Day on Torts

September 6, 2017

More on Pre-SuitNotice, HIPAA, in Tennessee Medical Malpractice Cases

HIPAA-compliant authorization forms continue to cause trouble for medical malpractice (now called “health care liability action” or ‘HCLA”) plaintiffs in Tennessee, with a recent plaintiff having his case dismissed due to his failure to fill in the portion of the form that lists who was authorized to make disclosures thereunder.

In Lawson v. Knoxville Dermatology Group, P.C., No. E2017-00077-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017), plaintiff filed suit against “a dermatology practice and a certified physician’s assistant employed by the practice.” The underlying injury occurred when plaintiff fell off an allegedly improperly secured examination table. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, asserting that plaintiff had failed to substantially comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), the HCLA provision that requires that pre-suit notice include a HIPAA-compliant authorization. Specifically, defendants pointed out that plaintiff’s “authorization form did not list which individual(s) or organization(s) were authorized to make disclosures of the specified medical records.”

The trial court granted the motions to dismiss and entered an order dismissing all of plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal only as to the dermatology group, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

On appeal, defendant pointed out that “the name or other specific identification of the person(s), or class of persons, authorized to make the requested use or disclosure” is listed as a “core element of the authorization” by the Code of Federal Regulations. (citation omitted). Defendant asserted that because this “core element” was left blank, plaintiff did not substantially comply with the HCLA requirements and dismissal was appropriate. According to defendant, “the medical authorization provided by [plaintiff] was insufficient to allow [defendant] to access relevant medical records to mount a defense.”

September 2, 2017

Case Dismissed Given Deficient Expert Testimony

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Plaintiffs preparing a Tennessee health care liablity (formerly called “medical malpractice”) must pay special attention to their standard of care expert witness, especially if they plan to argue that a specific procedure was required to meet the standard of care.

In Hopps v. Stinnes, No. W2016-01982-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. August 1, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to grant partial directed verdict and to refuse to let the jury consider a certain causation issue. Plaintiff was struck in the eye by an object while weed eating, and he went to the emergency room. There, he was treated by defendant nurse practitioner. Defendant obtained a history from plaintiff and “examined his eye with an ophthalmoscope and a Wood’s lamp.” She ultimately prescribed him antibiotic eye drops and discharged him with instructions 1) to come back to the ER if his condition worsened, and 2) to see his doctor within two days. Four days later, plaintiff went to a different hospital with additional symptoms, and he eventually lost his eye due to infection.

August 31, 2017

Tennessee Uninsured Motorist Claims Subject to Six-Year Statute of Limitations

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

While a case for personal injuries resulting from a car accident must be filed within one year, a claim against an insurance company for uninsured motorist coverage arising from the same incident is not subject to that one-year statute of limitations.

In Bates v. Greene, No. W2016-01868-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2017), plaintiff had been injured in a car accident. Plaintiff filed a timely suit less than one year after the accident against the driver of the other car, but the civil warrant was returned unserved. An “alias civil warrant was issued for [the driver], but it was also returned unserved.” Two years after the accident, an amended warrant was issued, adding plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier as a defendant.

Defendant insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment, “asserting that the claim against it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions.” Plaintiff responded that “she was asserting a contract claim…, subject to a six-year statute of limitations, rather than a tort claim…” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

August 29, 2017

Liability of Tennessee for Inmate-on-Inmate Attacks

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Cook v. State of Tennessee, No. W2016-01914-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2017), the Court affirmed summary judgment in a case where a plaintiff inmate alleged the state was liable for the injuries he suffered after being stabbed by another inmate.

Plaintiff and his cellmate were both inmates at West Tennessee State Penitentiary. They began sharing a cell in October 2010, and on December 6, 2010, cellmate stabbed plaintiff with a handmade knife. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission alleging that “the State was liable because [cellmate’s] attack on him was reasonably foreseeable.”

During discovery, it was established that both plaintiff and cellmate were listed as minimum security prisoners (the lowest rating), that the cellmates had a “good relationship” prior to the assault, and that plaintiff had never felt threatened or unsafe around cellmate. Based on these facts, the State moved for summary judgment, which the claims commission granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Continue reading

August 28, 2017

No HIPAA Form Required in Single Defendant HCLA Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Grizzle v. Parkwest Medical Center, No. E2016-01068-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2017), the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of a health care liability (medical malpractice) case based on plaintiff’s failure to provide a HIPAA compliant medical authorization.

Plaintiff had hip replacement surgery at defendant hospital, and when she woke up she began to have severe chest pains. An x-ray showed that she had broken ribs, yet the hospital “provided no explanation as to how the injury to her ribs had occurred.”

Plaintiff filed an HCLA action against the hospital on January 25, 2016. She stated in her complaint that she had complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements, but she “did not provide the requisite documentation with her complaint establishing proof of pre-suit notice.” Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to file the required documentation with her complaint and her failure to provide defendant with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. After the motion was filed, on March 14, 2016, plaintiff filed a “notice of filing” and attached “copies of the pre-suit notice letter and allegedly HIPAA-compliant authorization sent to [defendant].”

August 24, 2017

Inmate Injured on Work Detail – Recovery Limited to Medical Expenses

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Elliott v. City of Manchester, No. M2015-01798-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2017), the Court of Appeals analyzed an inmate’s ability to recover from a governmental entity when injured while on work detail.

Plaintiff was an inmate at Coffee County jail. While out performing a work assignment, plaintiff “fell from the bed of a pick-up truck and sustained head injuries.” The truck driver was another inmate, and the inmates were being supervised by a city police officer.

Plaintiff brought suit against both the city and county, but he settled with the county, leaving the city as the only defendant. The city filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that it was immune under the GTLA, and the trial court dismissed the case. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the Court first analyzed the application of the GTLA and the extent of the city’s potential liability in this case. The GTLA was enacted in 1973 and “is premised on the absolute immunity of governmental entities.” (internal citation omitted). Immunity is waived by the GTLA and a suit against a governmental entity is allowed “for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee acting within the scope of his employment.” (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205). Plaintiff argued that the GTLA waived immunity in this case, allowing his suit to move forward. Defendant city asserted, though, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-123(d)(2) applied here and “controll[ed] over the GTLA[.]”

August 23, 2017

Court of Appeals Discusses Tennessee Car Accident Damages

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Want a primer on the law of compensatory damages in Tennessee? Then look at Hyde v. South Central Tennessee Development District, No. M2015-02466-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2017), defendant admitted liability for a car accident but challenged the damages awarded to plaintiff by the trial court.

On June 14, 2013, defendant’s employee ran a red light and hit the driver’s side of plaintiff’s car. On the day of the accident, plaintiff was taken to a hospital and “was diagnosed with a strain in her thoracic spine and a contusion to her right leg, and discharged with pain medication.” Two days later plaintiff went to a different hospital complaining of head pain and was diagnosed with a headache. Five days after the accident, plaintiff went to a chiropractor “complaining of muscle spasms in her lumbar spine and aches throughout her body.” Plaintiff treated with the chiropractor from June 19 until October 10. In addition to her treatment with the chiropractor, plaintiff went to her primary care doctor on August 20 and November 20, as well as January 27 of the following year.

Defendant admitted liability and a bench trial was held as to damages. The trial court awarded plaintiff $271,378.95 in compensatory damages, and this appeal followed, with defendant challenging the trial court’s damage calculations.

August 22, 2017

No Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Based on Future Event

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Jones v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. W2016-00717-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a negligent misrepresentation claim.

Plaintiffs were the borrowers on a valid and enforceable mortgage, which was held by defendant. Plaintiffs were in default and had received a notice of foreclosure stating that “they were in arrears in the amount of $9,000.00.” Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff husband spoke with a representative from defendant by phone and offered to pay $7,800 by the end of the week, and that the representative “informed him that if he sent a payment of $6,000.00 he would qualify for a six-month repayment plan that would stop the foreclosure sale.” Plaintiff husband stated that he attempted to wire two separate payments totaling $6,000 to defendant, but that the transfers were declined. The foreclosure proceeded, and plaintiffs filed this action.

Plaintiffs asserted various contract-based claims as well as a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The trial court dismissed all the claims pursuant to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

August 17, 2017

Application of Tennessee Savings Statute When Initial Filing Deadline Missed

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Jones v. Behrman, No. W2016-00643-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of an HCLA claim for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations

Decedent suffered from several health problems, and in February 2011 she had a capsule endoscopy. Two days later, an x-ray showed that the “capsule was still present.” The following day, tests “showed no bowel obstruction but that the capsule remained in the right lower quadrant.” On February 20, 2011, decedent was admitted to the hospital and tests revealed a bowel obstruction. A procedure was performed, and at some point “the surgeons lacerated or penetrated the small bowel, which required them to resect a portion of the bowel.” The injured site or some other part of the small bowel leaked after the surgery, and decedent developed peritonitis and sepsis. Decedent died on April 21, 2011.

On January 24, 2012, decedent’s family members sent pre-suit notice to the doctors who did the capsule endoscopy and the subsequent bowel surgery. On August 13, 2012, plaintiffs filed their HCLA suit, but that case was voluntarily dismissed on September 27, 2012. Plaintiffs then gave pre-suit notice again before re-filing suit on September 26, 2013 pursuant to the savings statute.

August 14, 2017

Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, IIED, and Chickens

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Stinson v. Mensel, No. M2016-00624-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017), a neighborly dispute about chickens turned into a suit and counter-suit for nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy and injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs owned land on which several neighbors had an easement for access to their properties. Defendants, two couples who used the easement to get to their homes, alleged that they had never met plaintiffs until the facts surrounding this case began. In 2008, plaintiff husband “came to believe that [one of defendant couples] had stolen some of his chickens that wandered over” to defendants’ property. Plaintiffs left a note in defendants’ mailbox accusing them of stealing the chickens, and plaintiffs subsequently began harassing defendants. Plaintiffs would put brush and fence posts on the easement, blocking passage on the easement. Plaintiffs dug a ditch on the easement which subsequently caused excessive erosion. Plaintiffs screamed at defendants, followed one defendant with a rock, erected a sign telling one couple to stay off plaintiffs’ side of the easement, and prevented defendants from performing maintenance on the easement. Ultimately, plaintiffs filed this suit, claiming that defendants “had caused the easement to be graded and bulldozed, encroached onto [plaintiffs’] property, and made verbal threats and used intimidation” against plaintiffs.

Defendants filed a counter-complaint, and the trial court ultimately dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims and found that plaintiffs were liable to defendants for nuisance, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Further, the trial court “enjoined [plaintiffs] from forever using, driving on, damaging, or interfering with [the easement], or the maintenance of the same.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the nuisance finding, but reversed on the invasion of privacy and emotional distress claims, and it modified the injunction against plaintiffs.