintiff filed a personal injury case based on an automobile-motorcycle accident. The complaint was filed within the one-year statute of limitations on April 21, 2015, and process was issued, but the “original summons was never returned to the trial court and…there is no record of it having been served upon [defendant].” On May 26, 2016, an alias summons was issued, which was served on defendant on June 11, 2016. On July 21, 2016, the sheriff’s department sent a letter to the court clerk stating that they could not find the original summons. The “issuance and service of process undisputedly occurred after the one-year deadline contained in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3.”

August 15, 2018

Judicial Estoppel Doctrine Bars Legal Malpractice Claim

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a plaintiff has signed a settlement agreement swearing that such agreement is “fair and equitable,” she may be judicially estopped from later bringing a legal malpractice claim based on that same settlement.

In Kershaw v. Levy, No. M2017-01129-COA-R3-CV (No. M2017-01129-COA-R3-CV), plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against defendant attorney who had previously represented her during part of her divorce proceedings. When defendant took her case, plaintiff had already been convicted of criminal contempt once in the divorce case for incurring marital debt for gambling money, and she had a pending criminal contempt petition for forging checks to get gambling money. Further, her discovery responses were overdue. After defendant took the case, he drafted a response to the contempt motion wherein plaintiff admitted that she took the money, and she was sentenced to 30 days in jail, though she was released when defendant filed an appeal three days later.

August 14, 2018

Loss of Evidence Destroys Plaintiff’s Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a plaintiff in a tractor-trailer accident case unintentionally allowed the tractor at issue to be destroyed, dismissal of the case was ruled an appropriate remedy for spoliation of evidence.

In Gardner v. R&J Express, LLC, No. E2017-00823-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 7, 2018), plaintiff owned a tractor truck that was pulling a trailer owned by defendant. While driving, plaintiff was involved in a single vehicle accident when the tractor-trailer overturned, which plaintiff alleged was caused “because the tandem axle on the trailer ‘suddenly and unexpectedly’ came loose while they were traveling down the highway.”

The accident occurred on May 29, 2015, and plaintiff retained counsel just a few weeks later on June 17, 2015. On June 24, 2015, plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to defendant regarding plaintiff’s intention to file suit and “Defendant’s responsibility to preserve the relevant evidence.” Shortly after this letter was sent, plaintiff signed title of the tractor over to his insurance company, and the tractor was destroyed.

August 10, 2018

Conflicting Information Lighting Means No Summary Judgment

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a defendant has changed its story regarding relevant facts, leaving material facts in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate.

In Schacklett v. Rose, No. M2017-01650-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2018), plaintiff filed a premises liability claim after falling at defendants’ home. Plaintiff was a catering employee who had entered the home in the daylight using outdoor stairs that led to the kitchen. At the end of the evening, she left by the same stairs, and she fell “through a break in the railing,” landing on concrete. According to plaintiff, “there were no house lights and the motion lights on the steps…were not operating,” and “the entire area was dark.”

When defendant homeowners answered the complaint, they denied that there were no lights and that motion sensor lights were in place. They also “denied that the entire area was dark and therefore dangerous.” Later, in response to requests for admissions, defendants “stated that the outside lighting was working on the night of the accident.” They further asserted that instead of having motion sensor lights that were not working, they had “overrode the timer by placing the lights ‘all on’ for the party.” When defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, however, they asserted that “the exterior lights were off when [plaintiff] fell, and [plaintiff] was negligent in failing to turn the lights on before proceeding down the stairs.”

August 2, 2018

Sanctions Ordered For Failure to Comply With Rule 35 Order

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

When a plaintiff refuses to comply with an order to submit to a medical examination under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court may refuse to allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence of medical expenses at trial.

In Prewitt v. Brown, No. M2017-01420-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 30, 2018), plaintiff was injured in a car accident with defendant. Defendant admitted that he was at least partially at fault, but “disputed the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries.” After initial discovery, defendant “filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35 motion for an Independent Medical Examination (IME) (sic),” which the trial court granted.

(Note: a Rule 35 examination is not an “independent medical examination” but rather an examination, usually of a plaintiff, by a doctor of an adversary’s choosing. Calling such an examiner “independent” is untrue and unfair. In the typical case, a fairer label would be “defense medical examination (“DME”).)

August 1, 2018

No Claims Commission Jurisdiction Over Medical School Dismissal

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A claim that a medical student was wrongly dismissed without the proper process does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission.

In Williams v. State, No. E2017-00626-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 23, 2018), plaintiff had been dismissed from ETSU medical school, and he filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission alleging that his “permanent dismissal was negligently done by Defendant without a hearing or other university procedures required by the catalog and student hand book.” The Claims Commission dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

July 31, 2018

Police Dog Exception to the Tennessee Dog Bite Statute

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

When a Tenneseee state trooper was injured by a sheriff’s deputy’s police dog, his lawsuit against the owner of the dog was not statutorily precluded.

In Greenlee v. Sevier County, Tennessee, No. E2017-00942-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 26, 2018), plaintiff was a Tennessee State Trooper who had attempted to make a traffic stop and called for assistance when the suspect fled on foot. A Sevier County Sheriff’s Deputy was dispatched, along with his police dog. During the pursuit, the deputy and dog went under a house, and when the dog emerged first, he attacked and injured plaintiff.

July 30, 2018

Products Liability Statute of Repose Bars Claim

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Tennessee products liability claims are subject to a ten-year statute of repose, and that limitation period is not subject to equitable estoppel.

In Ismoilov v. Sears Holdings Corporation, No. M2017-00897-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 25, 2018), plaintiff brought a products liability suit based on a water heater that broke, causing a leak and damaging his property. The water heater in question was purchased on June 2, 2005, and plaintiff asserted that it was sold with a 12-year warranty. Plaintiff filed his suit on June 16, 2015, seeking damages for property damage to his home, unpaid rent, reduced rental value and cleaning fees. It was undisputed that defendant had replaced the water heater before the suit was filed.

The trial court dismissed all claims other than the warranty claims on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the claims all sounded in product liability and were time barred by the ten-year statute of repose. The trial court subsequently granted defendant summary judgment on the express warranty claim after defendant put forth evidence that the express warranty included replacement of the damaged heater only. Plaintiff appealed these findings, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.