Sylvius von Saucken, a partner in the Garretson firm, has written this analysis of the opinion in Murphy v. United States, released by D.C. Court of Appeals on July 3, 2007.    The case addresses the taxability of damage awards in cases alleging emotional distress.

Here, in bold,  is his analysis of the decision:

On July 3, 2007 the highly anticipated Murphy decision was handed down following its rehearing on April 23, 2007. The original three judge panel (for the D.C. Court of Appeals) reheard the case following the Government’s Petition for a Rehearing En Banc. This case has a rather unusual procedural history because it is atypical for a court to vacate its own opinion, which in turn renders an existing Petition for a Rehearing en banc moot, and then rehear the case. The court’s impetus for doing so remained a mystery up until Tuesday. In the recent decision the court explained its actions. In its Petition for a rehearing the Government raised a new constitutional issue, as the Government argued “even if Murphy’s award is not income, there is no constitutional impediment to taxing it because a tax on the award is not a direct tax and is imposed uniformly.”  This issue apparently triggered the court to vacate its earlier opinion and effectively gave the Government another try.

The Michigan Law Review  has published an interesting article called "Doctors & Juries" by Philip G. Peters, Jr.

Here is a synopsis of the article:  "Physicians widely believe that jury verdicts are unfair. This Article  tests that assumption by synthesizing three decades of jury research.  Contrary to popular belief, the data show that juries consistently sympathize more with doctors who are sued than with patients who sue them. Physicians win roughly half of the cases that expert reviewers believe physicians should lose and nearly all of the cases that experts feel physicians should win. Defendants and their hired experts, it turns out, are more successful than plaintiffs and their hired experts at persuading juries to reach verdicts contrary to the opinions of independent reviewers."

One of his conclusions:  "As a consequence, politicians and critics of jury performance in medical malpractice cases should think twice before concluding that doctors will be treated more favorably in health courts."

Former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White, former Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Joe Riley and I are sponsoring our annual "Justice Programs" seminars again this Fall.  Here is the schedule  for this two-day, fifteen-hour program.

First Day

8:00 – 8:30 Registration
8:30 – 10:15 Tort Law / Comparative Fault
10:15 – 10:30 Break
10:30 – 11:30 Dealing with Difficult Judges
11:30 – 12:15 U.S. Supreme Court Review
12:15 – 1:15 Lunch on your own
1:15 – 2:30 Tort Law / Comparative Fault (cont’d)
2:30 – 2:45 Break
2:45 – 4:15 Evidence in the Trenches
4:15 – 4:30 Break
4:30 – 5:45 Business Torts – The State of Tennessee’s Law

I have been in Chicago for the last four days, attending the Board meeting of the National Board of Trial Advocacy and spending time with my son , MIchael.  We saw the Cubs beat the Astros Saturday afternoon and took in a street fair in Chinatown yesterday.  It was a great trip.

I apologize for the problem with the links to the last few posts.  I have brought the issue to the attention of my service provider and assume that it has been fixed.

The highest court of New York has ruled that a "high-low" agreement must be disclosed to the judge and to non-settling defendants.

This is what the Court said:

To ensure that all parties to a litigation are treated fairly, we hold that whenever a plaintiff and a defendant enter into a high-low agreement in a multi-defendant action which requires the agreeing defendant to remain a party to the litigation, the parties must disclose the existence of that agreement and its terms to the court and the non-agreeing defendant(s). This result strikes a proper balance between this State’s public policy of encouraging the expeditious settlement of claims, and the need to ensure that all parties to a litigation are apprised of the true posture of the litigation so they may tailor their strategy accordingly. Disclosure provides a non-agreeing defendant a meaningful opportunity to place on the record how it intends to use the agreement at trial, if at all, and affords the trial court an opportunity to weigh the interests of all the parties in considering the extent to which an agreement may be utilized in that forum. Of course, the determinations as to what effect, if any, the existence of the agreement will have at trial, including whether such an agreement should be disclosed to the jury, are matters that lie within the sound discretion of the trial court.

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has released an en banc  opinion in Murphy v. Internal  Revenue Service,  No. 05-5139 (July 3, 2007).

The summary of the opinion as prepared by the Court:  "Marrita Murphy brought this suit to recover income taxes she paid on the compensatory damages for emotional distress and loss of reputation  she was awarded inan administrative action she brought against her former employer. Murphy contends that under § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2), her award should have been excluded from her gross income because it was compensation received “on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.” She also maintains that, in any event, her award is not part of her gross income as defined by § 61 of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. § 61. Finally, she argues that taxing her award subjects her to an unapportioned direct tax in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the United States.

We reject Murphy’s argument in all aspects. We hold, first, that Murphy’s compensation was not “received … on account of personal physical injuries” excludable from gross income under §104(a)(2). Second, we conclude gross income as defined by § 61 includes compensatory damages  for non-physical injuries. Third, we hold that a tax upon such damages is within the
Congress’s power to tax."

Put this is the "You ain’t gonna believe this" department.

A New Jersey firm admitted "that an associate — with two partners’ knowledge — asked a bank representative whether a client, Kennedy Funding Inc. of Hackensack, could purchase the personal mortgages of the attorney suing Kennedy Funding in four federal fraud cases.  Such a purchase would have made Kennedy Funding, a commercial lender, the holder of the home and office mortgages of adversary Gregg Trautmann, who has a firm in Rockaway, N.J."

The judge handling court cases was not amused.  Read more here.

i wrote several weeks ago about the lawsuit Robert Bork filed against the Yale Club. I mentioned that the some issues I had with the suit, including the request for punitive damages.

Eric Turkewitz wrote a much better post than I.  As a New York personal injury lawyer, he wrote what was wrong with the complaint filed on behalf of Judge Bork. 

The original complaint has been amended, and it still does not pass muster in Eric’s mind.  Here is his latest post that explains what was wrong with the original complaint and what the amended complaint missed.

You have undoubtedly heard about the lawsuit that was filed that claims that Starbursts are too chewy and caused an injury to a woman’s mouth. 

The plaintiff’s lawyer is Brian Muawad from St. Clair Shores, Michigan.  He and his brother hold themselves out as competent in " Personal Injury, Auto Accidents, Medical Malpractice, Slip and Fall , Worker’s Compensation, Business Litigation, Criminal Law, Real Estate, Business Transactions, Business Sales, Liquor License, Lemon Law, Credit Reporting Problems, and Other areas of Law."   (There is no indication if by "other areas of the law" Brian includes mergers and acquisition, international tax, oil and gas, and entertainment law. )  He urges the public to "[c]all now for a free consultation to get the most value for your case."   See his advertisement here (go to Page 12).  I cannot find a website for their firm.

Brian is not listed as a lawyer http://www.martindale.com/ and therefore the  rating of his ability by his peers is unknown.  He is a member of the Arab American Bar Association but, despite his claimed ability to handle tort cases for plaintiffs his name does not appear as a member of ATLA (now AAJ) (at least of the date of publication of the 2006-07 membership directory).   (To be sure, it only takes a law license and check to belong to AAJ.  AAJ membership is not a sign of competence.  AAJ membership is a sign that lawyer cares enough about his clients and tort practice that he will financially contribute to an organization dedicated to preserving the civil justice system and improving the competence of its members.)  He is a member of the Michigan Bar Association but the names of members of the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association are not available to the public so I do not know if he is a member of that organization.  If the MBA and the MTLA are like the TBA and TTLA one needs a law license and check to join.  Once again, competence over and above the ability to get a law license is not required.

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