Day on Torts

July 8, 2019

Corporations as “People:” How The Legal Fiction Arose

An interesting article in The Atlantic about how the law came to treat corporations as people.

An excerpt:

Somewhat unintuitively, American corporations today enjoy many of the same rights as American citizens. Both, for instance, are entitled to the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion. How exactly did corporations come to be understood as “people” bestowed with the most fundamental constitutional rights? The answer can be found in a bizarre—even farcical—series of lawsuits over 130 years ago involving a lawyer who lied to the Supreme Court, an ethically challenged justice, and one of the most powerful corporations of the day.

July 5, 2019

Pre-Suit Notice by Personal Delivery Must Actually Be Delivered to Comply with HCLA.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

When an HCLA plaintiff decides to serve pre-suit notice via personal service, such service must actually be completed in accordance with the statute in order for the plaintiff to take advantage of the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations.

In Webb v. Magee, No. 2018-01305-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 30, 2019), plaintiffs had filed a previous healthcare liability claim under the HCLA against multiple parties, including Dr. Charles Roberson. Plaintiffs attempted to personally serve Dr. Roberson with pre-suit notice within the one-year statute of limitations, but service of the pre-suit notice was not actually completed until almost two months later. One week after Dr. Roberson received pre-suit notice, plaintiffs filed their initial suit.

June 25, 2019

Slight Raise of Pavement Along Crack in Parking Lot – Case Dismissed

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a plaintiff tripped on a crack in a parking lot that was 54 feet long and resulted in a height deviation of no more than 1.5 inches, the property owner owed no duty to plaintiff and summary judgment in a premises liability case was affirmed.

In Shaw v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, No. M2018-01157-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019), plaintiff was a school bus driver who was required to attend a training session at a local school. Plaintiff parked in a large parking lot at the school, and as she was walking to board a shuttle bus, she tripped on a crack in the pavement. The crack was 54 inches long and “amounted to a deviation of up to one and a half inches.”

Plaintiff filed a premises liability claim, alleging that “the parking lot existed in a state of disrepair and had been in such a state for a sufficient length of time that Metro knew or should have known of its dangerous condition.” Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff filed a motion to amend and add allegations of negligence per se. The trial court granted summary judgment, and on a first appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court improperly “neither ruled upon the pending motion to amend nor undertook analysis…in order to determine whether the sought amendment should have been granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01.” The case was accordingly remanded. On remand, the trial court granted the motion to amend and add negligence per se claims, but then again granted summary judgment to defendant on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

June 24, 2019

Sanctions Affirmed in Tennessee Slander Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a plaintiff continued to pursue a defamation case even after depositions revealed that the allegedly defamatory statements were only made to two of plaintiffs’ friends and the statements did not change their opinion of plaintiff, Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff were affirmed.

In McMillin v. Realty Executives Associates, Inc., No. E2018-00769-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 12, 2019), plaintiff asked two of his friends to contact a realtor and set up a showing of a home that was part of plaintiff’s mother’s estate. During the showing, the realtor stated that utilities had been turned off due to plaintiff removing money from the estate, that the potential buyers might not want to become involved with plaintiff because he had sued several people, that the house had plumbing issues, and that plaintiff had replaced expensive appliances with cheaper ones. Based on these statements, plaintiff brought this pro se defamation suit.

June 10, 2019

Gym Not Liable for Sexual Assault in Locker Room

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a plaintiff claiming that he was sexually assaulted in a locker room failed to present any evidence that the “health club knew or should have known of prior assaults by the assailant or anyone else,” summary judgment for defendant health club was affirmed.

In Boswell v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Middle Tennessee, No. M2018-00180-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019), plaintiff claimed that he was sexually assaulted by Jack Dabney in the locker room at his local YMCA three times. Accordingly to plaintiff, Dabney first groped him in July 2015, at which time he left the facility and told no one. The second incident occurred one week later, at which time plaintiff reported the incident to the membership greeter. Plaintiff refused, however, to review video footage to identify the assailant, and instead wrote on a comment card that the YMCA should “put somebody inside the shower area to protect people from being sexually assaulted.” The third incident occurred seven months later. At that time, plaintiff told the YMCA executive director, and a male staff member went into the locker room with plaintiff and Dabney was identified. An investigation began, but plaintiff failed to return a phone message or email sent from the director regarding the matter. Although plaintiff did not supply additional information, Dabney’s membership was eventually revoked.

April 26, 2019

City’s Duty to Protect Against Dangerous Dog Fell Under Public Duty Doctrine

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A plaintiff’s claim that the city had a duty to protect her against a dog owned by another citizen fell under the public duty doctrine, and summary judgment for defendant city was thus affirmed.

In Fleming v. City of Memphis, No. W2018-00984-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2019), plaintiff filed suit against defendant city after she was attacked and mauled by a dog owned by a private citizen. Plaintiff alleged that the city “had actual prior notice of this dog’s vicious propensities” based on two prior attacks by the same dog. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the public duty doctrine, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

It was undisputed that the GTLA did not provide the City immunity in this case. After the dog bite preceding the attack on plaintiff, an animal control worker “did not believe there were grounds upon which [to seek] a petition to declare the dog dangerous and vicious under City ordinance,” and this decision by the government worker was determined to be operational. The issues raised by plaintiff, then, were “1) whether the GTLA supersedes the public duty doctrine; and 2) if the public duty doctrine survives, whether the trial court erred in finding that it applie[d]” here.

April 25, 2019

Plaintiff Must Name “John Doe” if Other Driver in Car Accident Case is Unknown.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In order to bring a direct claim against a plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier, the plaintiff must have filed his initial complaint against the uninsured motorist (or “John Doe” if unknown) within the one-year statute of limitations.

In Fults v. MetLife Auto & Home Insurance Agency, Inc., No. M2018-00647-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 7, 2019), plaintiff was injured in a hit-and-run car accident on November 16, 2015, and the other driver was never identified. Plaintiff filed suit, naming his uninsured motorist carrier as defendant, on July 14, 2017. Defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was barred “on the ground that the complaint did not name or contain allegations against a “John Doe” driver, that no summons had been issued against “John Doe”…, and that the statute of limitations…would prevent John Doe from being named as a defendant.” Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint and add John Doe, but the trial court denied the motion to amend and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

April 24, 2019

Claims Commissioner Must Make Conclusions of Law For Each Theory of Negligence

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where the Claims Commissioner’s ruling for defendant on a negligence suit did not include conclusions of law regarding both of plaintiffs’ theories, the order of dismissal was deemed deficient and was vacated by the Court of Appeals.

In Kim v. State, No. W2018-00762-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019), plaintiffs filed a negligence claim after their six-year-old son fell from a fifth-floor balcony at a state-owned hotel. Plaintiffs were guests of the hotel as part of a church group, and while checking out, the son became separated from his parents. The son went upstairs to the room that plaintiffs had been staying in, and despite having already been cleaned, the door to the room was ajar. The son entered the room, went onto the balcony, climbed on top of the railing, and ultimately fell, sustaining major injuries. Testimony at trial established that it was both hotel and industry policy for a housekeeper to ensure that the door to a hotel room was locked after it had been cleaned, and it was undisputed that the son could not have gained access to the room if it had been locked. It was further established that the housekeeper who cleaned this particular room “had previously been reprimanded for neglecting to secure a room after cleaning it.”

April 17, 2019

Rule 59.04 Motion Does Not to Save Medical Malpractice Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A nurse who worked in an administrative capacity in the year preceding an incident underlying an HCLA claim may not be qualified to give expert testimony in the case. A Rule 59.04 motion did not cure the deficiency in the initial affidavit.

In Smith v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis, No. W2018-00435-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2019), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit alleging that defendant hospital failed to provide him proper postsurgical care, necessitating a subsequent hospitalization and surgery. This case was originally filed in 1999 and had already been through one round of appeals, but the issue in this opinion was whether the trial court rightly granted summary judgment on the basis that neither of plaintiff’s identified expert witnesses were competent to testify, and then properly denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.

April 12, 2019

Fall Down Steps Not Enough to Prove Premises Liability Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where plaintiff failed to present any proof that the stairs owned by defendant were defective, the trial court’s finding for defendant was affirmed.

In James v. City of Dyersburg, No. W2018-00614-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2019), plaintiff filed a GTLA premises liability suit after falling on stairs outside of a city building. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that she fell due to the city’s negligence in “failing to provide a handrail on the steps, and in failing to correct a defect…being a separation between step and a metal strip[.]” At trial, plaintiff testified that she “stepped down from the top step with her right foot onto the second-step, but as she tried to step down with her left foot, the two-inch heel of her left shoe got caught on the metal strip on the stairs[.]” She also testified that she was unable to catch herself due to the absence of a handrail. Despite her allegation that the stairs were defective, plaintiff offered “no measurements…and no proof…of any code violations or applicable code requirements for the steps, stairway, or handrails,” nor did she present expert testimony.