Day on Torts

June 10, 2019

Gym Not Liable for Sexual Assault in Locker Room

Where a plaintiff claiming that he was sexually assaulted in a locker room failed to present any evidence that the “health club knew or should have known of prior assaults by the assailant or anyone else,” summary judgment for defendant health club was affirmed.

In Boswell v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Middle Tennessee, No. M2018-00180-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019), plaintiff claimed that he was sexually assaulted by Jack Dabney in the locker room at his local YMCA three times. Accordingly to plaintiff, Dabney first groped him in July 2015, at which time he left the facility and told no one. The second incident occurred one week later, at which time plaintiff reported the incident to the membership greeter. Plaintiff refused, however, to review video footage to identify the assailant, and instead wrote on a comment card that the YMCA should “put somebody inside the shower area to protect people from being sexually assaulted.” The third incident occurred seven months later. At that time, plaintiff told the YMCA executive director, and a male staff member went into the locker room with plaintiff and Dabney was identified. An investigation began, but plaintiff failed to return a phone message or email sent from the director regarding the matter. Although plaintiff did not supply additional information, Dabney’s membership was eventually revoked.

April 26, 2019

City’s Duty to Protect Against Dangerous Dog Fell Under Public Duty Doctrine

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A plaintiff’s claim that the city had a duty to protect her against a dog owned by another citizen fell under the public duty doctrine, and summary judgment for defendant city was thus affirmed.

In Fleming v. City of Memphis, No. W2018-00984-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2019), plaintiff filed suit against defendant city after she was attacked and mauled by a dog owned by a private citizen. Plaintiff alleged that the city “had actual prior notice of this dog’s vicious propensities” based on two prior attacks by the same dog. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the public duty doctrine, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

It was undisputed that the GTLA did not provide the City immunity in this case. After the dog bite preceding the attack on plaintiff, an animal control worker “did not believe there were grounds upon which [to seek] a petition to declare the dog dangerous and vicious under City ordinance,” and this decision by the government worker was determined to be operational. The issues raised by plaintiff, then, were “1) whether the GTLA supersedes the public duty doctrine; and 2) if the public duty doctrine survives, whether the trial court erred in finding that it applie[d]” here.

April 25, 2019

Plaintiff Must Name “John Doe” if Other Driver in Car Accident Case is Unknown.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In order to bring a direct claim against a plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier, the plaintiff must have filed his initial complaint against the uninsured motorist (or “John Doe” if unknown) within the one-year statute of limitations.

In Fults v. MetLife Auto & Home Insurance Agency, Inc., No. M2018-00647-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 7, 2019), plaintiff was injured in a hit-and-run car accident on November 16, 2015, and the other driver was never identified. Plaintiff filed suit, naming his uninsured motorist carrier as defendant, on July 14, 2017. Defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was barred “on the ground that the complaint did not name or contain allegations against a “John Doe” driver, that no summons had been issued against “John Doe”…, and that the statute of limitations…would prevent John Doe from being named as a defendant.” Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint and add John Doe, but the trial court denied the motion to amend and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

April 24, 2019

Claims Commissioner Must Make Conclusions of Law For Each Theory of Negligence

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where the Claims Commissioner’s ruling for defendant on a negligence suit did not include conclusions of law regarding both of plaintiffs’ theories, the order of dismissal was deemed deficient and was vacated by the Court of Appeals.

In Kim v. State, No. W2018-00762-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019), plaintiffs filed a negligence claim after their six-year-old son fell from a fifth-floor balcony at a state-owned hotel. Plaintiffs were guests of the hotel as part of a church group, and while checking out, the son became separated from his parents. The son went upstairs to the room that plaintiffs had been staying in, and despite having already been cleaned, the door to the room was ajar. The son entered the room, went onto the balcony, climbed on top of the railing, and ultimately fell, sustaining major injuries. Testimony at trial established that it was both hotel and industry policy for a housekeeper to ensure that the door to a hotel room was locked after it had been cleaned, and it was undisputed that the son could not have gained access to the room if it had been locked. It was further established that the housekeeper who cleaned this particular room “had previously been reprimanded for neglecting to secure a room after cleaning it.”

April 17, 2019

Rule 59.04 Motion Does Not to Save Medical Malpractice Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A nurse who worked in an administrative capacity in the year preceding an incident underlying an HCLA claim may not be qualified to give expert testimony in the case. A Rule 59.04 motion did not cure the deficiency in the initial affidavit.

In Smith v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis, No. W2018-00435-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2019), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit alleging that defendant hospital failed to provide him proper postsurgical care, necessitating a subsequent hospitalization and surgery. This case was originally filed in 1999 and had already been through one round of appeals, but the issue in this opinion was whether the trial court rightly granted summary judgment on the basis that neither of plaintiff’s identified expert witnesses were competent to testify, and then properly denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.

April 12, 2019

Fall Down Steps Not Enough to Prove Premises Liability Case

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where plaintiff failed to present any proof that the stairs owned by defendant were defective, the trial court’s finding for defendant was affirmed.

In James v. City of Dyersburg, No. W2018-00614-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2019), plaintiff filed a GTLA premises liability suit after falling on stairs outside of a city building. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that she fell due to the city’s negligence in “failing to provide a handrail on the steps, and in failing to correct a defect…being a separation between step and a metal strip[.]” At trial, plaintiff testified that she “stepped down from the top step with her right foot onto the second-step, but as she tried to step down with her left foot, the two-inch heel of her left shoe got caught on the metal strip on the stairs[.]” She also testified that she was unable to catch herself due to the absence of a handrail. Despite her allegation that the stairs were defective, plaintiff offered “no measurements…and no proof…of any code violations or applicable code requirements for the steps, stairway, or handrails,” nor did she present expert testimony.

March 20, 2019

2017 Tennessee Health Care Liability Statistics – Part 3

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

We have been reviewing data from the 2018 Tennessee Health Care Liability Claims Report, which reports data for claims closed in 2017 as well as other data.

Some additional statistics of note:

Health care facilities paid 46.44% (738) of all claims paid in 2017.

March 19, 2019

2017 Tennessee Health Care Liability Statistics – Part 2

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Yesterday’s post addressed the number of resolved health care liability (formerly medical malpractice) claims in Tennessee in 2017. Today we dive into the data a little deeper.

Here are the monies paid for claims closed in 2017:

Type of Injury Number Closed Closed W/ Payment Closed W/ No Pay. Average Amount Pd

March 18, 2019

2017 Tennessee Health Care Liability Statistics – Part 1

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance has released the 2018 Tennessee Health Care Liability Claims Report (“Report”). The 2018 Report was released in 2019 but contains data for 2017. The Report is required as a result of legislation passed by the Tennessee General Assembly in 2004.

Some 1589 claims against Tennessee health care providers were closed in 2017. Of those, 1242 (78.6%) were claims closed other than as the result of judgment, settlement or ADR.

Some 33 claims (2.08%) were closed as a result of judgment, 8 of which were defense verdicts in prior years but affirmed on appeal in 2017. A total of 253 cases (15.92%) were settled, and another 61 (3.84%) were resolved via ADR. (Do not ask me why these numbers are kept separately or whether they are accurate.)

March 14, 2019

Motion to Amend Must Be Considered Before Hearing Motion to Dismiss

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Before granting a motion to dismiss, a trial court should fully consider a pending motion to amend the complaint.

In Grose v. Kustoff, No. W2017-01984-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2019), plaintiffs filed a pro se legal malpractice claim against defendant attorney. Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs followed by filing a motion to amend their complaint, and they attached their proposed amended complaint to the motion. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the claim was time-barred, but never specifically addressed the motion to amend in its ruling. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment.

The Court began by noting that because defendant had not filed a responsive pleading, plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter of course without leave of the court pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. Because plaintiffs chose to file a motion to amend rather than simply filing their amended complaint, however, they could not rely on Rule 15.01 and did need leave of court to amend. In Tennessee, “even where leave of court is necessary to the filing of an amended pleading, the trial court must properly consider the motion pursuant to the liberal policy outlined by Rule 15.01.” (internal citation omitted).